Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3

However, for those ClientHello’s that support older versions, the compression_method field may contain other values. This means that if a TLSv1.3 client happened to support compression for TLSv1.2, it would be unable to negotiate that via a single ClientHello. There’s no way to attempt to negotiate TLSv1.2+compression and TLSv1.3+no-compression in a single ClientHello.

In effect, the document is stating that a TLSv1.3 client MUST NOT support compression, regardless of the protocol version that may be negotiated.

--
-Todd Short
// tshort@akamai.com<mailto:tshort@akamai.com>
// "One if by land, two if by sea, three if by the Internet."

On Oct 7, 2015, at 5:15 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 11:11 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com<mailto:mrex@sap.com>> wrote:
Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com<mailto:mrex@sap.com>> wrote:
>> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>
>>> That is what the document says:
>>> "Versions of TLS before 1.3 supported compression and the list of
>>> compression methods was supplied in this field. For any TLS 1.3
>>> ClientHello, this field MUST contain only the ?null? compression method
>>> with the code point of 0. If a TLS 1.3 ClientHello is received with any
>>> other value in this field, the server MUST generate a fatal
>>> ?illegal_parameter? alert. Note that TLS 1.3 servers may receive TLS 1.2
>>> or prior ClientHellos which contain other compression methods and MUST
>>> follow the procedures for the appropriate prior version of TLS."
>>
>> The quoted wording calls for a fatal handshake failure when ClientHello
>> offers
>>
>>   TLSv1.2+compression  _or_  TLSv1.3
>>
>> while at the same time the last requirement asserts that a ClientHello with
>>
>>   TLSv1.2+compression
>>
>> is perfectly OK.  To me, this looks quite odd.
>
> That's not how I read this text.
>
> Rather, I read it as:
> If ClientHelloVersion >= TLS 1.3
>    then the compression field must be empty
> else:
>    the compression field is dictated by other versions
>
> This doesn't seem inconsistent to me. If you still think that the paragraph
> reads differently, can you help me by diagramming it?

What you describe would be considerable worse that what I understood,
because it would mean that a TLSv1.3 ClientHello will be unconditionally
invalid for a TLSv1.2 server.

   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#page-42<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_rfc5246-23page-2D42&d=BQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=QBEcQsqoUDdk1Q26CzlzNPPUkKYWIh1LYsiHAwmtRik&m=IxUTnzF6SN6y6C4zTXXfgQmiV1FojXWtLZ0S8hS5eGY&s=Uu3NPBs1t52N_fGVGPqXazTAStG7cPUeCfNh6eCTtkk&e=>

   compression_methods
      This is a list of the compression methods supported by the client,
      sorted by client preference.  If the session_id field is not empty
      (implying a session resumption request), it MUST include the

Dierks & Rescorla           Standards Track                    [Page 41]

RFC 5246                          TLS                        August 2008

*>    compression_method from that session.  This vector MUST contain,
*>    and all implementations MUST support, CompressionMethod.null.
      Thus, a client and server will always be able to agree on a
      compression method.

Sorry, I spoke carelessly. It must contain solely the null method.

-Ekr

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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed