This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure.
An Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object that provides a means of validating that a Customer Autonomous System holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream providers or provide route server service at internet exchange point.
For the Providers it means that they are legal to send prefixes received from the Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and peers.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and
only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
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The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security.
(See [RFC6480] for more information.)
As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to validate that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to send routes in all directions.
The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this validation mechanism.¶
The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed
objects [RFC6488], which defines a
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well
as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed
objects. As ASPAs need to be validated with RPKI
certificates issued by the current infrastructure, we
assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in [RFC6485], or its successor.¶
To complete the specification of the ASPA (see
Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document
The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed object.
This OID appears in the eContentType field of the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure).¶
The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload signed by the CAS.
The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 [X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].¶
The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).¶
The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.1135188.8.131.52.1.49.
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see [RFC6488]).¶
The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further propagate announcements received from the customer.¶
Not all route servers at internet exchange points are transparent, e.g. in some cases they are present in the ASPATH.
In this case route server AS is acting as a provider AS, which propagates routes between its customers.
Thus, a customer MUST add both upstream providers and non-transparent route sever AS it is connected to its SPAS.¶
If customer is connected to multiple transit providers/non-transparent route servers they MUST be registered in a single ASPA object.
This rule is important to avoid possible race conditions during updates.¶
The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation, formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X680] module:¶
The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous System (AS) that authorizes a collection of provider ASes (as listed in the providerASSet) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family to other ASes.¶
The afiLimit field optionally constrains the authorization given to the provider AS to a single address family.¶
If present, it contains the two-octet Address Family Identifier (AFI) for which the relation between the customer and provider is authorized.
Only permitted AFI values are the IPv4 and IPv6 AFI values as specified in [IANA-AF].¶
If omitted, the authorization is valid for both IPv4 and IPv6 announcements.¶
Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object itself.
To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ASPA-specific validation step.¶
The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ASPA), and the Customer ASID in the ASPA eContent MUST be contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension.¶
The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.¶
Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 to the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.1135184.108.40.206.0)
registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:¶
While it's not restricted, but it's highly recommended maintaining for selected Customer AS a single ASPA object that covers all connected providers/route servers.
Such policy should prevent race conditions during ASPA updates that might affect prefix propagation.
The software that provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this rule.
In the case of the transition process between different CA registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries.¶
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs.
Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.
Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.¶
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".¶
A validator implementation [rpki-client] written in C based on the OpenBSD RPKI Validator was provided by Job Snijders from Fastly.¶
A signer and decoder implementation [rpkimancer] written in Python was provided by Ben Maddison from Workonline.¶
A signer implementation [krill] written in Rust was provided by Tim Bruijnzeels from NLnetLabs.¶
At IETF114 Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC shared a signer implementation had been developed internally.¶
Di Ma reported success [rpstir2] in RPSTIR2 validating objects produced by Tim Bruijnzeels.¶