[jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard

Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team <security@paragonie.com> Wed, 29 March 2017 16:19 UTC

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From: Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team <security@paragonie.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 12:19:52 -0400
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Subject: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard
Precedence: list

Hello,

We've outlined some suggestions to make a JOSE replacement/upgrade more
secure. Our suggestions are outlined at
https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03,
but I have mirrored them below.

Changes to JOSE that will prevent insecurity
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#deletions>
Deletions
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#jws-and-jwe>JWS
and JWE
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#drop-the-alg-header>Drop
the alg header

Neither JOSE users nor JOSE library designers should be required to
understand cryptography primitives. At a lower level, this can lead to badly
implemented primitives
<http://www.cryptofails.com/post/70059600123/saltstack-rsa-e-d-1>. On a
higher level, this can lead to reasoning by lego
<http://www.cryptofails.com/post/121201011592/reasoning-by-lego-the-wrong-way-to-think-about>
.

For all the reasons outlined here
<https://paragonie.com/blog/2017/03/jwt-json-web-tokens-is-bad-standard-that-everyone-should-avoid>
and here
<https://storify.com/jcuid/thomas-h-ptacek-don-t-use-json-web-tokens>, the
alg header (and algorithm agility in its entirety) should be considered
harmful.
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#jwe>
JWE
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#drop-the-enc-header>Drop
the enc header

For the same reason we're dropping the alg header, we should drop the enc
header.
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#consider-dropping-the-zip-header>Consider
dropping the zip header

As we've seen with CRIME <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME> and BREACH
<http://breachattack.com/>, as well as this error oracle attack against
iMessage
<https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/03/21/attack-of-week-apple-imessage/>,
compression can introduce side-channels that totally undermine
confidentiality.

This one is less of a hard-and-fast requirement to make JOSE secure, but I
still strongly recommend it.
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#additions>
Additions
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#jws-and-jwe-1>JWS
and JWE
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#new-header-ver-version>New
header: ver (version)

Instead of letting library developers and users mix-and-match cryptography
algorithms, the only choice they should be given is, "Which version are we
using?" Versions can look like this:

   - Version 1:
      - HMAC-SHA256 for shared-key authentication
      - AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256 in Encrypt-then-MAC mode for shared-key
      encryption
      - RSA-OAEP with MGF1-SHA256 and e=65537 + AES-128-CBC in KEM+DEM for
      public-key encryption, min. key size: 2048-bit
      - RSASSA-PSS with MGF1-SHA256 and e=65537 for public-key digital
      signatures, min. key size: 2048-bit
   - Version 2:
      - HMAC-SHA256 for shared-key authentication
      - AES-256-GCM for shared-key encryption
      - ECDH over secp256r1 (NIST P-256) + AES-256-GCM for public-key
      encryption
         - Libraries must verify that the point is on the curve
      - ECDSA over secp256r1 (NIST P-256), adhering to RFC 6979
      (deterministic ECDSA), for public-key digital signatures
   - Version 3:
      - HMAC-SHA512-256 for shared-key authentication
         - As per NaCl, this is HMAC-SHA-512 truncated to 256 bits, not
         HMAC-SHA-512/256.
      - Xsalsa20poly1305 for shared-key encryption
      - X25519 + Xsalsa20poly1305 for public-key encryption
      - Ed25519 for public-key digital signatures

Libraries that support version 3 SHOULD NOT support version 1.
<https://gist.github.com/paragonie-scott/c88290347c2589b0cd38d8bb6ac27c03#new-header-mode>New
header: mode

Only four options (case-insensitive):

   - se = Shared-key Encryption
   - sa = Shared-key Authentication
   - pe = Public-key Encryption
   - ps = Public-key digital Signatures


Kind regards,

Security Team
Paragon Initiative Enterprises <https://paragonie.com/security>

[jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Justin Richer
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Nathaniel McCallum
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Nathaniel McCallum
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Paragon Initiative Enterprises Security Team
Re: [jose] Towards a More Secure JOSE Standard Nathaniel McCallum