Network Working Group Y. Guo
Internet-Draft L. Xia
Intended status: Informational Huawei
Expires: 03 March 2025 Y. Fu
China Unicom
02 September 2024
Using ShangMi in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
draft-guo-ipsecme-ikev2-using-shangmi-01
Abstract
This document defines a set of cryptographic transforms for use in
the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). The transforms
are based on ISO and Chinese cryptographic standard algorithms
(called "ShangMi" or “SM” algorithms).
The use of these algorithms with IKEv2 is not endorsed by the IETF.
The SM algorithms is ISO standardization and are mandatory for some
scenario in China, so this document provides a description of how to
use the SM algorithms with IKEv2 and specifies a set of cryptographic
transforms so that implementers can produce interworking
implementations.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-guo-ipsecme-ikev2-using-
shangmi/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the ipsec Working Group
mailing list (mailto:ipsec@ietf.org), which is archived at
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. The SM Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Transforms Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Encryption Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. ENCR_SM4_CBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. ENCR_SM4_GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. ENCR_SM4_CCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Pseudorandom Function Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Integrity Algorithm Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Key Exchange Method Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Hash Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Appendix A. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1. SM4_CBC Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.2. SM4_GCM Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.3. SM4_CCM Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.4. SM3 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.5. AUTH_HMAC_SM3 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
This document describes a number of new transforms and a new
authentication method using SM2 signature and SM3 hash function for
IKEv2 ([RFC7296]), based on ISO and Chinese cryptographic standard
algorithms ("SM" algorithms) for encryption, hash function, digital
signature, and key exchange method. With the definition in this
document, the SM algorithms can be used to implement IPSec protocols.
For a more detailed introduction to SM cryptographic algorithms,
please see Section 1.1. These transforms follow the IKEv2
requirements. Specifically, all the encryption transforms use SM4 in
different encryption mode (e.g. CBC mode, Galois/Counter (GCM) mode
or Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode) . The key exchange mechanism
utilizes Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) over the SM2
elliptic curve, and the signature algorithm combines the SM3 hash
function and the SM2 elliptic curve signature scheme.
1.1. The SM Algorithms
Several different SM cryptographic algorithms are used to integrate
with IKEv2, including SM2 for key exchange and authentication, SM4
for encryption, and SM3 as the hash function.
SM2 is a set of cryptographic algorithms based on elliptic curve
cryptography, including a digital signature, public key encryption
and key exchange scheme. In this document, only the SM2 digital
signature algorithm and basic key exchange scheme are involved, which
have already been added to ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 [ISO-SM2] (as well as
to [GBT.32918.2-2016]). The parameter definition of SM2 is described
in [GBT.32918.5-2017]. SM4 is a block cipher defined in
[GBT.32907-2016] and now is being standardized by ISO to ISO/IEC
18033-3:2010 [ISO-SM4]. SM3 is a hash function that produces an
output of 256 bits. SM3 has already been accepted by ISO in ISO/IEC
10118-3:2018 [ISO-SM3] and has also been described by
[GBT.32905-2016].
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Transforms Description
3.1. Encryption Transforms
The new encryption transforms introduced in this document add three
encryption algorithms: ENCR_SM4_CBC, ENCR_SM4_GCM and ENCR_SM4_CCM.
ENCR_SM4_CBC is encryption transform based on SM4 for SM4[ISO-SM4]
and [GBT.32907-2016]encryption algorithm using CBC mode.
ENCR_SM4_GCM (Transform ID XX) and ENCR_SM4_CCM (Transform ID XX) are
AEAD transforms based on SM4 cipher in Galois/Counter mode and SM4
cipher in Counter with CBC-MAC mode, respectively. The hash function
for both cipher suites is SM3 ([ISO-SM3]).
3.1.1. ENCR_SM4_CBC
The specification of ENCR_SM4_CBC is as follows: The CBC (Cipher
Block Chaining) mode is defined in [NIST.SP.800-38A] and utilized
with the SM4 algorithm in the following sections. The input
plaintext of SM4-CBC MUST be a multiple of the block size, which is
128-bits in SM4. SM4-CBC requires an additional input, the IV, that
is unpredictable for a particular execution of the encryption
process. The IV does not have to be secret. The IV itself, or
criteria enough to determine it, MAY be transmitted with ciphertext.
A simple test vector of ENCR _SM4_CBC is given in Appendix A of this
document.
3.1.2. ENCR_SM4_GCM
The ENCR_SM4_GCM authenticated encryption algorithm is defined in
[GCM], using SM4 as the block cipher, by providing the key, nonce,
plaintext, and additional associated data to that mode of operation.
An authentication tag conforming to the requirements of IKEv2 as
specified in [RFC5282] MUST be constructed using the partial contents
of the IKEv2 message, starting from the first octet of the Fixed IKE
Header through the last octet of the Payload Header of the Encrypted
Payload (i.e., the fourth octet of the Encrypted Payload). This
includes any payloads that are between the Fixed IKE Header and the
Encrypted Payload. The additional data input that forms the
authentication tag MUST be the partial contents of the IKEv2 message,
starting from the first octet of the Fixed IKE Header through the
last octet of the Payload Header of the Encrypted Payload (i.e., the
fourth octet of the Encrypted Payload). This includes any payloads
that are between the Fixed IKE Header and the Encrypted Payload. The
ENCR_SM4_GCM has four inputs: an SM4 key, an initialization vector
(IV), a plaintext content, and optional additional authenticated data
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(AAD). ENCR_SM4_GCM generates two outputs: a ciphertext and message
authentication code.
The input and output lengths are as follows:
The SM4 key length is 16 octets.
The max plaintext length is $2^{36} - 31$ octets.
The max AAD length is $2^{61} - 1$ octets.
The nonce length is 12 octets.
The authentication tag length is 16 octets.
The max ciphertext length is $2^{36} - 15$ octets.
The nonce is generated by the party performing the authenticated
encryption operation. Within the scope of any authenticated
encryption key, the nonce value MUST be unique. That is, the set of
nonce values used with any given key MUST NOT contain any duplicates.
Using the same nonce for two different messages encrypted with the
same key destroys the security properties of GCM mode.
3.1.3. ENCR_SM4_CCM
The ENCR_SM4_CCM authenticated encryption algorithm is defined in
[CCM] using SM4 as the block cipher. The generation of the
authentication tag MUST conform to IKEv2 (See [RFC5282]) as described
in the above paragraph. ENCR_SM4_CCM has four inputs: an SM4 key, a
nonce, a plaintext, and optional additional authenticated data (AAD).
ENCR_SM4_CCM generates two outputs: a ciphertext and a message
authentication code.
The input and output lengths are as follows:
The SM4 key length is 16 octets.
The max plaintext length is $2^{24} - 1$ octets.
The max AAD length is $2^{64} - 1$ octets.
The max ciphertext length is $2^{24} + 15$ octets
To have a common set of terms for ENCR _SM4_GCM and ENCR _SM4_CCM,
the ENCR _SM4_GCM IV is referred to as a nonce in the remainder of
this document.
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A simple test vector of ENCR _SM4_GCM and ENCR _SM4_CCM is given in
Appendix A of this document.
3.2. Pseudorandom Function Transform
This specification defines a new transform of Type 2 (Pseudorandom
Function Transform IDs):
PRF_HMAC_SM3 (Transform ID XX). The PRF uses the SM3 hash function
with a 256-bit output defined in [ISO-SM3] and [GBT.32905-2016] and
with HMAC construction. The PRF has a 256-bit block size and a
256-bit output length.
PRF_ HMAC_SM3 is hash-based message authentication code (or HMAC),
which is defined in [RFC2104], using SM3 as the hash function. The
PRF_ HMAC_SM3 has two inputs: HMAC key and the plaintext. The output
of PRF_ HMAC_SM3 is 256 bits.
3.3. Integrity Algorithm Transform
This specification defines a new transform of Type 3 (Integrity
Algorithm Transform IDs):
AUTH_HMAC_SM3 (Transform ID XX). The MAC uses the SM3 hash function
with a 256-bit output defined in [ISO-SM3] and [GBT.32905-2016] and
with HMAC construction. AUTH_HMAC_SM3 is specified as described in
2.2.
While no fixed key length is specified in [RFC2104], this
specification requires that when used as an integrity/authentication
algorithm, a fixed key length equal to the output length of the hash
functions MUST be supported, and key lengths other than the output
length of the associated hash function MUST NOT be supported. These
key length restrictions are the same with HMAC-SHA-256 (see [RFC4868]
Sec2.1.1).
3.4. Key Exchange Method Transform
This specification defines one new transforms of Type 4 (Key Exchange
Method Transform IDs): curveSM2. This transform uses a fixed
elliptic curve parameter set defined in [GBT.32918.5-2017]. The
specification of curveSM2 is defined in clause 3.2 of RFC 8998
[RFC8998] as ”curveSM2”, which is used to define new cipher suites
for TLS 1.3 protocol.
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Implementations of the key exchange mechanism defined in this
document MUST conform to what [GBT.32918.5-2017] requires; that is to
say, the only valid elliptic curve parameter set for the ”curveSM2”
key exchange is defined as follows:
curveSM2: A prime field of 256 bits.
$y^2 = x^3+ ax + b$
p = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF
a = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFC
b = 28E9FA9E 9D9F5E34 4D5A9E4B CF6509A7 F39789F5 15AB8F92 DDBCBD41
4D940E93
n = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 7203DF6B 21C6052B 53BBF409
39D54123
Gx = 32C4AE2C 1F198119 5F990446 6A39C994 8FE30BBF F2660BE1 715A4589
334C74C7
Gy = BC3736A2 F4F6779C 59BDCEE3 6B692153 D0A9877C C62A4740 02DF32E5
2139F0A0
4. Authentication Method
This section specifies the use of the SM2 signature algorithm as the
authentication method for IKEv2 protocol.
The SM2 signature algorithm is defined in [ISO-SM2]. The SM2
signature algorithm is based on elliptic curves. The SM2 signature
algorithm uses a fixed elliptic curve parameter set defined in
[GBT.32918.5-2017]. This curve is named "curveSM2" as defined in
section 2.4.
Implementations of the signature scheme mechanism defined in this
document MUST conform to what [GBT.32918.5-2017] requires.
5. Hash Algorithms
The SM2 digital signature algorithm uses the SM3 hash functions
defined in [ISO-SM3] and [GBT.32905-2016]. This specification
defines one new value for the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry: SM3
(value XX) for the SM3 hash function with a 256-bit output length.
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The specification of SM3 is defined as follows:
The SM3 algorithm is intended to address multiple use cases for
commercial cryptography, including, but not limited to: - the use of
digital signatures and their verification; - the generation and
verification of message authenticity codes; as well as - the
generation of random numbers.
SM3 has a Merkle-Damgard construction and is similar to SHA-2
[NIST.FIPS.180-4]of the MD4 [RFC6150] family, with the addition of
several strengthening features including a more complex step function
and stronger message dependency than SHA-256 [RFC6234]. SM3 produces
an output hash value of 256 bits long, based on 512-bit input message
blocks, on input lengths up to 2^(m) [GBT.32905-2016]. This details
the SM3 algorithm and its internal steps can be find in
[GBT.32905-2016].
6. IANA Considerations
IANA maintains a registry called "Internet Key Exchange Version 2
(IKEv2) Parameters" with subregistries like "Transform Type Values",
“IKEv2 Authentication Method” and “IKEv2 Hash Algorithms”.
This document describes 3 new encryption transforms, 1 pseudorandom
function transform, 1 integrity algorithm transform, 1 key exchange
method transform and a new authentication method using SM2 signature
and SM3 hash function for IKEv2 ([RFC7296]).
IANA is requested to assign 3 new Transform IDs to the "Transform
Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" subregistry,
+========+==============+===============+=================+
| Number | Name | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |
+========+==============+===============+=================+
| TBD | ENCR_SM4_CBC | TBD | TBD |
+--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+
| TBD | ENCR_SM4_GCM | TBD | TBD |
+--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+
| TBD | ENCR_SM4_CCM | TBD | TBD |
+--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+
Table 1
_Encryption AlgorithmTransform IDs for SM4_
1 Transform ID to the “Transform Type 2 - Pseudorandom Function
Transform IDs” subregistry,
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+========+==============+===============+=================+
| Number | Name | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |
+========+==============+===============+=================+
| TBD | PRF_HMAC_SM3 | TBD | TBD |
+--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+
Table 2
1 Transform ID to the “Transform Type 3 - Integrity Algorithm
Transform IDs” subregistry,
+========+===============+===============+=================+
| Number | Name | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |
+========+===============+===============+=================+
| TBD | AUTH_HMAC_SM3 | TBD | TBD |
+--------+---------------+---------------+-----------------+
Table 3
1 Transform ID to the “Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method
Transform IDs” subregistry,
+========+==========+===============+=================+
| Number | Name | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |
+========+==========+===============+=================+
| TBD | curveSM2 | TBD | TBD |
+--------+----------+---------------+-----------------+
Table 4
1 new Authentication Method to the “IKEv2 Authentication Method”
subregistry,
+=======+=======================+===========+
| Value | Authentication Method | Reference |
+=======+=======================+===========+
| TBD | curveSM2 | TBD |
+-------+-----------------------+-----------+
Table 5
and 1 new Hash function to the “IKEv2 Hash Algorithms” subregistry.
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+=======+================+===========+
| Value | Hash Algorithm | Reference |
+=======+================+===========+
| TBD | SM3 | TBD |
+-------+----------------+-----------+
Table 6
7. Security Considerations
At the time of writing, there are no known weak keys for SM
cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3 and SM4, and no security issues
have been found for these algorithms.
A related work [CQCY21] analyzed the security of SM2 algorithm , and
the cryptanalysis results shows that SM2 is existentially unforgeable
against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the generic group model
if the underlying hash function is uniform and collision-resistant
and the underlying conversion function is almost-invertible.
Besides, SM2 is secure against the generalized key substitution
attacks if the underlying hash functions H and h are modeled as non-
programmable random oracles (NPROs) [ZYZC15].
As a result of the increasing prevalence and exploitation of side-
channel attacks ([JYW20], [WDW18], [LZHZ18]), the SM4 algorithm is
now confronted with significant threats when utilized in smart cards
and other cryptographic devices. However, these attacks can be
mitigated through the implementation of side-channel protection. On
the other hand, the classic cryptanalysis techniques are not
applicable to the entire cipher and are impractical, do not
compromise the overall security of SM4.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[CCM] NIST Special Publication 800-38C, "Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality", DOI 10.6028/
NIST.SP.800-38C , May 2004,
.
[GCM] NIST Special Publication 800-38D, "Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
and GMAC", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D , November 2007,
.
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[ISO-SM2] International Organization for Standardization, "IT
Security techniques -- Digital signatures with appendix --
Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms", ISO/IEC
14888-3:2018 , November 2018,
.
[ISO-SM3] International Organization for Standardization, "IT
Security techniques -- Hash-functions -- Part 3: Dedicated
hash-functions", ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 , October 2018,
<>.
[ISO-SM4] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology -- Security techniques --
Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers", ISO/IEC
18033-3:2010 , December 2010,
<>.
[NIST.FIPS.180-4]
NIST FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION,
"Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST.FIPS.180-4 , August
2015, .
[NIST.SP.800-38A]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A, "NIST Special
Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation --Methods and Techniques", INIST.SP.800-38A ,
December 2001,
<>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
.
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[RFC5282] Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5282, August 2008,
.
[RFC6150] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD4 to Historic Status",
RFC 6150, DOI 10.17487/RFC6150, March 2011,
.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, .
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[RFC8998] Yang, P., "ShangMi (SM) Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3",
RFC 8998, DOI 10.17487/RFC8998, March 2021,
.
8.2. Informative References
[CQCY21] Cui, X Qin, C Cai, T Yuen, H., "Security on SM2 and GOST
signatures against related key attacks", 2021 IEEE 20th
International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in
Computing and Communications (TrustCom) (pp. 155-163) ,
October 2021.
[GBT.32905-2016]
Standardization Administration of China, "Information
security technology --- SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm",
GB/T 32905-2016 , March 2017, <>.
[GBT.32907-2016]
Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of
China, "Information security technology -- SM4 block
cipher algorithm", GB/T 32907-2016 , March 2017,
<>.
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[GBT.32918.2-2016]
Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of
China, "Information security technology --- Public key
cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves ---
Part 2: Digital signature algorithm", GB/T 32918.2-2016 ,
March 2017, .
[GBT.32918.5-2017]
Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of
China, "Information security technology --- Public key
cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves ---
Part 5: Parameter definition", GB/T 32918.5-2017 ,
December 2017, <>.
[JYW20] JIN, H YANG, X WANG, Q YUAN, Y., "Improved differential
fault attack for SM4 cipher", Journal of Cryptologic
Research, 2020, 7(4) 453–464, July 2020,
<[{"DOI"=>"10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000380"}]>.
[LZHZ18] LOU, F ZHANG, J HUANG, X ZHAO, H LIU, X., "Research on
trace driven Cache analysis on SM4", Journal of
Cryptologic Research, 2018, 5(4) 430–441, 2018.
[WDW18] WU, Z DU, M WANG, Y WANG, K WANG, T YU, Z., "Chosen-
plaintext algorithm for chosen-plaintext power analysis
against SM4", Journal of Cryptologic Research, 2018,
5(4) 421–429, 2018.
[ZYZC15] Zhang, K Yang, J Zhang, C Chen, Z., "Security of the SM2
signature scheme against generalized key substitution
attacks", International Conference on Research in Security
Standardisation (pp. 140-153) , December 2015.
Appendix A. Appendix A. Test Vectors
All values are in hexadecimal and are in network byte order (big
endian).
A.1. SM4_CBC Test Vectors
key：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210
iv：FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
in：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210
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out：F0A2B07E64DD2C2590F93E4EDD90FBB4
A.2. SM4_GCM Test Vectors
Initialization Vector：00001234567800000000ABCD
Key：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210
Plaintext：AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Associated Data：FEEDFACEDEADBEEFFEEDFACEDEADBEEFABADDAD2
CipherText：17F399F08C67D5EE19D0DC9969C4BB7D
5FD46FD3756489069157B282BB200735 D82710CA5C22F0CCFA7CBF93D496AC15
A56834CBCF98C397B4024A2691233B8D
Authentication Tag：83DE3541E4C2B58177E065A9BF7B62EC
A.3. SM4_CCM Test Vectors
Initialization Vector：00001234567800000000ABCD
Key：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210
Plaintext：AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Associated Data：FEEDFACEDEADBEEFFEEDFACEDEADBEEFABADDAD2
CipherText：48AF93501FA62ADBCD414CCE6034D895
DDA1BF8F132F042098661572E7483094 FD12E518CE062C98ACEE28D95DF4416B
ED31A2F04476C18BB40C84A74B97DC5B
Authentication Tag：16842D4FA186F56AB33256971FA110F4
A.4. SM3 Test Vectors
in: 616263
out: 66c7f0f462eeedd9d1f2d46bdc10e4e24167c4875cf2f7a2297da02b8f4ba8e0
A.5. AUTH_HMAC_SM3 Test Vectors
Key: 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
in: abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq
Guo, et al. Expires 03 March 2025 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Using ShangMi in IKEv2 September 2024
out: DC813339153491AD81477754EB3DF00DBB3CC3E6A69F9CACCE737DB7E61342FF
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
TBD
Authors' Addresses
Yanfei Guo
Huawei Technologies
China
Email: guoyanfei3@huawei.com
Liang Xia
Huawei Technologies
China
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Yu Fu
China Unicom
China
Email: fuy186@chinaunicom.cn
Guo, et al. Expires 03 March 2025 [Page 15]