

X.1500

Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 **Cybersecurity information exchange techniques**

Summary

This Recommendation describes techniques for exchanging cybersecurity information. These techniques can be used individually or in combinations, as desired or appropriate, to enhance cybersecurity through coherent, comprehensive, global, timely and assured information exchange. No obligations to exchange information are implied, nor are the means of acquisition or ultimate use of the information treated.

Introduction

This Recommendation is intended to be adaptable, extensible, and non-prescriptive to allow a wide range of techniques – some of which are continuously evolving and in varying stages of completion – to be applied in different instantiations to enhance cybersecurity information exchange of telecommunication/ICT infrastructure, devices, and services. It will be revised periodically as those techniques evolve – those that are appropriate will be published as ITU-T Recommendations in the X.1500 series.

The expectation for the techniques embodied in this Recommendation is that telecommunication/ICT organizations, including Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTs), both within and between jurisdictions, will:

- a) have information to enable decision making and action to substantially enhance the confidentiality, integrity and availability of global telecommunication/ICT facilities and services;
- b) have information to facilitate secure collaborative processes and controls which improve the level of assurance in the information exchanges between organizations ;
- c) enable a coherent approach to manage and exchange cybersecurity information on a global basis;
- d) improve security awareness and collaboration to diminish cyber threats, attacks and malware.

The techniques include:

- structuring cybersecurity information for exchange purposes
- identifying and discovering cybersecurity information and entities
- establishment of trust and policy agreement between exchanging entities
- requesting and responding with cybersecurity information
- assuring the integrity of the cybersecurity information exchange

and are organized into “clusters”:

- Weakness, vulnerability and state
- Event, incident, and heuristics
- Information exchange policy
- Identification, discovery, and query
- Identity assurance
- Exchange protocols

X.1500

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Table of Contents

1	Scope	3
2.	References	3
3	Definitions	4
	3.1 Terms defined elsewhere.....	4
	3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation.....	4
4	Abbreviations and acronyms	4
5	Conventions	5
6	Basic concept - cybersecurity information exchange (CYBEX) techniques	5
	6.1 Description of CYBEX	5
7	Structured cybersecurity information exchange techniques	7
	7.1 Weakness, vulnerability and state - exchange cluster	7
	7.2 Event, incident, and heuristics - exchange cluster.....	10
	7.3 Information exchange policy - exchange cluster.....	12
	7.4 Identification, discovery, and query cluster	13
	7.5 Identity assurance cluster	14
	7.6 Exchange protocol cluster	16
	Appendix I – A cybersecurity information exchange ontology	16
	I.1 Operation domains	19
	I.2 Cybersecurity entities	19
	I.3 Cybersecurity operational information.....	19
	Appendix II – CYBEX Examples of security automation schemas.....	22
	II.1 Example: USA Federal Desktop Core Configuration/United States Government Configuration Baseline.....	23
	II.2 Example: Japan Vulnerability Information Portal Site, JVN	23
	Bibliography	26

History

RECOMMENDATION ITU-T X.1500

Cybersecurity information exchange techniques

1 Scope

This Recommendation presents a CYBEX model and discusses techniques that can be used to facilitate the exchange of cybersecurity information. These techniques can be used individually or in combinations, as desired or appropriate, to enhance cybersecurity through coherent, comprehensive, global, timely and assured information exchange. No obligations to exchange information are implied, nor are the means of acquisition or ultimate use of the information treated. The techniques include the structured global discovery and interoperability of cybersecurity information in such a way as to allow for continual evolution to accommodate the significant activities and specification evolution occurring in numerous cybersecurity forums.

The scope of this Recommendation has the following basic functions that can be used separately or together as appropriate, and extended as needed in order to better enable assured cybersecurity information exchange:

- structuring cybersecurity information for exchange purposes
- identifying and discovering cybersecurity information and entities
- establishment of trust and policy agreement between exchanging entities
- requesting and responding with cybersecurity information
- assuring the integrity of the cybersecurity information exchange

For the purposes of accomplishing these exchanges, cybersecurity information includes structured information or knowledge concerning:

- The “state” of equipment, software, or network based systems as related to cybersecurity, especially vulnerabilities
- Forensics related to incidents or events
- Heuristics and signatures gained from experienced events
- Cybersecurity entities involved
- Specifications for the exchange of cybersecurity information, including modules, schemas, terms & conditions, and assigned numbers
- The identities and assurance attributes of all cybersecurity information
- Implementation requirements, guidelines and practices

Subject to agreed policies and applicable laws and regulations, the means of acquiring information as well as the uses made of the information are specifically out of scope and not treated in this Recommendation. Some specific national and regional regulation and legislation may require implementation of mechanisms to protect personally identifiable information. Neither the included techniques nor the exchange of related cybersecurity information are mandated by this Recommendation.

2 References

The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the

most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.

- [ITU-T E.409] ITU-T Recommendation E.409 (2008-04), *Incident organization and security incident handling: Guidelines for telecommunication organizations* .
- [ITU-T X.1205] ITU-T Recommendation X.1205 (2004-05), *Overview of cybersecurity*

3 Definitions

3.1 Terms defined elsewhere

This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:

3.1.1 cybersecurity [ITU-T X.1205]: The collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user's assets. Organization and user's assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user's assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. The general security objectives comprise availability, integrity (which may include authentication and non-repudiation, and confidentiality).

Note – Some specific national regulation and legislation may require implementation of mechanisms to protect personally identifiable information.

3.1.2 security incident [ITU-T E.409]: Any adverse event whereby some aspect of security could be threatened.

3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation

This Recommendation defines the following terms:

3.2.1 assurance: The degree of confidence that the process or deliverable meets its security objectives.

3.2.2 exchange protocol: A set of technical rules and associated behavior governing the exchange of information between two or more computer systems via a network.

3.2.3 information exchange policy: The terms and conditions associated with the use and sharing of cybersecurity information

3.2.4 system state: the current status of a system or entity, including such information as its configuration, memory usage, or other data relevant to cybersecurity.

4 Abbreviations and acronyms

This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:

ARF	Asset Reporting Format
BEEP	Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol
CA	Certificate of Authority
CAPEC	Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
CCE	Common Configuration Enumeration

CEE	Common Event Expression
CEEE	Common Event Expression Exchange
CYIQL	Cybersecurity Information Query Language
CPE	Common Platform Enumeration
CIRT	Computer Incident Response Team
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CVSS	Common Vulnerability Scoring System
CWE	Common Weakness Enumeration
CWSS	Common Weakness Scoring System
CYBEX	Cybersecurity Information Exchange
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
EVCERT	Extended Validation Certificate
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IODEF	Incident Object Description Exchange Format
MAEC	Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization
OID	Object Identifier
OVAL	Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
RID	Real-time Inter-network Defense
SCAP	Security Content Automation Protocol
SOAP	Simple Object Access Protocol
TLP	Traffic Light Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TNC	Trusted Network Connect
TPM	Trusted Platform Module
XCCDF	eXensible Configuration Checklist Description Format

5 Conventions

None

6 Basic concept - Cybersecurity information exchange (CYBEX) techniques

6.1 Description of CYBEX

This Cybersecurity information exchange (CYBEX) techniques Recommendation is intended to accomplish a simple, limited objective – describe techniques by which cybersecurity entities can exchange assured cybersecurity information. Such entities typically consist of organizations, persons, devices, or processes possessing or seeking cybersecurity information. Most frequently, these entities are CIRTs and the operators or vendors of equipment, software or network-based systems.

Cybersecurity information exchange is valuable for achieving enhanced cybersecurity and infrastructure protection, as well as contributing to the principal functions performed by CIRTs.

The exchange of cybersecurity information can occur within highly compartmentalized trust communities adhering to need-to-know principles based on previously agreed upon policies, as well as within the public domain. Knowledge of threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, risks, and mitigations and their associated remedies are typical examples of the types of cybersecurity information exchanged between entities. The related techniques included in this Recommendation are intended to facilitate this information exchange and thereby enhance cybersecurity.




Figure 1 –CYBEX model

The general cybersecurity information exchange model used in this Recommendation, as shown above in Figure 1, consists of basic functions that can be used separately or together as appropriate, and extended as needed in order to facilitate assured cybersecurity information exchanges. These are:

- structuring cybersecurity information for exchange purposes
- identifying and discovering cybersecurity information and entities
- establishment of trust and information exchange policy agreements between exchanging entities
- requesting and responding with cybersecurity information
- assuring the integrity of the cybersecurity information exchange

Clause 7 of this Recommendation describes techniques for accomplishing these functions.

The exchange of cybersecurity information may be bi-directional. This bi-directionality allows for verified information requests and responses to facilitate required levels of assurance between the parties or to provide certification of delivery.

Subject to agreed policies and applicable laws and regulations, the means of acquiring information as well as the uses made of the information are specifically out of scope and not treated in this Recommendation. For example, some specialized cybersecurity information exchange implementations such as traceback of attack sources may require application-specific mechanisms that allow for a recursive series of requests and responses to obtain required information. However, other implementations such as making cybersecurity measureable and manageable through the use of security automation capabilities are in scope. These and other types of use-cases may be facilitated by the techniques included in this Recommendation. Neither the included techniques nor the exchange of related cybersecurity information are mandated by this Recommendation; and other techniques may be appropriate.

7 Structured cybersecurity information exchange techniques

For the exchange of cybersecurity information to occur between any two entities, it must be structured and described in some consistent manner that is understood by both of those entities. The goal of CYBEX is to make it easier to share cybersecurity information that includes "common enumerations," that is, ordered lists of well-established information values for the same data type. Common enumeration allows distributed databases and other capabilities to be linked together, and facilitates cybersecurity related comparisons.

As a means of describing at a general level the desired attributes of cybersecurity information exchange, the structured information capabilities are organized into six "clusters" of techniques for distinct cybersecurity information exchange groups. These are:

- Weakness, vulnerability and state
- Event, incident, and heuristics
- Information exchange policy
- Identification, discovery, and query
- Identity assurance
- Exchange protocol

These clusters are broad classifications, and capabilities in one cluster may actually be used in one or more other clusters, depending on the application.

Each of the clusters listed above is described in detail in the sub-clauses below. Each cluster description provides an overview of its role in CYBEX, and lists techniques for its realization. None of the identified techniques are intended to be prescriptive; rather, they simply illustrate techniques considered consistent with the purposes of the relevant cluster. The choice of treatment has primarily to do with the degree of specialization of the "owning" user community and the global benefits derived by the importing.

The CYBEX techniques in this Recommendation identify an array of complementary techniques that enable and facilitate these and other instantiations.

The remainder of this clause describes each cluster, including an overview of the role of each within CYBEX, and lists techniques for the realization of each cluster. The references are non-normative and further detailed in the Bibliography at the end of this Recommendation.

Implementers and users of the cluster techniques shall comply with all applicable national and regional laws, regulations and policies.

7.1 Weakness, vulnerability and state - exchange cluster

The weakness, vulnerability, and state exchange cluster supports the exchange of weakness and vulnerability information and/or assessing the state of systems, and applications.

Table 1 lists techniques that are representative of the types that can support exchanging weakness, vulnerability, and state information, as well as non-normative references.

Table 1 – Techniques in the weakness, vulnerability and state exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures is a method for identifying and exchanging information security vulnerabilities and exposures, and that aims to provide common identifiers for publicly known problems. The goal	Rec. ITU-T X.1520

	<p>of CVE is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, repositories, and services) with this "common enumeration." CVE is designed to allow vulnerability databases and other resources to be linked together, and to facilitate the comparison of security tools and services. As such, CVE does not contain information such as risk, impact, fix information, or detailed technical information. CVE only contains the standard identifier number with status indicator, a brief description, and references to related vulnerability reports and advisories. The intention of CVE is to be comprehensive with respect to all publicly known vulnerabilities and exposures. While CVE is designed to contain mature information, the primary focus is on identifying vulnerabilities and exposures that are detected by security tools, as well as identifying any new problems that become public, and then addressing any older security problems that require validation.</p>	
<p>Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)</p>	<p>The Common Vulnerability Scoring System process provides for an open framework for communicating the characteristics and impacts of ICT vulnerabilities. CVSS consists of three groups: Base, Temporal and Environmental. Each group produces a numeric score ranging from 0 to 10, and a Vector, a compressed textual representation that reflects the values used to derive the score. The Base group represents the intrinsic qualities of a vulnerability. The Temporal group reflects the characteristics of a vulnerability that change over time. The Environmental group represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are unique to the environment of the user. CVSS enables ICT managers, vulnerability bulletin providers, security vendors, application vendors and researchers to all benefit by adopting a common language of scoring ICT vulnerabilities.</p>	<p>Rec. ITU-T X.1521</p>
<p>Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)</p>	<p>Common Weakness Enumeration is a process for identifying and exchanging unified, measurable sets of software weaknesses. CWE enables more effective discussion, description, selection, and use of software security tools and services that can find these weaknesses in source code and operational systems. It also provides for better understanding and management of software weaknesses related to architecture and design. CWE implementations are compiled and updated by a diverse, international group of experts from business, academia and government agencies, ensuring breadth and depth of content. CWE provides standardized terminology, allows service providers to inform users of specific potential weaknesses and proposed resolutions, and allows software buyers to compare similar products offered by multiple</p>	<p>[b-CWE]</p>

	vendors.	
Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS)	The Common Weakness Scoring System provides for an open framework for communicating the characteristics and impacts of software weakness.	[b-CWSS]
Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL)	<p>Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language is an international specification effort to promote open and publicly available security content, and to standardize the transfer of this information across the entire spectrum of security tools and services. OVAL includes a language used to encode system details, and an assortment of content repositories held throughout the community. The language standardizes the three main steps of the assessment process: representing configuration information of systems for testing; analyzing the system for the presence of the specified machine state (vulnerability, configuration, patch state, etc.); and reporting the results of this assessment. The repositories are collections of publicly available and open content that utilize the language.</p> <p>OVAL schemas written in XML have been developed to serve as the framework and vocabulary of the OVAL Language. These schemas correspond to the three steps of the assessment process: an OVAL System Characteristics schema for representing system information, an OVAL Definition schema for expressing a specific machine state, and an OVAL Results schema for reporting the results of an assessment.</p>	[b-OVAL]
eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF)	The eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format is a specification language for writing security checklists, benchmarks, and related kinds of documents. An XCCDF document represents a structured collection of security configuration rules for some set of target systems. The specification is designed to support information interchange, document generation, organizational and situational tailoring, automated compliance testing, and compliance scoring. The specification also defines a data model and format for storing results of benchmark compliance testing. The intent of XCCDF is to provide a uniform foundation for expression of security checklists, benchmarks, and other configuration guidance, and thereby foster more widespread application of good security practices. XCCDF documents are expressed in XML.	[b-XCCDF]
Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)	Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) is a standardized method to identify and describe the software systems and hardware devices present in an enterprise's computing asset inventory. CPE provides: a naming specification, including the logical structure of well-formed CPE names and the procedures for binding and unbinding these names with	[b-CPE]

	machine-readable encodings; a matching specification, which defines procedures for comparing CPE names to determine whether they refer to some or all of the same products or platforms; and a dictionary specification, which defines the concept of a dictionary of identifiers and prescribes high-level rules for dictionary curators.	
Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE)	Common Configuration Enumeration provides unique identifiers to system configuration issues in order to facilitate fast and accurate correlation of configuration data across multiple information sources and tools. For example, CCE Identifiers can be used to associate checks in configuration assessment tools with statements in configuration best-practice documents	[b-CCE]
Asset Reporting Format (ARF)	Asset Reporting Format (ARF) is an open specification that provides a structured language for exchanging per-device assessment results data between assessment tools, asset databases, and other products that manage asset information. It is intended to be used by tools that collect detailed configuration data about IT assets. ARF also includes an aggregate reporting specification to enable reporting on information across multiple assets and a tasking and query language to enable requesting assessment results. The security automation specifications describe an end-to-end process for delivering assessment content to data stores, requesting assessments against that content, reporting on the results of those assessments, and aggregating assessment results to an enterprise level.	[b-ARF]

7.2 Event, incident, and heuristics - exchange cluster

The event, incident, and heuristics exchange cluster supports the exchange of information pertaining to observed events, incidents, or heuristic.

Table 2 lists techniques that are representative of the types that can support exchanging observed event, incident or heuristic information in a structured fashion among Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTS) and others to create a comprehensive means of both responding to attacks as well as reduce weaknesses and vulnerabilities, as well as non-normative references.

Table 2 – Techniques relevant to the event, incident, and heuristics exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
Common Event Expression (CEE)	Common Event Expression standardizes the way computer events are described, logged, and exchanged. By using CEE's common language and syntax, enterprise-wide log management, correlation, aggregation, auditing, and incident handling can be performed more efficiently and produce better results. The primary goal of the effort is to standardize the representation and exchange of logs from electronic systems. CEE breaks the recording and exchanging of logs into four (4) components: the event taxonomy, log syntax, log transport, and logging	[b-CEE]

	recommendations	
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)	The Incident Object Description Exchange Format defines a data representation that provides a framework for the exchange of information commonly exchanged by CIRTs about computer security incidents. IODEF describes an information model and provides an associated data model specified with XML Schema.	[b-IETF RFC 5070]
Phishing, Fraud, and Misuse Format	The Phishing, Fraud, and Misuse Exchange Format extends the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) to support the reporting of phishing, fraud, and other types of misuse. The extensions also support the exchange on information about widespread spam incidents. These extensions are flexible enough to support information gleaned from activities throughout the entire electronic fraud or spam cycle. Both simple reporting and complete forensic reporting are possible, as is consolidating multiple incidents. Note: This Recommendation only describes techniques for commonly understood, assured means for cybersecurity entities to exchange cybersecurity information, and does not include the uses of that information.	[b-IETF RFC 5901]
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)	CAPEC is a specification method for the identification, description, and enumeration of attack patterns. Attack patterns are a powerful mechanism to capture and communicate the attacker's perspective. They are descriptions of common methods for exploiting software. They derive from the concept of design patterns applied in a destructive rather than constructive context and are generated from in-depth analysis of specific real-world exploit examples. The objective of CAPEC is to provide a publicly available catalog of attack patterns along with a comprehensive XML schema and classification taxonomy.	[b-CAPEC]
Malware Attribution Enumeration and Characterization Format	The Malware Attribution Enumeration and Characterization Format (MAEC) is a formal language that includes a schema to provide both a syntax for the common vocabulary of enumerated attributes and behaviors, and an interchange format for structured information about these data elements. The enumerations are at different levels of abstraction: low-level actions, mid-level behaviors and high-level mechanisms. At the lowest level, MAEC describes attributes tied to the basic functionality and low-level operation of malware. At the middle level, MAEC's language organizes the aforementioned low-level actions into groups for the purpose of defining mid-level behaviors. At the more conceptual and high level, MAEC's vocabulary allows for the construction of mechanisms that abstract clusters of mid-level malware behaviors based upon the achievement of a higher order classification.	[b-MAEC]

7.3 Information exchange policy - exchange cluster

The exchange cluster of the information exchange policy supports the sharing and use of cybersecurity information between entities concerning the terms and conditions associated with the information being shared. This understanding may be bound to the specific information being shared, or to the broad class of information to which it belongs, or be associated with the entities involved. To the extent it is necessary under the circumstances, it is desirable to provide notice of these policies to the entities involved. This notice may take many forms, and be conveyed together with the information or independently provided through a query-response mechanism.

Table 3 lists techniques that are representative of the types that can support policy exchange between cybersecurity entities. Note that the protocols and requirements for policy exchange continue to emerge within information security exchange forums, and care should be taken to ensure their proper implementation, as well as non-normative references.

Table 3 – Techniques relevant to the policy exchange cluster

Technique	Description	References
Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)	<p>The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) was created to encourage greater sharing of sensitive information. The originator signals how widely they want their information to be circulated beyond the immediate recipient. The TLP provides a simple method to achieve this. It is designed to improve the flow of information between individuals, organizations or communities in a controlled and trusted way. The TLP is based on the concept of the originator labeling information with one of four colors to indicate what further dissemination, if any, the recipient can undertake. The recipient must consult the originator if wider dissemination is required. The TLP is accepted as a model for trusted information exchange among security communities in over 30 countries. The four "information sharing levels" for the handling of sensitive information are:</p> <p>RED – Personal. This information is for named recipients only. In the context of a meeting, for example, RED information is limited to those present. In most circumstances RED information will be passed verbally or in person.</p> <p>AMBER - Limited distribution. The recipient may share AMBER information with others within their organization, but only on a "need-to-know" basis.</p> <p>GREEN - Community wide. Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. However, the information may not be published or posted on the Internet, nor released outside of the community.</p> <p>WHITE - Unlimited. Subject to standard copyright rules, WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction.</p>	[b-TLP]

7.4 Identification, discovery, and query cluster

Common interests exist among cybersecurity communities regarding cybersecurity identifiers and their creation, administration, discovery, verification, and use. Some of those interests include:

- Enhance the value of the cybersecurity information by enabling widespread exchange of the related event information and analysis of events over long periods of time
- Enhance the security of cybersecurity information exchanges by enabling identifier information to be obtained for verification and the related policies to be known
- Enhance the flexibility of cybersecurity information exchanges by enabling new or additional information associated with the message to be obtained, e.g., information status

Different cybersecurity organizations may desire to implement common cybersecurity protocols for the capture and exchange of system state, vulnerability, incident forensics, and incident heuristics information in operational applications. As this information is becoming available from many different sources, implementers should harmonize how they identify cybersecurity organizations, trust and information exchange policies, and the information itself that is exchanged or distributed. That a globally unique identifier used for global cybersecurity information exchange may exist necessarily implies that it has the following characteristics:

- simplicity, usability, flexibility, extensibility, scalability, and deployability;
- distributed management of diverse identifier schemes;
- long-term reliability of identifier registrars, and the availability of high-performance tools for discovering information associated with any given identifier

Table 4 lists techniques that are representative of the types that can support identifying cybersecurity organizations, and discovering and querying for cybersecurity information, as well as non-normative references.

Table 4 – Techniques relevant to the identification, discovery, and query cluster

Technique	Description	References
Discovery Mechanisms in the Exchange of Cybersecurity Information	These techniques include methods and mechanisms which can be used to identify and locate sources of cybersecurity information, types of cybersecurity information, specific instances of cybersecurity information, methods available for access of cybersecurity information as well as policies which may apply to the access of cybersecurity information..	
Guidelines for Administering the OID arc for cybersecurity information exchange	A common global cybersecurity identifier namespace is described in Rec. ITU-T X.1500.1, together with administrative requirements, as part of a coherent OID arc, and includes identifiers for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cybersecurity information • Cybersecurity organization • Cybersecurity policy 	
Cybersecurity Information Query Language	The Cybersecurity Information Query Language defines a flexible data representation that provides a framework for requesting information commonly exchanged by Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTs) about computer security incidents. This specification describes the information model for CYIQL and provides an associated data model specified with XML Schema.	

7.5 Identity assurance cluster

Within CYBEX, the actual exchange of structured information can occur many different ways – via a network or physically transported. A key element for this exchange is trust – trust in the identity of the parties, as well as the information being conveyed.

Table 5 lists techniques that are representative of the types that can support identity assurance, as well as non-normative references.

Table 5 – Techniques relevant to the identity assurance cluster

Technique	Description	References
Trusted platforms	<p>Computing and communications products with embedded Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) advance the ability of businesses, institutions, government agencies, and consumers to conduct trustworthy information exchange; therefore, TPMs are relevant to most CYBEX implementations. TPMs are special-purpose integrated circuits (ICs) built into a variety of platforms to enable strong user authentication and machine attestation - essential to prevent inappropriate access to confidential and sensitive information and to protect against compromised networks.</p> <p>Trusted Platform Module technology is based on open standards to ensure interoperability of diverse products in mixed-vendor environments. The prevalent TPM standard consists of a set of specifications developed and maintained by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), alongside with a protection profile for security evaluation against the Common Criteria.</p> <p>The design principles give the basic concepts of the TPM and generic information relative to TPM functionality. A TPM designer must review and implement the information in the TPM Main specification (parts 1-3) and review the platform specific document for the intended platform. The platform specific document contains normative statements that affect the design and implementation of a TPM. A TPM designer must review and implement the requirements, including testing and evaluation, as set by the TCG Conformance Workgroup. The TPM must comply with the requirements and pass any evaluations set by the Conformance Workgroup. The TPM may undergo more stringent testing and evaluation.</p>	[b-TPM]
Trusted Network Connect	<p>ICT security operations often desire to discover the state of Operating System (OS)-level and the application software used by the supporting network. For example, when systems lack OS security patches or antivirus signatures, reliable notification is crucial to containing the damage associated with network- based attacks. Making this appraisal requires reliable information that a connected system is in a particular state.</p>	[b-TNC]

	<p>In order to prevent systems (e.g. hacked systems) from falsifying information, successful appraisal requires a hardware basis on the system to be appraised. Trusted Platforms are embedded in the hardware to record certain facts about the boot process and deliver them in digitally signed form. Furthermore, major chip manufacturers are now supplementing the Trusted Platforms with a “late launch” capability that allows for execution of trusted code later in the boot sequence. This, in turn, allows events to be reliably recorded after the hardware-specific boot process.</p> <p>Network configuration management is effectively a deployment of system attestation: software agents on enterprise machines that periodically send configuration reports to a central repository, which evaluates and flags non-compliant systems. Data from these software agents, while valuable, is easily modified by an attacker. Using the widespread deployment of Trusted Platforms to enable a more trustworthy evaluation of system state would greatly increase an enterprise’s confidence in its configuration management data.</p> <p>Trusted Network Connect (TNC) is an open architecture for network access control. Its aim is to enable network operators to provide endpoint integrity at every network connection, thus enabling interoperability among multi-vendor network endpoints.</p>	
Entity authentication assurance	<p>This standard provides an authentication life cycle framework for managing the assurance of an entity’s identity and its associated identity information in a given context. Specifically it provides methods to 1) qualitatively measure and assign relative assurance levels to the authentication of an entity’s identities and its associated identity information, and 2) communicate relative authentication assurance levels.</p>	[b-EAA]
Extended Validation Certificate framework	<p>The Extended Validation Certificate framework consists of an integrated combination of technologies, protocols, identity proofing, lifecycle management, and auditing practices that describe the minimum requirements that must be met in order to issue and maintain Extended Validation Certificates (“EV Certificates”) concerning a subject organization. The framework accommodates a wide range of security, localization and notification requirements.</p>	[b-EVCERT]
Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates	<p>The specified document specifies policy requirements relating to Certification Authorities (CAs) issuing public key certificates, including Extended Validation Certificates (EVC). It defines policy requirements on the operation and management practices of certification authorities issuing and managing certificates such that subscribers, subjects certified by the CA and relying parties may have confidence in the applicability of the certificate in support of cryptographic</p>	[b-ETSI TS102042]

	mechanisms.	
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7.6 Exchange protocol cluster

The exchange protocol cluster identifies specific exchange protocols that are used in diverse cybersecurity information exchange contexts. Table 6 lists representative exchange protocols, as well as nonnormative references.

Table 6 – Techniques relevant to the exchange protocol cluster

Technique	Description	References
Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) Profile for CYBEX	A BEEP Profile for Cybersecurity Information Exchange Techniques specifies the BEEP Profile for use within CYBEX. BEEP is a generic application protocol kernel for connection-oriented, asynchronous interactions described in RFC3080. At BEEP's core is a framing mechanism that permits simultaneous and independent exchanges of messages between peers. All exchanges occur in the context of a channel -- a binding to a well-defined aspect of the application, such as transport security, user authentication, or data exchange. Each channel has an associated "profile" that defines the syntax and semantics of the messages exchanged.	[b-IETF RFC3080]
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) for CYBEX	SOAP is a lightweight protocol for exchange of information in a decentralized, distributed environment. It is an XML based protocol that consists of three parts: an envelope that defines a framework for describing what is in a message and how to process it; a set of encoding rules for expressing instances of application-defined datatypes; and a convention for representing remote procedure calls and responses. SOAP can potentially be used in combination with a variety of other protocols; however, the only bindings defined in this document describe how to use SOAP in combination with HTTP and HTTP Extension Framework.	[b-SOAP]
Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages	This mechanism specifies the transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) messages within HTTP Request and Response messages transported over TLS.	[b-IETF RFC 6046]

There are many use-cases for CYBEX, and several are provided as Appendices to this Recommendation as examples for illustration of the cybersecurity information exchange process. These include the following:

- Appendix I provides a Cybersecurity information exchange ontology. This illustrates an operational context for CYBEX, and results in an effective cybersecurity ecosystem where knowledge derived from reports, testing, and experience are used to create and evolve the weakness and vulnerability information that in turn can be used together with system state information to measure and enhance security.

- Appendix II provides two examples of security automation schemas. These capabilities can be used for creating specific CYBEX instantiations that include automating known secure or trusted “states” of software, services, and systems, detecting malware, capturing incident and heuristics information. The two examples include: 1) the USA National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) for implementing the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) and its replacement, the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), and 2) the Japan JVN Security Content Automation Framework.

Appendix I

A cybersecurity information exchange ontology

(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)

This appendix contains a CYBEX ontology, which defines the following terms:

1. **Cybersecurity operations:** Methods and processes used to monitor and manage security within defined operational limits including:
 - The collection and analysis of information that may have an effect on security.
 - The detection of behavior or events which adversely affect security or by which the likelihood of a future adverse effect can be determined.
 - Action taken as a result of adverse behavior or event taking place in order to limit, mitigate and/or prevent future incidents.
 - Security-related communications concerning the status and condition of systems.
2. **Cybersecurity entity:** any entity that is part of an exchange of cybersecurity information, including the information object itself.
3. **Cybersecurity operational information:** any information that is needed for cybersecurity entities to run cybersecurity operations

The cybersecurity techniques described in CYBEX are usefully described further within this CYBEX ontology; that is, a model for describing the abstracted world of cybersecurity operations. The ontology consists of a set of types, properties, and relationships. See Figure I.1. The solid lines indicate the relationship of the information types, while arrows indicate information input from a functional entity to a knowledge base/database. The functional entities shown on the right are generic and entities such as CIRTs may encompass one or more of these functions.




Figure I.1 – CYBEX ontology model

In this ontology, a model is used to define domains for cybersecurity operations, which is then used to identify required cybersecurity entities to support the operations in each domain. In the

following sub-clauses, a detailed ontology is derived. This illustrates how the CYBEX techniques can be used to support this ontology.

I.1 Operation domains

Cybersecurity operations principally consist of three domains: Incident Handling, ICT Asset Management and Knowledge Accumulation.

The Incident Handling Domain includes detection and response to cybersecurity incidents by monitoring incidents, computer events that constitute the incidents, and attack behavior identified in the incidents. For instance, it detects anomalies through alarms from detectors, and then assembles details by collecting various logs. Sometimes it provides alerts and advisories, e.g. early warnings against candidate threats to user organizations.

The ICT Asset Management Domain includes cybersecurity operations within each user organization such as installing, configuring, and managing ICT assets in the organization. It includes both incident preventive operations and damage controlling operations in each organization.

The Knowledge Accumulation Domain includes cybersecurity-related information. Reusable knowledge for other organizations is generated and accumulated.

I.2 Cybersecurity entities

Based on the operation domains described above, the cybersecurity functional entities that are necessary to run cybersecurity operations in each domain can be identified.

Within the Incident Handling Domain, two entities exist for its operations: the Response Team, and the Coordinator. The Response Team is an entity that monitors and analyzes various kinds of incidents, e.g., unauthorized access, DDoS attacks and phishing, and accumulates incident information. Based on this information, a Response Team may implement countermeasures, e.g., register phishing site addresses on black lists. A Coordinator is an entity that coordinates with the other entities and addresses potential threats based on known incident information.

In the ICT Asset Management Domain, two operation entities exist: Administrator and ICT Infrastructure Provider. The Administrator administers the system of its organization and possesses information on its own ICT assets. An ICT administrator inside each organization is a typical instance. The ICT Infrastructure Provider provides each organization with ICT infrastructures, which includes the network connectivity, cloud computing services such as software as a service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS) and infrastructure as a service (IaaS), and identity services. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) and Application Service Provider (ASP) are typical instances.

In the Knowledge Accumulation Domain, three operation entities exist: Researcher, Product & Service Developer, and Registrar. A Researcher researches cybersecurity information, extracting and accumulating knowledge. A Product & Service Developer possesses information on products and services, e.g., naming, versions, their vulnerabilities, their patches and configuration information. Software vendors, ASPs and individual software programmers are typical instances. A Registrar is an entity that classifies and organizes cybersecurity knowledge provided by Researchers, Developers, and Vendors so that the knowledge can be used by another organization.

I.3 Cybersecurity operational information

Based on the operation domains and entities, this sub-clause elaborates on cybersecurity operational information provided by the functional entities for each operation domain.

I.3.1 Incident Handling Domain

In the Incident Handling Domain, there exist an Incident Database and a Warning Database. An Incident Database contains information on incidents provided by a Response Team. It includes three kinds of records: event, incident, and attack. An event record includes computer events such as privileged users logging into a system. It also includes information on packets, files and transactions related to incidents. Usually, most of the records are provided by computers automatically. An incident record includes events that are incident candidates. This record is usually derived from several event records and their conjectures, which are created automatically and/or manually. An attack record is based on the analyses of incidents and includes the precise date and time of the attacks as well as their sequences.

A Warning Database includes information on cybersecurity warnings provided by a Response Team and Coordinator. The warnings are based on the Incident Database as well as the Cyber Risk Knowledge Base.

I.3.2 ICT Asset Management Domain

In the ICT Asset Management Domain, there are two databases: a User Resource Database and a Provider Resource Database.

The User Resource Database accumulates information on assets within an individual organization and contains information such as the list of software, hardware, their configurations, status of resource usage, security policies including access control policies, security level assessment results, and intranet topology. The information is provided by the Administrator.

The Provider Resource Database accumulates information on assets outside the individual organization. It mainly contains external resource information and external network information. External resource information consists of information on resources that each organization is utilizing outside their organization such as the list and status of external cloud services (e.g., data center and SaaS). The external network information consists of information on networks that connect each organization to other organizations such, as their topology, routing information, access control policy, traffic status and the security level. The information is provided by the ICT Infrastructure Provider.

I.3.3 Knowledge Accumulation Domain

Three knowledge bases exist in the Knowledge Accumulation Domain: Cyber Risk, Countermeasure, and Product & Service. They accumulate knowledge on cybersecurity provided by the Researcher and Product & Service Developer, which is then organized and classified by the Registrar.

The Cyber Risk Knowledge Base accumulates cybersecurity risk information and includes Vulnerability Knowledge and Threat Knowledge. The Vulnerability Knowledge Base accumulates known vulnerability information, including naming, taxonomy and enumeration of known vulnerabilities. It also includes human vulnerabilities exposed by human ICT users. The Threat Knowledge Base accumulates known threat information that includes attack knowledge and misuse knowledge. Attack knowledge includes information on attack patterns, attack tools (e.g., malware) and their trends such as the information on past attack trends in terms of geography and attack target. It also includes statistical information about past attacks. Misuse knowledge includes information about misuses of ICT caused by human users without any malicious intention. Information of mistyping, being caught by phishing traps, and compliance violations are included.

The Countermeasure Knowledge Base accumulates information on countermeasures to cybersecurity risks and contains two knowledge bases: Assessment and Detection/Protection. The Assessment Knowledge Base accumulates known rules and criteria for assessing the security level

of ICT assets as well as the checklist of configurations. The Detection/Protection Knowledge Base accumulates known rules and criteria for detecting/protecting security threats, for example IDS/IPS signatures and related detection/protection rules.

The Product & Service Knowledge Base accumulates information on products and services. It includes two knowledge bases: Version Knowledge and Configuration Knowledge. The Version Knowledge Base accumulates version information on products and services, including naming and enumeration of their versions. Regarding product version, security patches are also included within the knowledge base. The Configuration Knowledge Base accumulates configuration information on products and services. Regarding product configuration, it includes naming, taxonomy and enumeration of known configurations.

Each of the databases and knowledge bases mentioned above may utilize various information description techniques as shown in Figure I.2.




Figure I.2 - Detailed view of the CYBEX ontology model with techniques shown

For further information on CYBEX ontology, see Reference [b-A1].

Appendix II

CYBEX Examples of security automation schemas

(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)

As described in the introduction to clause 6, there are many possible implementations of the protocol clusters described in the CYBEX Recommendation, with the object of achieving various levels of cybersecurity through the implementation of the capabilities.

It is expected that a large number of implementations will emerge – particularly security automation schema for ensuring that ICT systems are properly configured and patched. Two initial prominent examples include:

- 1) The USA National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) for implementing the Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) and its replacement, the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), and
- 2) The Japan JVN Security Content Automation Framework.

Each of these is briefly described in this Appendix. In general, these security automation tool implementations take the form shown in Fig. II.1, below, and include varied numbers of the CYBEX information exchange platforms represented by the overlay pointers in the diagram.




Figure II.1 – Cybersecurity assurance and integrity automation

II.1 Example: USA Federal Desktop Core Configuration/United States Government Configuration Baseline.

The Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) and its replacement, the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), using the NIST Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) comprises specifications for organizing and expressing security-related information in standardized ways, as well as related reference data such as unique identifiers for vulnerabilities. The purpose of these two initiatives is to create security configuration baselines for ICT products widely deployed across the federal agencies. The USGCB baseline evolved from the Federal Desktop Core Configuration mandate. The USGCB is a Federal government-wide initiative that provides guidance to agencies on what should be done to improve and maintain effective configuration settings focusing primarily on security.

The USGCB technical specification describes the requirements and conventions that are to be employed to ensure the consistent and accurate exchange of SCAP content and the ability of the content to reliably operate on SCAP validated tools. The initial version is comprised of six specifications: XCCDF, OVAL, CPE, CCE, CVE, and CVSS. These specifications are grouped into three categories: languages, enumerations, and vulnerability measurement and scoring systems.

SCAP implements 1) a specified format and nomenclature by which security software products communicate software flaw and security configuration information, and 2) specific software flaw and security configuration standard reference data known as SCAP content. Goals for SCAP include standardizing system security management, promoting interoperability of security products, and fostering the use of standard expressions of security content. Because many different SCAP contents are likely to emerge for diverse systems and levels of security, the structured tagging, discovery, and assurance verification of current schema are important requirements. The USGCB initiative creates content and guidance based on the SCAP specifications.

II.2 Example: Japan Vulnerability Information Portal Site, JVN

JVN stands for “Japan Vulnerability Notes” and provides vulnerability and related information on software used in Japan, with which it intends to contribute to the countermeasure to cyber threats. In order to enable application developers to use data through an open interface, JVN has adopted SCAP and contains local (domestic) information and international information, resulting in the JVN Security Content Automation Framework. Just like the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), each of the vulnerability information contains a CVE number, provides a CVSS score, and a CWS number. Moreover, the CPE name of the affected product is also provided.

The framework consists of three components: MyJVN, JVN, and JVN iPedia (see Figure II.2), each of which is elaborated below.

MyJVN provides vulnerability countermeasure information via MyJVN API, a machine readable interface including Web APIs, and the MyJVN tools such as the Version Checker. It improves the usage of vulnerability countermeasure information stored in JVN and JVN iPedia by making it easier and more efficient for users to collect their target information through the services like customized filtering, auto searching and checklist creation. Also, “MyJVN Version Checker,” a tool based on SCAP, allows people to easily check whether the software installed on their PC is the latest version.

JVN provides vulnerability countermeasure information and Japanese vendor status for reported vulnerabilities by “Information Security Early Warning Partnership”, which is a public-private partnership framework has been established to promote software product and web site security and prevent the damage to spread to the vast range of computers due to computer viruses or unauthorized access. When the vulnerability information is reported to IPA (Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan) as the recipient body of this partnership, it is passed to the

JPCERT/CC as a coordination body. JPCERT/CC specifies the affected software products and coordinates with developers. When solutions for vulnerability such as patches or software updates are available for users, the vulnerability details with developers' statements are published on JVN.

JVN iPedia provides vulnerability countermeasure information collected on software products, such as operating systems, applications, libraries and embedded systems, used in Japan. JVN aims to offer the vulnerability and countermeasure information to the public as soon as possible. A coordination body interacts with the vendors regarding when to disclose new reported vulnerabilities. The JVN iPedia mission on the other hand, aims to collect additional vulnerability and countermeasure information found on a daily basis on Japanese software products that are not released on JVN.




Figure II.2 – Concept of JVN Security Content Automation Framework




Figure II.3 – Database with International and local information

Users adopting standard formats such as RSS may enjoy a database that contains international and local information (see Figure II.3). Among the three components, MyJVN works as a user interface, whose usability is facilitated with the tools and APIs elaborated in the next section.

MyJVN tools and API

The MyJVN tools are security tools based on SCAP that improve the usage of vulnerability countermeasure and information exchange environment for users. Currently, the major tools we offer are as follows:

Filtered Vulnerability Countermeasure Information Tool improves the usage of vulnerability countermeasure information stored in JVN and JVN iPedia by making it easier and more efficient for users to collect their target information through services like customized filtering by CPE.

Version Checker is an OVAL based on-line scanner that allows people to easily check whether the software installed on their PC is the latest version. With just one mouse click, people can check the versions of multiple software. The results are easy to understand: a tick mark signifies the latest version and a cross mark signifies an obsolete version. If the software is not the latest version, users can easily access the vendor's download website with just a few clicks. MyJVN Version Checker supports internet-related software products that were selected seeking cooperation from the software vendors.

MyJVN Security Configuration Checker is an XCCDF and OVAL based on-line scanner. It is a free, easy-to-use tool to assess Windows security configuration, including account policies such as the minimum password length, password expiration period, automatic turn-on of screensaver, the USB autorun feature, etc.

MyJVN API is a software interface to access and utilize vulnerability countermeasure information stored in JVN and JVN iPedia. To enable application developers to use data through an open interface, JVN iPedia has adopted SCAP, a set of standards for describing vulnerability countermeasure information. By using MyJVN API, any custom applications can access the data in JVN iPedia and various vulnerability management services can now efficiently utilize vulnerability countermeasure information.

Basic functions of MyJVN API are a filtered information service API and SCAP collaboration service API. The former API supports "Get list of products", "Get list of vulnerability overviews" etc., that are used by the Filtered Vulnerability Countermeasure Information Tool. The latter API supports "Get list of OVAL definitions", "Get data of OVAL definition" etc., that are used by the MyJVN Version Checker and the MyJVN Security Configuration Checker.

For further information on JVN, please refer to the article [b-A2].

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