
Composite Crypto


Composite Signatures and Keys for X.509 and CMS



Composite Signatures What?

- Address quantum timeline uncertainty by extending public keys and signatures to have 2 or more "component" algorithms.
- Automatically applies to X.509, CMS, and any protocol that uses "ASN.1-based" signatures.





Composite Signatures Why do it this way?

General

0

- Simplicity: list of SPKI / Signature, so inherits all flexibility of alg / param selection (for ex. vs pairwise alg OIDs).
- Simplicity / Sec:

Alg:Composite" means that the "multiple-signature" logic is handled by crypto library, not protocol or application layer; harder for everyday programmers to get it wrong.

vs Multiple certs

- Simplicity: Fits into existing pubkey / sig fields in (any?) existing protocol.
- Binds multiple PubKeys / SigValues into one object.
 - Sec: easier to analyze, ex.: alg / key substitution attacks.
 - Sec: All component keys revoked together.
 - **Ops**: Still a single cert / private key to manage.
 - Sec / Ops: Single PKI chain/root.

Cert size

- **Objection**: "PQ algs will blow certs up to ~50 kb!!!"
 - This is unavoidable.
 - Solutions to this problem (ex.: certs contain hashes of key / sig data) would probably be made to the SPKI / SigValue objects, and therefore are orthogonal to this draft.

Composite Signatures Open Design Questions

Verifier behavior for Unsupported and deprecated algs?

What if a client doesn't recognize a component AlgID?

What if RSA is deprecated, but is present as a component key?

- In single-key crypto, you reject.
- Desired behaviour in composite: proceed so long as "there are enough good algs left".
- Implementation is tricky.

0

Key Revocation:

- Desired behaviour in composite:
 If any component key is revoked, the entire composite key / cert is revoked.
- Security Consideration:
 Does each component key need to be checked individually for previous compromise?

Key Usage:

- This draft only covers signatures; we leave encryption keys as a future work.
- This draft applies the same
 KeyUsage to all component
 keys. "Dual-usage" or other
 kinds of non-homogenous
 KeyUsages are attractive,
 but makes security analysis
 very complex.

Composite Signatures Implementation Gotchas

"Intrinsic" Message Digests

- Some sig algs (ex. RSA) expect to be given a digest to sign, while some have an intrinsic hash (ex. EdDSA) and expect to be given a full message.
- Some crypto libs will need re-architecture to do message digesting at sig verification layer, and not higher in the call stack.

Alg Parameters

• Currently, the AlgID inside the PUBLIC-KEY structure says "I'm Composite" rather than

"I'm Composite with RSA-4096, EdDSA, and SPHINCS" (ie absent PARAMS) which means the AlgID by itself carries almost no information. Will that cause problems for any protocols?

• The

sa-CompositeSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM structure uses the PARAMS field to list component algs. RSASSA-PSS is the only existing alg that uses SigAlg PARAMS. Some implementations hard-code RSA-PSS as an exception and may not have generic support for SigAlg PARAMS.

