Distributed Authenticated Mappings DINRG IETF-101

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I. Authenticated Mappings

Problem

Private conversations over encrypted email

Secure internet service for small websites

Domain lookups

Verifying identity

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Private conversations over encrypted email

Point Solution

Trusted keyservers

Secure internet service for small websites

HSTS preload lists

Domain lookups

DNS (+ DNSSEC)

Verifying identity

CA trust chains + CT

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Trusted keyservers // MITM

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DNS (+ DNSSEC) // Poisoning; low adoption

CA trust chains + CT // Single point of failure

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Need Public key mappings

HSTS preload lists // Downgrade attacks Policy mappings

DNS (+ DNSSEC) // Poisoning; low adoption Name mappings

CA trust chains + CT // Single point of failure Certificate mappings

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Trusted keyservers // MITM

HSTS preload lists // Downgrade attacks

DNS (+ DNSSEC) // Poisoning; low adoption

CA trust chains + CT // Single point of failure

Need Public key mappings Policy mappings Name mappings Certificate mappings

Authenticated mappings!

Generalized Mappings

Can we derive a scalable solution that will work for any mapping?

Idea: infrastructure for a global state database

- Append-only

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Idea: infrastructure for a global state database

- Append-only
- Well-formed transitions (more on this later)
- Transparent



(1) Bootstrap Certificate Transparency

Incentive and priority mismatch. Lack of knowledge to enforce domain specific semantics.



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Incentive and priority mismatch. Lack of knowledge to enforce domain specific semantics. (2) Byzantine Fault Tolerant Cluster

Limited participation. Uniform set of incentives undermines security.

KeyNet (interim meeting)

Distributed OpenPGP key store for encrypted email


(1) Bootstrap Certificate Transparency

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(3) Proof-of-{Work, Stake}

Open membership w/out accountability. Trust is tied to hashing power or available resources.



(1) Bootstrap Certificate Transparency	(2) Byzantine Fault Tolerant Cluster
Incentive and priority mismatch. Lack of knowledge to enforce domain specific semantics.	Limited participation. Uniform set of incentives undermines security.
(3) Proof-of-{Work, Stake}	(4) Federated Byzantine Agreement
Open membership w/out accountability.	Variety of well-known stakeholders.

II. Well-formed Transitions

Example 1: PGP Keys

We might want to securely map <u>aliases</u> to <u>public keys</u>.

On creation of an entry, we can check that <u>a domain authority verifies their</u> <u>identity</u>.

Every time an entry is updated, we should verify

1. <u>the previous public key has signed the update</u>.

OR

2. <u>*n* of *m* trusted parties have signed the update</u>.

Example 2: Binary Hashes

We might want to securely map <u>download URLs</u> to <u>binary hashes</u>.

On creation of an entry, we should check that <u>the domain hosting the URL</u> <u>has signed the entry</u>.

Every time an entry is updated, we should maintain

1. <u>the same domain has signed the update</u>.


Observations


A mapping abstraction allows for shared components

- Entry **create** and **update** validation based on local state
- External authentication
- Ownership
- Recovery/threshold cryptography

Mapping: specification for key-value mapping with **validators** to ensure well-formed, secure entry **creation** and **updates**.

- All creation validators must succeed to allow a new entry
- All update validators must succeed to allow a transition/change





```
create_validator = [ "bootstrap_validator": Validator {...} ],
update_validator = [ "identity_validator": Validator {...} ],
key_type = ALIAS,
value_type = PUBLIC_KEY
```

Validators: collections of operations enforced on entry creation/update

- At least one must succeed for validation to pass
- create and update validators defined at the mapping level

```
Validator Example: PGP Keys
```

```
"identity_validator": Validator {
    operation = [
        // require existing signature for updates
        "owner": ...,
        // allow threshold encryption for recovery
        "multisig": ...
]
```

Operations: validation rules enforced on each entry in a mapping

- Allowed operations in **Validators** are specified at **mapping** level
- Individual entries can customize operation parameters
- Example Operations
 - OpCASignature, OpOwnerSignature, OpNofMSignatures

```
Operation Example: PGP Keys
```

```
Validator { operations = [
    "owner": OpOwnerSignature { }
    "multisig": OpNOfMSignatures {
        alias = ["eff.org", "mozilla.org", "ietf.org"]
        required_number = 2
    }
]}
```

EntryUpdates: changes to a mapping entry


• All validators are evaluated and must pass for update to succeed

Entry Update Example: PGP Keys

```
EntryUpdate {
    mapping_id = "keynet",
    key = Alias { Email {
        address = "colinman@stanford.edu"
        domain = "stanford.edu"
        } }
    value = "{new public key here}"
    update_operations = {optional parameters}
}
```

Mapping Abstraction vs Smart Contracts

- Easy to implement on top of consensus layer
- Easy to use (operations already defined)
- Less error-prone (Parity, Dao, etc.)
- Designed to be bootstrapped off existing trust infrastructure
 - Exploring options to use Stellar Consensus Protocol



https://github.com/colinman/keynet