I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments. For more information, please see the FAQ at . Document: draft-ietf-bfcpbis-bfcp-websocket13- Reviewer: Robert Sparks Review Date: 2017-01-04 IETF LC End Date: 2017-01-11 IESG Telechat date: 2017-01-19 Summary: Basically ready but with issues that need to be addressed before publication as a Proposed Standard Issues: The BFCP spec (at draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4582bis) relies heavily on recommendations it makes about the use of TLS or DTLS, and even goes to the point of specifyig a particular set of cipher suites to use wih those protocols when using them with BFCP. The security considerations section of that document details some specific attacks and how the use of TLS/DTLS mitigates them (providing some justification for the cipher suites that the document specifies). This document provides a _COMPLETELY DIFFERENT_ security mechanism (essentially punting entirely to whatever a websocket library provides with the expectation that that will also be rooted in TLS) when it substitutes websockets as the layer under BFCP. The security considerations section needs to make this much more obvious - implementers and deployers need to be see this as a strong-primary point to avoid anyone thinking all the thinking that went into securing BFCP as captured in draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4582bis still applies. There should be more discussion about what a BFCP implementation that cares about the attacks discussed in section 14 of draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4582bis requires of its library. The current document gets most of the way there, but there are things missing. Shouldn't there be some discussion of ensuring the websocket library used supports and will use the cipher suites called out in the core BFCP document? If not, this document needs to be very explicit that you are only going to get the confidentiality protection the library provides. The current consideration section calls out relying on "a typical webserver-client model" and talks about server authentication, but not client authentication. Section 8 shows most of what you're expecting the server to do to authenticate the client, but you need more text about what you expect the client libraries to be doing to let the server do its job (and you should point back to that from the security considerations section). I strongly recommend simply walking through the cases again in the security considerations section of this document, explaining how the websocket library and the bfcp implementation are going to interact to mitigate the attacks. Nits/editorial comments: The 3rd paragraph of section 3 speaks generally about how the websocket protocol works - you call out it can carry text or binary data and that it supports split frames. But then you go on to constrain the use of the protocol in this document to a particular bit of binary data and constrain using the protocol to not split frames (and to only put one BFCP message in each frame). This is confusing. I suggest deleting the second sentence of that paragraph and the indented call-out below it. If the observation about the API callbacks is important, work it in where you talk about the one-messsage-per-frame restriction. The last sentence of the second paragraph of section 5 relies on an inference that you should make explicit. Instead of "is a server on the Internet", say "will have a globally routable address". The last paragraph of 6.1 is not logically sound - it falls apart at "So". Please restructure it. As it stands, it says something like: 'Some soda manufacturers don't provide sugar-free variants of their soda. Therefore, we recommend always drinking sugar-laden soda, but we allow drinking sugar-free.' What were you actually trying to say?