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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 draft

Martin Rex <martin.rex@sap.com> Tue, 06 March 2007 17:12 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <martin.rex@sap.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2 draft
To: ekr@networkresonance.com
Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2007 18:12:12 +0100
In-Reply-To: <20070305054158.3A09C1CC24@delta.rtfm.com> from "EKR" at Mar 4, 7 09:41:58 pm
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EKR wrote:
> 
>      - Remove ephemeral RSA [issue 3]

This makes me sad.

I would have SIGNIFICANTLY preferred if temporary/ephemeral RSA
had been retained and the restriction to the RSA_EXPORT ciphersuites
had been removed instead.

As I had previously explained, the use of temporary/ephemeral RSA
with same-strength keys as the server's certificate would make
key-stealing of the servers' key much less useful for passive
attacks.

-Martin


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