




Securing IoT Devices on our networks

Eliot Lear
IETF 103

Why is IoT different?



Questions that need answering

What is this thing?

Who is responsible for it?

What access does it need?

Is it doing what it should be doing?

- What is the device's identity? Does this particular thing belong on the network?

- What type of thing is it?


- If something breaks, who should be called?

- With which devices should it communicate?


- With which devices is it actually communicating?

- Is it behaving as designed?

Steps needed to get a device to join a network



Design goal choices



Basic concept: a voucher (RFC 8366)

module: ietf-voucher

yang-data voucher-artifact:

+---- voucher

+---- created-on yang:date-and-time

+---- expires-on? yang:date-and-time

+---- assertion enumeration

+---- serial-number string

+---- idevid-issuer? binary

+---- pinned-domain-cert binary


+---- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean

+---- nonce? binary


+---- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time

Bootstrapping with wired (ANIMA BRSKI)

- Pledge=Device
- Registrar=Store of known devices (tied to AAA infrastructure)
- MASA="Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority"
- EST -enrollment over secure transport




Client gets a certificate via EST (RFC 7030)




Getting there with wireless

- Use existing management path in the network: EAP
- Keep onboarding capabilities in interface “bring up”
- Reuse as much as possible

draft-lear-eap-teap-brski



Does MASA know lightbulb was sold to Company B?



What if the Internet isn't there?




SSID="Company A"




SSID="Company B"




MASA tests proof of ownership



Thing tests proof of ownership



No MASA



Approaches to onboarding


| | WPS | Simple Serial # | DPP | BRSKI w/ sales integration | BRSKI no sales integration | BRSKI with POP |
|---------------------------------|-------|-----------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Correct Network Selection | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Onboard without Internet access | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Proof of ownership | No | No | No | Yes | Yes** | Yes*** |
| Supply chain security | No | No | No | Yes | Yes*** | Partial |
| Hands free* | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Well secured | No | Maybe | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Status | Here | Not planned | Std | Partially standardized | Partially standardized | Beginning |
| Key type | None | Ser # | Asym. | X.509 | X.509 | X.509 + private |
| Manufacturing complexity | Nvram | Serial# | Public Key + label/BOM | Cert+Back End Integration | Cert | Cert+label/BOM |

*Hands free = no label or BOM integration

**Assumes protection of proof of ownership

***Assumes Internet access to enterprise AAA at some point

Lines of complexity



Key Observation

- All of this revolves around a formal assertion handed to the device- **a voucher**
- Making the voucher extensible for different forms of authentication/pop seems ideal

```
yang-data voucher-artifact:
+---- voucher
+---- created-on          yang:date-and-time
+---- expires-on?        yang:date-and-time
+---- assertion           enumeration
+---- serial-number       string
+---- idevid-issuer?      binary
+---- pinned-domain-cert  binary
+---- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+---- nonce?              binary
+---- last-renewal-date?  yang:date-and-time
```

Questions

- Which methods should we standardize?
 - Thing tests proof of ownership
 - MASA test proof of ownership
 - No MASA involved
- Can manufacturers reasonably use...
 - 802.1X?
 - EAP-TLS/EAP-TEAP?
 - X.509 Certificates?
 - COSE/JOSE objects?
- Can we merge some of these capabilities with EAP-NOOB?

Drafts

- draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16 (core draft)
- draft-friel-anima-brski-over-802dot11-01 (some options)
- draft-lear-eap-teap-brski-01 (BRSKI over EAP)
- draft-lear-brski-pop-00 (proof of possession)