

# Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data

draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-01

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# Big News from IANA

	17	IP Address/Prefix Option	[RFC5568]
	18	New Router Prefix Information Option	[RFC4068]
	19	Link-layer Address Option	[RFC5568]
	20	Neighbor Advertisement Acknowledgment Option	[RFC5568]
	21	PvD ID Router Advertisement Option (reclaimable in future)	[draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains]
	22	unassignea	
	23	MAP Option	[RFC4140]
	24	Route Information Option	[RFC4191]
	25	Recursive DNS Server Option	[RFC5006][RFC8106]
	26	RA Flags Extension Option	[RFC5175]
	27	Handover Key Request Option	[RFC5269]
	20	Handayar Kay Banky Ontion	[DECE360]

-02 will include this number. Hackathon was done with this NDP Option Type



# Changes in -01

- Remove all information about 'metered', 'characteristics'
  - Still relevant but in another document?
- Clarify that PvD additional information is NOT to modify host stack behavior but only for applications
- Improve security & privacy sections
- Padding now to the 64-bit boundary
- Container approach to address a mix of PvD-aware and non PvD-aware hosts (see next slide)



## PvD ID Option Format

```
Length
      Sequence Number
  -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                          PvD ID FQDN
                                 Padding
             Router Advertisement message header
              (Only present when A-flag is set)
  Options ...
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```




# PvD ID Example

```
Type: 21
                  Length: 12
                                0000
                                               Reserved
       Sequence Number
      Χ
                       а
                                       m
                                       3
                                                        0
                                                    0 (padding)
                                       0
      r
                       g
   0 (padding) |
                  0 (padding)
                                    0 (padding)
                                                    0 (padding)
  RDNSS option (RFC 6106) length: 5
| Prefix Information Option (RFC 4861) length: 4
```





# PvD ID Example





# PvD ID Example

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3	4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1			
Type: 21	Length: 12	0 0 0  R	eserved			
Sequence	Number	7	e			
x	a	m	p			
l l	e	] 3	0			
r	l g	0	0 (padding)			
0 (padding)	0 (padding)	0 (padding)	0 (padding)			
RDNSS option (RFC 6106) length: 5						
Prefix Information Option (RFC 4861) length: 4						

Non PvD-Aware Host



# Implementation status

Linux - <a href="https://github.com/IPv6-mPvD">https://github.com/IPv6-mPvD</a>

- pvdd: A Daemon to manage PvD IDs and Additional Data
- Linux Kernel patch for RA processing
- iproute tool patch to display PvD IDs
- Wireshark dissector
- RADVD and ODHCPD sending PvD ID

Implemented in one commercial vendor router

# IPv6 mPvD + NEAT + SADR + Capport

=

Tom Jones





Pierre Pfister

Eric Vyncke



Wenqin Shao




**Kyle Larose** 



Michael Di Bartolomeo



# This Hackathon: Complete test topology and interop.



https://github.com/IPv6-mPvD



# Next steps

• Review is required

• Present the I-D to 6MAN & V6OPS WG

intarea WG IETF 101 11



# What about Security & Privacy




#### Confidentiality of PvD Additional Information

- The well-known URL <a href="https://pvd-name.example.org/.well-known/pvd">https://pvd-name.example.org/.well-known/pvd</a> could contain some sensitive data (bandwidth, recursive DNS servers, ...)
- This well-known URL is guessable ;-)
- How to provide confidentiality?
- 1) do not put anything which is really confidential
- 2) the HTTPS server should reject connections originated from prefixes not belonging to example.org



### Spoofing the PvD ID

- Can an hostile party send rogue PvD, pretending to be example.org while they are hacker.org?
- No signature in the RA option (SeND not used)






# Layer-2 Adjacent Attacker






Attackers are First Hop Router and PvD "Server"






#### Attacker is the First Hop Router






#### Attacker is the First Hop Router with NPTv6





#### Attacker Has a Foothold in "Good" PvD

PIO=2001:db8:beef::/64





#### Host Privacy with Additional Information

- Each host will fetch the additional information on connection
- The HTTPS server will know the IP address of all clients and that the client is connecting...
  - Some privacy issues esp. if using EUI-64 or stable address
- Host can change to another IP address after fetching the file
- HTTPS belongs to the network operator (same as RADIUS, DHCP, ...)
- Anyway, it has more privacy than <a href="http://captive.example.com/hotspot-detect.html">http://captive.example.com/hotspot-detect.html</a> which belongs to another global operator