Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bis-04.txt> (Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator) to Proposed Standard
Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> Thu, 30 July 2015 15:51 UTC
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Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 11:51:33 -0400
From: Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bis-04.txt> (Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator) to Proposed Standard
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I think that requiring line breaks is silly. Most Base64 parsers handle arbitrary whitespace. OpenSSL's parser is just plain nasty (yes, I once made the mistake of reading the code), but even with OpenSSL's parser there's a straightforward (if ridiculous) workaround: http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/trunk/rp/rcynic/bio_f_linebreak.c http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/trunk/rp/rcynic/bio_f_linebreak.h I really don't think we need to enshrine OpenSSL's warts in the specification. I prefer Richard's option 2 (allow but do not require linebreaks), which is what RFC 6490 RP implementations had to support anyway.
- [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bis-04… The IESG
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… Richard Hansen
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… Tim Bruijnzeels
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… Richard Hansen
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… Rob Austein
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… David Mandelberg
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… Sandra Murphy
- Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6490-bi… Rob Austein