Discarding Handshake Keys

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When Can Keys Be Destroyed? (#1544)





Simple Solution: Timers

Treat each packet number space separately

A space is done when both read and write keys for the next space are ready

Set a timer when done and destroy the keys when it expires

- ... until then, resend CRYPTO and send ACK as normal
- ... afterwards, drop packets protected with those keys

The timer can be long-ish (no practical harm in infinite)

Separate Packet Number Spaces



Optimization: Implicit Acknowledgment

Receiving Handshake packets implies that all CRYPTO frames from Initial packets were received

Receiving 1-RTT packets at a server means that all CRYPTO frames in Handshake packets were received by the client

Receiving acknowledgments for 1-RTT packets at a client means that all CRYPTO frames in Handshake and 0-RTT packets were received by a server

Stop sending those CRYPTO frames then

Let the packets with ACK frames that appear afterwards drop

Alternative: HANDSHAKE_DONE Frame

An explicit signal that an endpoint believes that the handshake is done

On receipt endpoints could destroy all handshake keys



Doesn't address 0-RTT receive keys at the server

Proposal: Document Timer-based Cleanup

Optimizations are fun, but they don’t need to be standard