



Special usage of SPI values

- o The SPIs used for PIM will be statically configured

What if the sequence number wraps around ?

- how long does it take to wrap around ?

1 PIM message/second ==> 136 years

- Define rollover SPIs that are used when the existing SPI's sequence number overflows.

- o When dynamic key distribution mechanism becomes available, the SPIs can be obtained through the dynamic SA setup mechanism.
No need to change the current mechanism.

Special usage of SPI values

o Will ask IANA to assign three PIM specific values:

SPI: 0, not used

1, SKIP

2, equal opportunity, HMAC-MD5-96


3, Candidate RP advertisement HMAC-MD5-96

4, Bootstrap router PKCS#1 RSA signature


5 - 128, reserved with other configured keys

rest, reserved with dynamically distributed keys


Message Format, Authentication Header from IPSEC



Use of BSR private/public keys



Use of RP Key




All other routers will accept the bootstrap message if the RSA signature verification process succeeds.

- “RP key”

Candidate RPs share another MD5 key, with the candidate BSRs.

- “Equal opportunity key”



- o **“Differentiated capabilities” method** (HMAC-MD5-96/
HMAC-SHA1-96, RSA)

- “BSR private key”, “BSR public key”

- BSR signs an entire bootstrap message, and attach the signature*

Authentication Methods (static keys):

- o **“Equal Opportunity” method** (HMAC-MD5-96, HMAC-SHA1-96 based)

All routers share the same secret to compute digests

What to protect in PIM:(continued)

- Register/Register-stop messages

Affects a single group/router per message. No massive derivative actions

What to Protect in PIM:

- o “Single hop” messages:

Join/prune/graft/graft-ack/assert/hello

- o “Multihop” messages:

- Bootstrap messages

Contains Group-to-RP mapping, used by all routers

- Candidate RP advertisement messages

“Good” RP needed for sparse mode to function

Purposes:

- o Protection from unwanted protocol behavior.
 - Allow exchange of protocol messages only with authorized routers
 - Detect and discard bogus messages.
- o Privacy of message contents is a non-goal.

- o Purpose
- o What to protect, how much to protect
- o What security options to use
- o How to do it

Authenticating PIM version 2 messages

<draft-ietf-pim-v2-auth-00.txt>

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All mistakes are assumed to be the presenter's.