

Systems Considerations

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RFC 7258: Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack

[Docs] [txt|pdf] [draft-farrell-p...] [Tracker] [Diff1] [Diff2]

BEST CURRENT PRACTICE

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ARM Ltd.
May 2014

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Request for Comments: 7258
BCP: 188
Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721

Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack

Abstract
Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.

Status of This Memo
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on BCPS is available in [Section 2 of RFC 5741](#).

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

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IETF

IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality

IAB Chair <iab-chair@iab.org> | Fri, 14 November 2014 09:26 UTC | Show h

Please find this statement issued by the IAB today.

On behalf of the IAB,
Russ Housley
IAB Chair

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IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality

In 1996, the IAB and IESG recognized that the growth of the Internet depended on users having confidence that the network would protect their private information. RFC 1984 documented this need. Since that time, we have seen evidence that the capabilities and activities of attackers are greater and more pervasive than previously known. The IAB now believes it is important for protocol designers, developers, and operators to make encryption the norm for Internet traffic. Encryption should be authenticated where possible, but even protocols providing confidentiality without authentication are useful in the face of pervasive surveillance as described in RFC 7258.

Newly designed protocols should prefer encryption to cleartext operation. There may be exceptions to this default, but it is important to recognize that protocols do not operate in isolation. Information leaked by one protocol can be made part of a more substantial body of information. Correlation of traffic observation. There are protocols which result require encryption on the Internet even when it would be a detriment for that protocol operating in isolation.

Encryption be deployed throughout the protocol stack in a single place within the stack where all kinds of information are protected.

to design for confidential operation by developers to include encryption in their code by default. We similarly encourage policy administrators to permit encryption to be deployed throughout the protocol stack in a single place within the stack where all kinds of information are protected.


to restore the trust users place in content delivery networks, we must demonstrate the effectiveness of traffic management and intrusion detection. These activities there are no solutions to those affected to foster development of policies which allow us to move to an Internet that is secure by default.

Encrypt everything!


DISPLAY LUMAscape



The Confidentiality Dilemma



The Confidentiality Dilemma



Our Reaction So Far

[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: [00](#) [01](#) [02](#) [03](#)

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational
Expires: January 7, 2020

S. Farrell
Trinity College Dublin
July 6, 2019

We're gonna need a bigger threat model

draft-farrell-etm-03

Abstract

We argue that an expanded threat model is needed for Internet protocol development as protocol endpoints can no longer be considered to be generally trustworthy for any general definition of "trustworthy."

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2020.

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Versions: [00](#)

Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational
Expires: February 23, 2020

M. Nottingham
August 22, 2019

The Internet is for End Users

draft-iab-for-the-users-00

Abstract

This document explains why the IAB believes the IETF should consider end-users as its highest priority concern, and how that can be done.

Note to Readers

The issues list for this draft can be found at <https://github.com/intarchboard/for-the-users-00>.

The most recent (often, unpublished) changes are listed at <https://intarchboard.github.io/users/commits/master> [3].

See also the draft's current status at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-iab-for-the-users-00>.

Dirk Kutscher

Great Expectations

without comments

Protocol Design and Socioeconomic Realities

(PDF-version)

The Internet & Web as a whole qualify as wildly successful technologies, each of which empowered by wildly successful protocols per RFC 5218's definition [1]. As the Internet & Web became critical infrastructure and business platforms, most of the originally articulated design goals and features such as global reach, permissionless innovation, accessibility etc. [5] got overshadowed by the trade-offs that they incur. For example, global reach —intended as enabling global connectivity — can also imply global reach for infiltration, regime change and infrastructure attacks by state actors. Permissionless innovation — motivated by the intention to overcome the lack of innovation options in traditional telephone networks — has also led to permissionless surveillance and mass-manipulation-based business models that have been characterized as detrimental from a societal perspective.

Most of these developments cannot be directly ascribed to Internet technologies alone. For example, most user surveillance and data extraction technologies are actually based on web protocol mechanisms and particular web protocol design decisions. While it has been documented that some of these technology and standards developments have been motivated by particular economic interests [2], it is unclear whether different Internet design decisions could have led to a different, "better" outcome. Fundamentally, economic drivers in different societies (and on a global scale) cannot be controlled through technology and standards development alone.

This memo is thus rather focused on specific protocol design and evolution questions, specifically on the question how technical design decisions relate to socio-economic effects, and aims at providing input for future design discussions, leveraging experience from 50 years of Internet evolution, 30 years of Web evolution, observations from economic realities, and from years of Future Internet research.

IP Service Model

Systems Considerations

- **Suggest looking at bigger picture and starting more principled discussion**
- Consolidation/Centralization
 - Need a discussion without sensationalizing issues
 - Technical vs. economic factors
- **Control points in the network**
 - Censorship by authoritarian regime bad
 - Parental & enterprise control seems useful
- **For the user...**
 - Applications don't want to trust the infrastructure
 - Can users trust the applications?
 - Role of operating systems...

Systems Considerations

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