Crypto Forum Research Group S. Fluhrer
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational Q. Dang
Expires: 21 March 2024 NIST
18 September 2023
Additional Parameter sets for HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signatures
draft-fluhrer-lms-more-parm-sets-11
Abstract
This note extends HSS/LMS (RFC 8554) by defining parameter sets by
including additional hash functions. These include hash functions
that result in signatures with significantly smaller size than the
signatures using the current parameter sets, and should have
sufficient security.
This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG)
in the IRTF.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 March 2024.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Additional Hash Function Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. 192 bit Hash Function based on SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. 256 bit Hash Function based on SHAKE256 . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. 192 bit Hash Function based on SHAKE256 . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Additional LM-OTS Parameter Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Additional LM Parameter Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Usage for these additional hash functions within HSS . . . . 7
7. Comparisons of 192 bit and 256 bit parameter sets . . . . . . 7
8. Parameter Set Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Note on the version of SHAKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
Stateful hash based signatures have small private and public keys,
are efficient to compute, and are believed to have excellent
security. One disadvantage is that the signatures they produce tend
to be somewhat large (possibly 1k - 4kbytes). What this draft
explores are a set of parameter sets to the HSS/LMS (RFC8554)
stateful hash based signature method that reduce the size of the
signature significantly or rely on a hash function other than SHA-256
(to increase cryptodiversity).
This document is intended to be compatible with the NIST document
[NIST_SP_800-208].
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Quick note about the distinction between HSS and LMS. LMS is a
stateful hash based signature scheme that a based on a single level
Merkle tree. HSS is a way of binding several LMS signatures together
in a hierarchical manner, to increase the number of signatures
available. Strictly speaking, all the signatures that this document
discusses are HSS signatures (even if the HSS signature consists of a
single LMS signature). However, it is common to refer to these
signatures are LMS signatures. This document uses the term HSS/LMS
to cover both the pedantic and the common meanings.
1.1. Disclaimer
This document is not intended as legal advice. Readers are advised
to consult with their own legal advisers if they would like a legal
interpretation of their rights.
The IETF policies and processes regarding intellectual property and
patents are outlined in [RFC3979] and [RFC4879] and at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/about.
2. Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Additional Hash Function Definitions
3.1. 192 bit Hash Function based on SHA-256
This document defines a SHA-2 based hash function with a 192 bit
output. As such, we define SHA-256/192 as a truncated version of
SHA-256 [FIPS180]. That is, it is the result of performing a SHA-256
operation to a message, and then omitting the final 64 bits of the
output. This is the procedure found in FIPS 180-4 (section 7) for
truncating the hash output to 192 bits.
The following test vector may illustrate this:
SHA-256("abc") = ba7816bf 8f01cfea 414140de 5dae2223
b00361a3 96177a9c b410ff61 f20015ad
SHA-256/192("abc") = ba7816bf 8f01cfea 414140de 5dae2223
b00361a3 96177a9c
We use the same IV as the untruncated SHA-256, rather than defining a
distinct one, so that we can use a standard SHA-256 hash
implementation without modification. In addition, the fact that you
get partial knowledge of the SHA-256 hash of a message by examining
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the SHA-256/192 hash of the same message is not a concern for this
application. Each message that is hashed is randomized. Any message
being signed includes the C randomizer (a value that is selected by
the signer and is included in the hash) which varies per message.
Therefore, signing the same message by SHA-256 and by SHA-256/192
will not result in the same value being hashed, and so the latter
hash value is not a prefix of the former one. In addition, all
hashes include the I identifier, which is included as a part of the
[RFC8554] signature process. This I identifier is selected randomly
for each private key (and hence two keys will have different I values
with high probability), and so two intermediate hashes computed as a
part of signing with two HSS private keys (one with a SHA-256
parameter set and one a SHA-256/192 parameter set) will also be
distinct with high probability.
3.2. 256 bit Hash Function based on SHAKE256
This document defines a SHAKE-based hash function with a 256 bit
output. As such, we define SHAKE256/256 as a hash where you submit
the preimage to the SHAKE256 XOF, with the output being 256 bits, see
FIPS 202 [FIPS202] for more detail.
3.3. 192 bit Hash Function based on SHAKE256
This document defines a SHAKE-based hash function with a 192 bit
output. As such, we define SHAKE256/192 as a hash where you submit
the preimage to the SHAKE256 XOF, with the output being 192 bits, see
FIPS 202 [FIPS202] for more detail.
4. Additional LM-OTS Parameter Sets
Here is a table with the LM-OTS parameters defined that use the above
hashes:
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+=====================+==============+====+===+=====+====+========+
| Parameter Set Name | H | n | w | p | ls | id |
+=====================+==============+====+===+=====+====+========+
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W1 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 1 | 200 | 8 | 0x0005 |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W2 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 2 | 101 | 6 | 0x0006 |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W4 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 4 | 51 | 4 | 0x0007 |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W8 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 8 | 26 | 0 | 0x0008 |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W1 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 1 | 265 | 7 | 0x0009 |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W2 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 2 | 133 | 6 | 0x000a |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W4 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 4 | 67 | 4 | 0x000b |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W8 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 8 | 34 | 0 | 0x000c |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W1 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 1 | 200 | 8 | 0x000d |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W2 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 2 | 101 | 6 | 0x000e |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W4 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 4 | 51 | 4 | 0x000f |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W8 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 8 | 26 | 0 | 0x0010 |
+---------------------+--------------+----+---+-----+----+--------+
Table 1
The id is the IANA-defined identifier used to denote this specific
parameter set, and which appears in both public keys and signatures.
The SHA256_N24, SHAKE_N32, SHAKE_N24 in the parameter set name denote
the SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256 and SHAKE256/192 hash functions defined
in Section 3.
Remember that the C message randomizer (which is included in the
signature) has the same size (n bytes) as the hash output, and so it
shrinks from 32 bytes to 24 bytes for the parameter sets that use
either SHA-256/192 or SHAKE256/192.
5. Additional LM Parameter Sets
Here is a table with the LM parameters defined that use SHA-256/192,
SHAKE256/256 and SHAKE256/192 hash functions:
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+====================+==============+====+====+========+
| Parameter Set Name | H | m | h | id |
+====================+==============+====+====+========+
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H5 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 5 | 0x000a |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H10 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 10 | 0x000b |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H15 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 15 | 0x000c |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H20 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 20 | 0x000d |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H25 | SHA-256/192 | 24 | 25 | 0x000e |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M32_H5 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 5 | 0x000f |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M32_H10 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 10 | 0x0010 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M32_H15 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 15 | 0x0011 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M32_H20 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 20 | 0x0012 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M32_H25 | SHAKE256/256 | 32 | 25 | 0x0013 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M24_H5 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 5 | 0x0014 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M24_H10 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 10 | 0x0015 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M24_H15 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 15 | 0x0016 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M24_H20 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 20 | 0x0017 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
| LMS_SHAKE_M24_H25 | SHAKE256/192 | 24 | 25 | 0x0018 |
+--------------------+--------------+----+----+--------+
Table 2
The id is the IANA-defined identifier used to denote this specific
parameter set, and which appears in both public keys and signatures.
The SHA256_M24, SHAKE_M32, SHAKE_M24 in the parameter set name denote
the SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256 and SHAKE256/192 hash functions defined
in Section 3.
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6. Usage for these additional hash functions within HSS
To use the additional hash functions within HSS, you would use the
appropriate LMOTS id from Table 1 and the appropriate LMS id from
Table 2, and use that additional hash function when computing the
hashes for key generation, signature generation and signature
verification.
Note that the size of the I Merkle tree identifier remains 16 bytes,
independent of what hash function is used.
7. Comparisons of 192 bit and 256 bit parameter sets
Switching to a 192 bit hash affects the signature size, the
computation time, and the security strength. It significantly
reduces the signature size and somewhat reduces the computation time,
at the cost of security strength. See Section 9 for a discussion of
the security strength.
The impact on signature size and computation time is based on two
effects:
1. Each hash that appears in the signature is shorter.
2. We need fewer Winternitz chains (because LM-OTS signs a shorter
value).
For signature length, both effects are relevent (because the
signature consists of a series of hashes and each hash is shorter,
and because we need fewer Winternitz chains, we need fewer hashes in
each LM-OTS signature.
For computation time (for both signature generation and
verification), effect 1 is irrelevant (we still need to perform
essentially the same hash computation), however effect 2 still
applies. For example, with W=8, SHA-256 requires 34 Winternitz
chains per LM-OTS signature, but SHA-256/192 requires only 26. Since
the vast majority of time (for both signature generation and
verification) is spent computing these Winternitz chains, this
reduction in the number of chains gives us some performance
improvement.
Here is a table that gives the space used by both the 256 bit
parameter sets and the 192 bit parameter sets, for a range of
plausible Winternitz parameters and tree heights:
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+=========+============+==============+==============+
| ParmSet | Winternitz | 256 bit hash | 192 bit hash |
+=========+============+==============+==============+
| 15 | 4 | 2672 | 1624 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 15 | 8 | 1616 | 1024 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 20 | 4 | 2832 | 1744 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 20 | 8 | 1776 | 1144 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 15/10 | 4 | 5236 | 3172 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 15/10 | 8 | 3124 | 1972 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 15/15 | 4 | 5396 | 3292 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 15/15 | 8 | 3284 | 2092 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 20/10 | 4 | 5396 | 3292 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 20/10 | 8 | 3284 | 2092 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 20/15 | 4 | 5556 | 3412 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
| 20/15 | 8 | 3444 | 2212 |
+---------+------------+--------------+--------------+
Table 3
ParmSet: this is the height of the Merkle tree(s), which is the
parameter "h" from Table 2. Parameter sets listed as a single
integer have L=1, and consist of a single Merkle tree of that height;
parameter sets with L=2 are listed as x/y, with x being the height of
the top level Merkle tree, and y being the bottom level.
Winternitz: this is the Winternitz parameter used, with is the
parameter "w" from Table 1. For the tests that use multiple trees,
this applies to all of them.
256 bit hash: the size in bytes of a signature, assuming that a 256
bit hash is used in the signature (either SHA-256 or SHAKE256/256).
192 bit hash: the size in bytes of a signature, assuming that a 192
bit hash is used in the signature (either SHA-256/192 or
SHAKE256/192).
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An examination of the signature sizes show that the 192 bit
parameters consistently give a 35% - 40% reduction in the size of the
signature in comparison with the 256 bit parameters.
For SHA-256/192, there is a smaller (circa 20%) reduction in the
amount of computation required for a signature operation with a 192
bit hash (for reason 2 listed above). The SHAKE256/192 signatures
may have either a faster or slower computation, depending on the
implementation speed of SHAKE versus SHA-256 hashes.
The SHAKE256/256 based parameter sets give no space advantage (or
disadvantage) over the existing SHA-256-based parameter sets; any
performance delta would depend solely on the implementation and
whether they can generate SHAKE hashes faster than SHA-256 ones.
8. Parameter Set Selection
This document, along with [RFC8554], defines four hash functions for
use within HSS/LMS; namely SHA-256, SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256 and
SHAKE256/192. The main reason one would select a hash with a 192 bit
output (either SHA-256/192 or SHAKE256/192) would be to reduce the
signature size; this does this at the cost of reducing the security
margin; however the security should be sufficient for most uses. In
contrast, there is no security or signature size difference between
the SHA-256 based parameter sets (SHA-256 or SHA-256/192) versus the
SHAKE based parameter sets (SHAKE256/256 or SHAKE256/192); the reason
for selecting between the two would be based on practical
considerations, for example, if your implementation happens to have
an existing SHA-256 (or SHAKE) implementation already present or if
one of the two happens to give better hashing performance on your
platform.
9. Security Considerations
The strength of a signature that uses the SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256
and SHAKE256/192 hash functions is based on the difficulty in finding
preimages or second preimages to those hash functions. As shown in
[Katz16], if we assume that the hash function can be modeled as a
random oracle, then the security of the system is at least 8N-1 bits
(where N is the size of the hash output in bytes); this gives us a
security level of 255 bits for SHAKE256/256 and 191 bits for SHA-
2/192 and SHAKE256/192).
If we look at this in a different way, we see that the case of
SHAKE256/256 is essentially the same as the existing SHA-256 based
signatures; the difficultly of finding preimages and second preimages
is essentially the same, and so they have (barring unexpected
cryptographical advances) essentially the same level of security.
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The case of SHA-256/192 and SHAKE256/192 requires closer analysis.
For a classical (nonquantum) computer, there is no known attack
better than performing hashes of a large number of distinct
preimages. Therefore, a successful attack has a high probability of
requiring nearly 2**192 hash computations (for either SHA-256/192 or
SHAKE256/192). These can be taken as the expected work effort, and
would appear to be completely infeasible in practice.
With a Quantum Computer, an attacker could in theory use Grover's
algorithm [Grover96] to reduce the expected complexity required to
circa 2**96 hash computations (for N=24). On the other hand,
implementing Grover's algorithm with this number of hash computations
would require performing circa 2**96 hash computations in succession,
which will take more time than is likely to be acceptable to any
attacker. To speed this up, the attacker would need to run a number
of instances of Grover's algorithm in parallel. This would
necessarily increase the total work effort required, and to an extent
that makes it likely to be infeasible.
Hence, we expect that HSS/LMS based on these hash functions is secure
against both classical and quantum computers, even though, in both
cases, the expected work effort is less (for the N=24 case) than
against either SHA-256 or SHAKE256/256.
There is one corner case for which the security strength is reduced:
if we need to assume that the signer will never generate a signature
which is valid for two different messages. HSS uses randomized
hashing when signing a message. That is, when a message is being
presented to be signed, the signer generates a random value C and
includes that in what is prepended to the message. Because the
attacker cannot predict this value, it is infeasible for anyone other
than the signer to find a generic collision. That is, practically
speaking, a signature that is valid for two colliding messages is
feasible only if the signer signed both messages. For this to
happen, a signer (that is, the one with the private key and who picks
the random C value) would have to break the collision resistance in
the hash function to generate those two colliding messages. Note
that this does not apply to someone who submits the messages for
signing, only the signer could perform this. This would result in a
signature that would be valid for two different selected messages.
This is a nonstandard assumption for signature schemes and is usually
not a concern, as we need to assume that the signer is trusted to
generate signatures for any message. However, if the application
needs to assume that it is infeasible for the signer to generate such
a signature, then the security strength assumptions the application
needs to make is reduced; 128 bits for SHAKE256/256 and 96 bits for
SHA-2/192 and SHAKE256/192.
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9.1. Note on the version of SHAKE
FIPS 202 [FIPS202] defines both SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. This
specification selects SHAKE256, even though it is, for large
messages, less efficient. The reason is that SHAKE128 has a low
upper bound on the difficulty of finding preimages (due to the
invertibility of its internal permutation), which would limit the
strength of HSS/LMS (whose strength is based on the difficulty of
finding preimages). Hence, we specify the use of SHAKE256, which has
a considerably stronger preimage resistance.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[FIPS180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS 180-4, March 2012.
[FIPS202] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions", FIPS 202, August 2015.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC3979] Bradner, S., Ed., "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF
Technology", RFC 3979, DOI 10.17487/RFC3979, March 2005,
.
[RFC4879] Narten, T., "Clarification of the Third Party Disclosure
Procedure in RFC 3979", RFC 4879, DOI 10.17487/RFC4879,
April 2007, .
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
.
[RFC8554] McGrew, D., Curcio, M., and S. Fluhrer, "Leighton-Micali
Hash-Based Signatures", RFC 8554, DOI 10.17487/RFC8554,
April 2019, .
10.2. Informative References
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[Grover96] Grover, L.K., "A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for
database search", 28th ACM Symposium on the Theory of
Computing p. 212, 1996.
[Katz16] Katz, J., "Analysis of a Proposed Hash-Based Signature
Standard", SSR 2016: Security Standardisation Research pp.
261-273, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_12, 2016,
.
[NIST_SP_800-208]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature
Schemes", NIST SP 800-208, October 2020.
Appendix A. Test Cases
This section provides three test cases that can be used to verify or
debug an implementation, one for each hash function. This data is
formatted with the name of the elements on the left, and the value of
the elements on the right, in hexadecimal. The concatenation of all
of the values within a public key or signature produces that public
key or signature, and values that do not fit within a single line are
listed across successive lines.
Test Case 1 Private Key for SHA-256/192
--------------------------------------------
(note: procedure in Appendix A of [RFC8554] is used)
SEED 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
1011121314151617
I 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 1 Public Key for SHA-256/192
--------------------------------------------
HSS public key
levels 00000001
--------------------------------------------
LMS type 0000000a # LMS_SHA256_M24_H5
LMOTS type 00000008 # LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W8
I 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
K 2c571450aed99cfb4f4ac285da148827
96618314508b12d2
--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
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Test Case 1 Message for SHA-256/192
--------------------------------------------
Message 54657374206d65737361676520666f72 |Test message for|
205348413235362d3139320a | SHA-256/192.|
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 1 Signature for SHA-256/192
--------------------------------------------
HSS signature
Nspk 00000000
sig[0]:
--------------------------------------------
LMS signature
q 00000005
--------------------------------------------
LMOTS signature
LMOTS type 00000008 # LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W8
C 0b5040a18c1b5cabcbc85b047402ec62
94a30dd8da8fc3da
y[0] e13b9f0875f09361dc77fcc4481ea463
c073716249719193
y[1] 614b835b4694c059f12d3aedd34f3db9
3f3580fb88743b8b
y[2] 3d0648c0537b7a50e433d7ea9d6672ff
fc5f42770feab4f9
y[3] 8eb3f3b23fd2061e4d0b38f832860ae7
6673ad1a1a52a900
y[4] 5dcf1bfb56fe16ff723627612f9a48f7
90f3c47a67f870b8
y[5] 1e919d99919c8db48168838cece0abfb
683da48b9209868b
y[6] e8ec10c63d8bf80d36498dfc205dc45d
0dd870572d6d8f1d
y[7] 90177cf5137b8bbf7bcb67a46f86f26c
fa5a44cbcaa4e18d
y[8] a099a98b0b3f96d5ac8ac375d8da2a7c
248004ba11d7ac77
y[9] 5b9218359cddab4cf8ccc6d54cb7e1b3
5a36ddc9265c0870
y[10] 63d2fc6742a7177876476a324b03295b
fed99f2eaf1f3897
y[11] 0583c1b2b616aad0f31cd7a4b1bb0a51
e477e94a01bbb4d6
y[12] f8866e2528a159df3d6ce244d2b6518d
1f0212285a3c2d4a
y[13] 927054a1e1620b5b02aab0c8c10ed48a
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
e518ea73cba81fcf
y[14] ff88bff461dac51e7ab4ca75f47a6259
d24820b9995792d1
y[15] 39f61ae2a8186ae4e3c9bfe0af2cc717
f424f41aa67f03fa
y[16] edb0665115f2067a46843a4cbbd297d5
e83bc1aafc18d1d0
y[17] 3b3d894e8595a6526073f02ab0f08b99
fd9eb208b59ff631
y[18] 7e5545e6f9ad5f9c183abd043d5acd6e
b2dd4da3f02dbc31
y[19] 67b468720a4b8b92ddfe7960998bb7a0
ecf2a26a37598299
y[20] 413f7b2aecd39a30cec527b4d9710c44
73639022451f50d0
y[21] 1c0457125da0fa4429c07dad859c846c
bbd93ab5b91b01bc
y[22] 770b089cfede6f651e86dd7c15989c8b
5321dea9ca608c71
y[23] fd862323072b827cee7a7e28e4e2b999
647233c3456944bb
y[24] 7aef9187c96b3f5b79fb98bc76c3574d
d06f0e95685e5b3a
y[25] ef3a54c4155fe3ad817749629c30adbe
897c4f4454c86c49
--------------------------------------------
LMS type 0000000a # LMS_SHA256_M24_H5
path[0] e9ca10eaa811b22ae07fb195e3590a33
4ea64209942fbae3
path[1] 38d19f152182c807d3c40b189d3fcbea
942f44682439b191
path[2] 332d33ae0b761a2a8f984b56b2ac2fd4
ab08223a69ed1f77
path[3] 19c7aa7e9eee96504b0e60c6bb5c942d
695f0493eb25f80a
path[4] 5871cffd131d0e04ffe5065bc7875e82
d34b40b69dd9f3c1
Test Case 2 Private Key for SHAKE256/192
--------------------------------------------
(note: procedure in Appendix A of [RFC8554] is used)
SEED 303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f
4041424344454647
I 505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f
--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
Test Case 2 Public Key for SHAKE256/192
---------------------------------------------
HSS public key
levels 00000001
--------------------------------------------
LMS type 00000014 # LMS_SHAKE256_N24_H5
LMOTS type 00000010 # LMOTS_SHAKE256_N24_W8
I 505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f
K db54a4509901051c01e26d9990e55034
7986da87924ff0b1
--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 2 Message for SHAKE256/192
--------------------------------------------
Message 54657374206d65737361676520666f72 |Test message for|
205348414b453235362d3139320a | SHAKE256/192.|
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 2 Signature for SHAKE256/192
--------------------------------------------
HSS signature
Nspk 00000000
sig[0]:
--------------------------------------------
LMS signature
q 00000006
--------------------------------------------
LMOTS signature
LMOTS type 00000010 # LMOTS_SHAKE256_N24_W8
C 84219da9ce9fffb16edb94527c6d1056
5587db28062deac4
y[0] 208e62fc4fbe9d85deb3c6bd2c01640a
ccb387d8a6093d68
y[1] 511234a6a1a50108091c034cb1777e02
b5df466149a66969
y[2] a498e4200c0a0c1bf5d100cdb97d2dd4
0efd3cada278acc5
y[3] a570071a043956112c6deebd1eb3a7b5
6f5f6791515a7b5f
y[4] fddb0ec2d9094bfbc889ea15c3c7b9be
a953efb75ed648f5
y[5] 35b9acab66a2e9631e426e4e99b733ca
a6c55963929b77fe
y[6] c54a7e703d8162e736875cb6a455d4a9
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
015c7a6d8fd5fe75
y[7] e402b47036dc3770f4a1dd0a559cb478
c7fb1726005321be
y[8] 9d1ac2de94d731ee4ca79cff454c811f
46d11980909f047b
y[9] 2005e84b6e15378446b1ca691efe491e
a98acc9d3c0f785c
y[10] aba5e2eb3c306811c240ba2280292382
7d582639304a1e97
y[11] 83ba5bc9d69d999a7db8f749770c3c04
a152856dc726d806
y[12] 7921465b61b3f847b13b2635a45379e5
adc6ff58a99b00e6
y[13] 0ac767f7f30175f9f7a140257e218be3
07954b1250c9b419
y[14] 02c4fa7c90d8a592945c66e86a76defc
b84500b55598a199
y[15] 0faaa10077c74c94895731585c8f900d
e1a1c675bd8b0c18
y[16] 0ebe2b5eb3ef8019ece3e1ea7223eb79
06a2042b6262b4aa
y[17] 25c4b8a05f205c8befeef11ceff12825
08d71bc2a8cfa0a9
y[18] 9f73f3e3a74bb4b3c0d8ca2abd0e1c2c
17dafe18b4ee2298
y[19] e87bcfb1305b3c069e6d385569a4067e
d547486dd1a50d6f
y[20] 4a58aab96e2fa883a9a39e1bd45541ee
e94efc32faa9a94b
y[21] e66dc8538b2dab05aee5efa6b3b2efb3
fd020fe789477a93
y[22] afff9a3e636dbba864a5bffa3e28d13d
49bb597d94865bde
y[23] 88c4627f206ab2b465084d6b780666e9
52f8710efd748bd0
y[24] f1ae8f1035087f5028f14affcc5fffe3
32121ae4f87ac5f1
y[25] eac9062608c7d87708f1723f38b23237
a4edf4b49a5cd3d7
--------------------------------------------
LMS type 00000014 # LMS_SHAKE256_N24_H5
path[0] dd4bdc8f928fb526f6fb7cdb944a7eba
a7fb05d995b5721a
path[1] 27096a5007d82f79d063acd434a04e97
f61552f7f81a9317
path[2] b4ec7c87a5ed10c881928fc6ebce6dfc
e9daae9cc9dba690
path[3] 7ca9a9dd5f9f573704d5e6cf22a43b04
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
e64c1ffc7e1c442e
path[4] cb495ba265f465c56291a902e62a461f
6dfda232457fad14
Test Case 3 Private Key for SHAKE256/256
--------------------------------------------
(note: procedure in Appendix A of [RFC8554] is used)
SEED 606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f
707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f
I 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f
--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 3 Public Key for SHAKE256/256
--------------------------------------------
HSS public key
levels 00000001
--------------------------------------------
LMS type 0000000f # LMS_SHAKE256_N32_H5
LMOTS type 0000000c # LMOTS_SHAKE256_N32_W8
I 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f
K 9bb7faee411cae806c16a466c3191a8b
65d0ac31932bbf0c2d07c7a4a36379fe
--------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 3 Message for SHAKE256/256
--------------------------------------------
Message 54657374206d657361676520666f7220 |Test mesage for |
5348414b453235362d3235360a |SHAKE256/256.|
--------------------------------------------
Test Case 3 Signature for SHAKE256/256
--------------------------------------------
HSS signature
Nspk 00000000
sig[0]:
--------------------------------------------
LMS signature
q 00000007
--------------------------------------------
LMOTS signature
LMOTS type 0000000c # LMOTS_SHAKE256_N32_W8
C b82709f0f00e83759190996233d1ee4f
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
4ec50534473c02ffa145e8ca2874e32b
y[0] 16b228118c62b96c9c77678b33183730
debaade8fe607f05c6697bc971519a34
y[1] 1d69c00129680b67e75b3bd7d8aa5c8b
71f02669d177a2a0eea896dcd1660f16
y[2] 864b302ff321f9c4b8354408d0676050
4f768ebd4e545a9b0ac058c575078e6c
y[3] 1403160fb45450d61a9c8c81f6bd69bd
fa26a16e12a265baf79e9e233eb71af6
y[4] 34ecc66dc88e10c6e0142942d4843f70
a0242727bc5a2aabf7b0ec12a99090d8
y[5] caeef21303f8ac58b9f200371dc9e41a
b956e1a3efed9d4bbb38975b46c28d5f
y[6] 5b3ed19d847bd0a737177263cbc1a226
2d40e80815ee149b6cce2714384c9b7f
y[7] ceb3bbcbd25228dda8306536376f8793
ecadd6020265dab9075f64c773ef97d0
y[8] 7352919995b74404cc69a6f3b469445c
9286a6b2c9f6dc839be76618f053de76
y[9] 3da3571ef70f805c9cc54b8e501a98b9
8c70785eeb61737eced78b0e380ded4f
y[10] 769a9d422786def59700eef3278017ba
bbe5f9063b468ae0dd61d94f9f99d5cc
y[11] 36fbec4178d2bda3ad31e1644a2bcce2
08d72d50a7637851aa908b94dc437612
y[12] 0d5beab0fb805e1945c41834dd6085e6
db1a3aa78fcb59f62bde68236a10618c
y[13] ff123abe64dae8dabb2e84ca705309c2
ab986d4f8326ba0642272cb3904eb96f
y[14] 6f5e3bb8813997881b6a33cac0714e4b
5e7a882ad87e141931f97d612b84e903
y[15] e773139ae377f5ba19ac86198d485fca
97742568f6ff758120a89bf19059b8a6
y[16] bfe2d86b12778164436ab2659ba86676
7fcc435584125fb7924201ee67b535da
y[17] f72c5cb31f5a0b1d926324c26e67d4c3
836e301aa09bae8fb3f91f1622b1818c
y[18] cf440f52ca9b5b9b99aba8a6754aae2b
967c4954fa85298ad9b1e74f27a46127
y[19] c36131c8991f0cc2ba57a15d35c91cf8
bc48e8e20d625af4e85d8f9402ec44af
y[20] bd4792b924b839332a64788a7701a300
94b9ec4b9f4b648f168bf457fbb3c959
y[21] 4fa87920b645e42aa2fecc9e21e000ca
7d3ff914e15c40a8bc533129a7fd3952
y[22] 9376430f355aaf96a0a13d13f2419141
b3cc25843e8c90d0e551a355dd90ad77
y[23] 0ea7255214ce11238605de2f000d2001
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
04d0c3a3e35ae64ea10a3eff37ac7e95
y[24] 49217cdf52f307172e2f6c7a2a4543e1
4314036525b1ad53eeaddf0e24b1f369
y[25] 14ed22483f2889f61e62b6fb78f5645b
dbb02c9e5bf97db7a0004e87c2a55399
y[26] b61958786c97bd52fa199c27f6bb4d68
c4907933562755bfec5d4fb52f06c289
y[27] d6e852cf6bc773ffd4c07ee2d6cc55f5
7edcfbc8e8692a49ad47a121fe3c1b16
y[28] cab1cc285faf6793ffad7a8c341a49c5
d2dce7069e464cb90a00b2903648b23c
y[29] 81a68e21d748a7e7b1df8a593f3894b2
477e8316947ca725d141135202a9442e
y[30] 1db33bbd390d2c04401c39b253b78ce2
97b0e14755e46ec08a146d279c67af70
y[31] de256890804d83d6ec5ca3286f1fca9c
72abf6ef868e7f6eb0fddda1b040ecec
y[32] 9bbc69e2fd8618e9db3bdb0af13dda06
c6617e95afa522d6a2552de15324d991
y[33] 19f55e9af11ae3d5614b564c642dbfec
6c644198ce80d2433ac8ee738f9d825e
--------------------------------------------
LMS type 0000000f # LMS_SHAKE256_N32_H5
path[0] 71d585a35c3a908379f4072d070311db
5d65b242b714bc5a756ba5e228abfa0d
path[1] 1329978a05d5e815cf4d74c1e547ec4a
a3ca956ae927df8b29fb9fab3917a7a4
path[2] ae61ba57e5342e9db12caf6f6dbc5253
de5268d4b0c4ce4ebe6852f012b162fc
path[3] 1c12b9ffc3bcb1d3ac8589777655e22c
d9b99ff1e4346fd0efeaa1da044692e7
path[4] ad6bfc337db69849e54411df8920c228
a2b7762c11e4b1c49efb74486d3931ea
Authors' Addresses
Scott Fluhrer
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA
United States of America
Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Additional HSS/LMS Signatures September 2023
Quynh Dang
NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD
United States of America
Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
Fluhrer & Dang Expires 21 March 2024 [Page 20]