INTERNET-DRAFT Local Domain Names November 1998 Expires May 1999 Local DNS Names ----- --- ----- Donald E. Eastlake 3rd Status of This Document This draft, file name draft-ietf-dnsind-local-names-06.txt, is intended to be become an Informational RFC. Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent to the DNS mailing list or to the author. This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months. Internet-Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a ``working draft'' or ``work in progress.'' To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Abstract A set of second level domain names are defined under a new top level domain name such that local private DNS zones can be maintained similar to the private IP addresses reserved in [RFC 1918]. These zone locally appear to be part of the global DNS name tree. Additional second level domain names are assigned under this TLD for loopback addresses and IPv6 link and site local addresses. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 1] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names Acknowledgments The valuable contributions of the following persons are gratefully acknowledged: Dan Harrington Michael A. Patton Table of Contents Status of This Document....................................1 Abstract...................................................1 Acknowledgments............................................2 Table of Contents..........................................2 1. Introduction............................................3 2. Local Names Via The .local Top Level Domain.............3 2.1 Local DNS Server Specifics.............................6 2.2 Local in-addr.arpa Zones...............................7 2.3 Name Conflicts.........................................7 2.4 Nested Enclaves........................................8 3. Other Names in .local...................................8 4. Security Considerations.................................8 4.1 Strength of Privacy Offered............................8 4.2 Interaction with DNSSEC................................9 4.3 Network Abuse..........................................9 References................................................10 Author's Address..........................................10 Expiration and File Name..................................10 Appendix A: the .local zone...............................11 Appendix B: the .in-addr.arpa zone.......................13 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 2] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names 1. Introduction The global Internet Domain Name System (DNS) is documented in [RFC 1034, 1035, 1591] and numerous additional Requests for Comment. It defines a tree of names starting with root, ".", immediately below which are top level domain names such as .com and .us. Below top level domain names there are normally additional levels of names. Generally the information in the DNS is public and intended to be globally accessible. Certainly, in the past, the model of the Internet was one of end-to-end openness [RFC 1958]. However, with increasing security threats and concerns, firewalls and enclaves have appeared. In many cases, organizations have hosts or resources that they specifically want to reference with DNS names but which they also want to be walled off from global access and even from global knowledge of the DNS name. In the realm of IP addresses, this has been accomplished by reserving three blocks of addresses as documented in [RFC 1918]. Familiarity with the contents of that RFC is assumed. In the DNS area, local private names have generally been achieved in the past by "splitting" DNS at the enclave boundary, giving different answers to resolvers depending or whether they are inside or outside of the enclave, using different servers for inside and outside, etc. as mentioned in [RFC 1918]. Such relatively complex configuration diddling is at variance with the simple global tree structure of the initial DNS. This document specifies an alternative approach to achieving the effect of local names that is more in tune with the concept of a single global DNS tree or at least the appearance of a single tree. Use of this approach is not required and older techniques will continue to work. [RFC 1918] requires that private IP addresses not be indirectly exposed to the general Internet via DNS records or otherwise. This RFC provides the recommended way to accomplish such private IP address hiding and carves out an exception thereto for the addresses of the servers for some zones which are children of the .local top level domain name. 2. Local Names Via The .local Top Level Domain The fundamental idea, as described in more detail below, is to define second level domains under .local which are served by DNS name servers that have private IP addresses. These server's addresses would only be routed within the domain to which the names are local. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 3] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names Thus the servers, and the names and resource records inside them, would not be directly accessible outside the enclave, if the guidelines in this document are followed. The following figure shows a highly simplified overview of an example configuration: +----------------------------+ | domain/enclave A | | | | #====================# | | H private IP addrs A H | | H H | +-----------------------O privhost1 H | | | H H | +-----+-----------------O privhost2 H | | | | H H | | | | #====================# | | | a | | | +--------------------O pubhost3 | .local | | | | | +----+ | | +----------------------------+ | | | | | | | | +----------------------------+ | | | | | domain/enclave B | (root) | | | | | | . ----+ | | | | #====================# | | | | | | H private IP addrs B H | | | | | | H H | | +--|--------------------O privhost2 H | | | | | H H | +-------+ +-----------------O privhost3 H | .com | | H : H | | | #====:===============# | | | : | | b +-------------O pubhost4 | +------+ | | | +-------------O pubhost5 | | | | | +----------------------------+ | | example +---------------------O pubhost6 Starting at the bottom, pubhost6 is intended to illustrate an ordinary host connected to the Internet with domain name pubhost6.example.com. Though not indicated in the above diagram, every DNS zone is in fact served by at least two hosts (and some but substantially more). The addresses of the servers for the root (.), .com, and example.com zones would all be in the public portion of the Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 4] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names IP address space, i.e., in the space of all unicast IP addresses not reserved for private use. Moving to the top of the figure, enclave A represents some organization that wishes to have some hosts with publicly visible names and some with hidden names that are visible only locally. pubhost3.a.com is an example of a publicly visible host which would probably have a public IP address although access to pubhost3 from outside the enclave might be filtered or even blocked by a firewall or the like. privhost1 and privhost2 are examples of hidden names. If a zone with privhost1 and privhost2 in it is served by DNS servers with private IP addresses ("private IP addresses A") such that the servers are accessible within enclave A but not from outside enclave A, then the information is that zone will only be locally visible. As show in the above figure, privhost1 and privhost2 have addresses that are also private IP addresses, making those hosts inaccessible outside enclave A, but it is the private addresses of the DNS servers, not of the hosts pointed to from within the private DNS zone, that provides the protection for the DNS names and other private DNS information. (From the above simplified diagram, it might appear that fully qualified domain names of these hosts would be privhost1.local and privhost2.local but the names are actually more complex as explained in Section 2.1.) Finally, in the middle, another enclave is shown with two hosts with visible names and public IP addresses, pubhost4.b.com and pubhost5.b.com. In addition, there are two private host names privhost2 and privhost3. The duplication of privhost2 between enclaves A and B would not be a problem as only DNS resolvers in enclave A can access the DNS servers with the zone having the enclave A version of privhost2 and only DNS resolvers in enclave B can access the DNS servers with the zone having the enclave B version of privhost2. Publicly visible host names are required by [RFC 1918] to have public (i.e., globally unique) IP addresses. Private DNS names would normally have private IP addresses, and all do in the figure above, but this is not required. A public IP address could be stored under a private name. And, of course, it is possible for the same physical host to have multiple IP addresses, including a mix of public and private. The dotted line in the figure above is intended to indicate that privhost3 and pubhost4 are actually the same physical machine. The could be accomplished equally well by storing a single public address for that host under both the public and private names or by having the host answer to both a public IP address stored under the public name and a private IP address stored under the private name. In the later case you could even also store the public address along with the private address under the private name. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 5] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names 2.1 Local DNS Server Specifics A variety of second level names are provided in the .local zone each of which is a delegation point to a zone with some number of name servers in one of the private IP address space blocks. The multiple second level names permit choice between the different private IP blocks and different numbers of servers. Thus the actual fully qualified name for the private host examples in the figure above would be more like privhost1.a2.local, privhost2.a2.local, etc. (but see Section 2.3 below). Glue records are provided to give private IP addresses for initial name servers; however, it should be noted that the NS and A records in the local zones will dominate the information stored in the .local zone. This means that once a resolver has contacted a local server, the list of NS RRs in the local zone on that server will control and could contain more or different servers than were given at the chosen .local delegation point. Nevertheless, the glue A records in the global .local zone do place some constraints of the private IP address of the local DNS servers implementing zones which are children of .local. It is also possible for an enclave to locally configure its own version of the .local zone. Depending on its enclave boundary implementation, it might be able to constrain all of its internal references to .local to use its own variant version. This version could have whatever private addresses were desired for the name servers involved. Such a configuration MAY be used, but it is recommended that the globally accessible .local specified herein be used for uniformity. That way, even a unconstrained resolver starting from the normal root servers (i.e., an "out of the box" resolver) will correctly resolve or fail to resolve names under .local depending on the resolvers location in the network as specified herein. It is only necessary for the local DNS servers to have private IP addresses to achieve the effect of local names. However, care MUST be taken that none of the local DNS servers or any server that might cache their output is accessible by any network interface that has a non-private IP address. Otherwise considerable confusion could result if local names are resolved by a resolver outside a local enclave to private IP addresses which have a different meaning for that resolver. The Appendix A to this document gives the recommended initial content of the .local zone. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 6] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names 2.2 Local in-addr.arpa Zones Inverse lookup of local names corresponding to private IP addresses needs to be provided via the in-addr.arpa zone. Appendix B contains recommended additions to the in-addr.arpa zone (or subzones thereof) to accomplish this. Because of the fixed naming within this zone, different names with different numbers of servers or different addresses can not be provided. As with the forward .local entries, the actual NS RRs in the servers serving the private portions of the inverse in-addr.arpa will dominate. When one of these is queried by a resolver, it can provide information on additional servers for that particular subzone in the private IP address portion of the in- addr.arpa tree. 2.3 Name Conflicts The intention is that local names would only be used in the enclave where the entities they refer to exist, and these names would not be exported. However, experience indicates that. despite best efforts to avoid it, some such names will leak out via email cc's, URL's in HTML, etc. (Such leakage occurs regardless of how the local names are formed or whether they are accessible via the default root zone.) These leaked private names can cause confusion if they can conflict with global names or names local to other enclaves. Use of the .local top level domain assures no conflict with global names. To assure no conflict with different local fully qualified names, the domain name of the enclave SHOULD always be prefixed to .local. For example, a company might have host1.company.co.xy as a globally accessible host and host2.company.co.xy.b3.local as a host for internal use only. The global name could normally be resolvable anywhere on the Internet while the local name could not be resolved anywhere except within the company enclave. Note that different names were chosen for the initial label in the two names above, i.e., host1 and host2. The reason for this is that, in some environments, local hosts are referred to by an unqualified names, such as host3. For DNS look up purposes, such a name must be expanded into a fully qualified domain name and a "search list" of possible suffix qualifications is tried. If, for example, both host4.school.ac.xy and host4.school.ac.xy.b3.local existed, then a local reference to "host4" would be ambiguous and could lead to either machine depending on the order of qualifications tried. This order could even be different in different pieces of local software or on different local hosts, resulting in substantial confusion. For this reason, it is strongly recommended that disjoint name sets be Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names used for global and local entity unqualified domain names and that fully qualified domain names be used wherever practical. 2.4 Nested Enclaves It is possible to have enclaves within enclaves. In general the best way to accomplish this is to use a different portion of the private IP address space at each nesting level of enclave. (Private IP address space can be reused in enclaves that are siblings or the like.) Then similar entries to those proposed here for .local can be made in the private zone referring to name servers with addresses in the nested enclave's private IP address space. 3. Other Names in .local Three additional second level domain names are assigned in the .local top level domain for other types of local names. In particular, link.local and site.local are reserved for use in qualifying IPv6 link local names and site local names. In addition, loopback.local is assigned and given the loopback address. 4. Security Considerations This section discusses the strength of the privacy offered by using subzones of .local, interactions with DNS security, and possible interaction with network abuse. 4.1 Strength of Privacy Offered It should be noted that the privacy of the DNS information protected by storing it in servers with private IP addresses is not strong. It is completely dependent on the integrity of enclave perimeter routing to make these servers inaccessible. And it may occasionally leak out in any case due to inclusion in email address fields, web pages, and the like, although such leakage should be no worse than current split DNS implementations of DNS data hiding. Software should not depend on local names being accessible only within a particular enclave as someone could deliberately create the Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 8] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names same names within a different enclave even if the names incorporate the name of the original enclave in an attempt to avoid such conflicts. 4.2 Interaction with DNSSEC Although an enclave may derive some amount of security by virtue of its isolation, it will normally be desirable to implement DNS security [draft-ietf-dnssec-secext2-*.txt] within the enclave. The enclave owner should generate their own keys and sign their subzone of .local. However, a signed copy of their public key can not be included in the .local zone as it is different for every enclave. Thus, to authenticate the .local subzone contents, it will be necessary to sign the KEY RR at the apex of the local subzone of .local with the .local zone key or another key that is trusted by local resolvers or staticly configure the public key for the .local subzone in local resolvers. 4.3 Network Abuse Use of the defined private server second level domain names under return addresses, or the like, could cause DNS, SMTP, and many other types of references to IP addresses in the [RFC 1918] blocks. This can occur from within a firewall due to web browsing or email processing of web pages or email from virtually anywhere in the Internet. However, this is not a new situation as anyone who controls any zone in the DNS, say zone.foo.example, can, although this violates [RFC 1918], create entries therein with arbitrary IP addresses (including multicast and undefined formats). Then, by using these name entries in email, web links, etc., attempt to cause a variety of spurious protocol connections to those addresses. Use of .local at least provides some warning that a name may be not be correctly resolvable. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 9] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names References RFC 1033 - M. Lottor, "Domain Administrators Operations Guide", November 1987. RFC 1034 - P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities", STD 13, November 1987. RFC 1035 - P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Implementation and Specifications", STD 13, November 1987. RFC 1591 - J. Postel, "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation", 03/03/1994. RFC 1918 - Y. Rekhter, R. Moskowitz, D. Karrenberg, G. de Groot, E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", 02/29/1996. RFC 1958 - B. Carpenter, "Architectural Principles of the Internet", 06/06/1996. draft-ietf-dnssec-secext2-*.txt - D. Eastlake "Domain Name System Security Extensions". Author's Address Donald E. Eastlake 3rd IBM 318 Acton Street Carlisle, MA 01741 USA Telephone: +1 978-287-4877 +1 914-784-7913 FAX: +1 978-371-7148 EMail: dee3@us.ibm.com Expiration and File Name This draft expires May 1999. Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsind-local-names-06.txt. Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 10] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names Appendix A: the .local zone ===== The .local zone suggested initial contents ==== local. IN SOA ... ... ( 1234 ; serial 90000 ; refresh, 25 hours 36000 ; retry, 10 hours 3456000 ; expiry, 40 days 43200 ) ; minimum of 12 hours NS ... ; actual servers for .local zone NS ... ... loopback A 127.0.0.1 AAAA 0::1 MX 100 loopback.local. a2.local. NS ns1.a2.local. NS ns2.a2.local. ns1.a2.local. A 10.1.1.2 ns2.a2.local. A 10.1.2.2 a3.local. NS ns1.a3.local. NS ns2.a3.local. NS ns3.a3.local. ns1.a3.local. A 10.1.1.2 ns2.a3.local. A 10.1.2.2 ns3.a3.local. A 10.2.1.2 a4.local. NS ns1.a4.local. NS ns2.a4.local. NS ns3.a4.local. NS ns4.a4.local. ns1.a4.local. A 10.1.1.2 ns2.a4.local. A 10.1.2.2 ns3.a4.local. A 10.2.1.2 ns4.a4.local. A 10.128.1.2 b2.local. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. ns1.b2.local. A 172.16.1.2 ns2.b2.local. A 172.16.2.2 b3.local. NS ns1.b3.local. NS ns2.b3.local. NS ns3.b3.local. ns1.b3.local. A 172.16.1.2 ns2.b3.local. A 172.16.2.2 ns3.b3.local. A 172.16.128.2 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 11] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names c2.local. NS ns1.c2.local. NS ns2.c2.local. ns1.c2.local. A 192.168.1.2 ns2.c2.local. A 192.168.2.2 c3.local. NS ns1.c3.local. NS ns2.c3.local. NS ns3.c3.local. ns1.c3.local. A 192.168.1.2 ns2.c3.local. A 192.168.2.2 ns3.c3.local. A 192.168.128.2 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 12] INTERNET-DRAFT Local DNS Names Appendix B: the .in-addr.arpa zone ===== Auggested additional entries in the in-addr.arpa zone ==== 10.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.a2.local. NS ns2.a2.local. ns1.a2.local. A 10.1.1.2 ns2.a2.local. A 10.1.2.2 16.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. ns1.b2.local. A 172.16.1.2 ; one set of glue records ns2.b2.local. A 172.16.2.2 ; for all the b2 cases 17.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 18.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 19.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 20.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 21.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 22.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 23.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 24.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 25.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 26.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 27.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 28.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 29.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 30.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 31.172.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.b2.local. NS ns2.b2.local. 168.192.in-addr.arpa. NS ns1.c2.local. NS ns2.c2.local. ns1.c2.local. A 192.168.1.2 ns2.c2.local. A 102.168.2.2 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [Page 13]