I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the  IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

This is a short, well-written document which describes a mechanism to avoid Route Refresh due to new RPKI data being available at BGP speakers. The idea is that the BGP speakers preserve the partial routing data (Adj-RIB-In) in case Route Origin Validation fails, in order to be able to check it back once the RPKI data is available. The mechanism improves the previous situation where some implementations would trigger the Route Refresh upon receiving new RPKI data.

The Security Considerations section refers to the document references for considerations. While I am not an expert on BGP, I do not perceive new security issues with this proposal.