Compromise trustworthy visibility in working systems Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (RATS) BOF IETF #103


Eric Voit
Principal Engineer – Cisco Systems, Inc.
evoit@cisco.com

Nov-2018

Agenda

- Remotely attesting switches and routers
- ~ Demo

Remotely attesting switches and routers



Known Good Value — is it correct? - compare attested measurement against verifiable know good value

Imprint Value — has it changed? - compare attested measurement against initial snap shot value

Event Occurrence – **did it happen?** – monitor device for attested events that should not occur

More than just at Boot time

Platform Verification of the secure boot and the identity of the device.

Software Checks of the software files and in-memory contents. Logs.


Hardware Inventory of hardware components as expected.

Configuration Unexpected changes in the device configuration? Logs.

ACL configuration
Filtered Syslog entries
Configured keys
Users, and their permissions
Checksum of software binaries
Running software processes
Adjacent L2 / L3 neighbors
Interface state (up/down)


~Demo

(Screen-shots of Demo due to time constraints)



~Demo

(Screen-shots of Demo due to time constraints)



More info

https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/td/docs/cloud-systems-management/application-policy-infrastructure-controller-enterprise-module/1-5-x/integrity verification/user-guide/Cisco Integrity Verification Application APIC-EM User Guide 1 5 0 x.pdf

Thank you!