Internet Engineering Task Force John Shriver IP Security Working Group Intel Corporation Internet Draft March 22, 1999 IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB Status of this Memo This document is a submission to the IETF Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) Working Group. Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the working group mailing list (ipsec@tis.com) or to the editor. This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice This document is a product of the IETF's IPSec Working Group. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. Table of Contents 1 Introduction .............................................. 2 2 The SNMP Network Management Framework ..................... 2 3 Discussion ................................................ 3 IPSec Working Group [Page 1] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 4 MIB Definitions ........................................... 4 5 Security Considerations ................................... 16 6 IANA Considerations ....................................... 16 7 Acknowledgements .......................................... 16 8 Revision History .......................................... 16 9 References ................................................ 17 10 Author's Address ......................................... 18 1. Introduction This memo defines textual conventions for use in monitoring, status, and configuration MIBs for IPSec. It includes a MIB module that defines those textual conventions. 2. The SNMPv2 Network Management Framework The SNMP Network Management Framework presently consists of three major components. They are: o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2271 [2271]. o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described in RFC 1155 [1155], RFC 1212 [1212] and RFC 1215 [1215]. The second version, called SMIv2, is described in RFC 1902 [1902], RFC 1903 [1903] and RFC 1904 [1904]. o Message protocols for transferring management information. The first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1 and described in RFC 1157 [1157]. A second version of the SNMP message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [1901] and RFC 1906 [1906]. The third version of the message protocol is called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [1906], RFC 2272 [2272] and RFC 2274 [2274]. o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1157 [1157]. A second set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [1905]. o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2273 [2273] and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 2275 [2275]. IPSec Working Group [Page 2] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI. This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate translations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent, except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the translation process. However, this loss of machine readable information is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB. 3. Discussion The IPSec architecture [SECARCH] defines protocols for dynamic key management. These are based on the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol [ISAKMP]. ISAKMP defines the concept of Domains of Interpretation (DOI). The IPSec architecture has defined the Internet IP Security Domain of Interptetation for ISAKMP [IPDOI]. The IPSec architecture defines the Internet Key Exchange [IKE]. The use of this protocol is indicated by one of the constants in the IPSec DOI. This MIB defines textual conventions for the constants defined in ISAKMP, the IPSec DOI, and IKE. These are defined in a seperate MIB for two reasons. o There will be variables with a syntax corresponding to these textual conventions in numberous MIBs that will be defined for the IPSec architecture. o All of the numbers defined in these textual conventions are in "magic number" spaces that are managed by the IANA. If these conventions were part of the relevant MIBs, those MIBs would be constantly out of date. By placing them in a seperate MIB, that MIB can be maintained by the IANA simultaneously with assigning new values. IPSec Working Group [Page 3] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 4. MIB Definitions IPSEC-ISAKMP-IKE-DOI-TC DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS -- delete next line before release experimental, MODULE-IDENTITY, Unsigned32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- uncomment next line before release -- mib-2 FROM RFC1213-MIB TEXTUAL-CONVENTION FROM SNMPv2-TC; ipsecIsakmpIkeDoiTC MODULE-IDENTITY LAST-UPDATED "9902181705Z" ORGANIZATION "Shiva" CONTACT-INFO "John Shriver Intel Corporation 28 Crosby Drive Bedford, MA 01730 Phone: +1-781-687-1329 E-mail: John.Shriver@intel.com" DESCRIPTION "The MIB module which defines the textual conventions used in IPSEC MIBs. This includes Internet DOI numbers defined in RFC 2407, ISAKMP numbers defined in RFC 2408, and IKE numbers defined in RFC 2409. These Textual Conventions are defined in a seperate MIB module since they are protocol numbers managed by the IANA. Revision control after publication will be under the authority of the IANA." REVISION "9902181705Z" DESCRIPTION "Added IsakmpDOI TEXTUAL-CONVENTION." REVISION "9903051545Z" DESCRIPTION "Changed CONTACT-INFO." -- replace xxx in next line before release, uncomment before release -- ::= { mib-2 xxx } -- delete next line before release ::= { experimental 2407 } -- BOGUS! -- The first group of textual conventions are based on definitions IPSec Working Group [Page 4] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 -- in the IPSEC DOI, RFC 2407. IpsecDoiSituation ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "x" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IPSEC DOI Situation provides information that can be used by the responder to make a policy determination about how to process the incoming Security Association request. It is a four (4) octet bitmask, with the following values: sitIdentityOnly 0x01 sitSecrecy 0x02 sitIntegrity 0x04 The upper two bits (0x80000000 and 0x40000000) are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 sections 4.2 and 6.2" SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..4294967295) -- The syntax is not BITS, because we want the representation -- to be the same here as it is in the ISAKMP/IKE protocols. IpsecDoiSecProtocolId ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "These are the IPSEC DOI values for the Protocol-Id field in an ISAKMP Proposal Payload, and in all Notification Payloads. They are also used as the Protocol-ID In the Notification Payload and the Delete Payload. The values 249-255 are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 section 4.4.1" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI protoIsakmp(1), -- message protection -- required during Phase I -- of the IKE protocol protoIpsecAh(2), -- IP packet authentication -- via Authentication Header protoIpsecEsp(3), -- IP packet confidentiality IPSec Working Group [Page 5] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 -- via Encapsulating -- Security Payload protoIpcomp(4) -- IP payload compression } IpsecDoiTransformIdent ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IPSEC DOI ISAKMP Transform Identifier is an 8-bit value which identifies a key exchange protocol to be used for the negotiation. It is used in the Transform-Id field of an IKE Phase I Transform Payload. The values 249-255 are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 sections 4.4.2 and 6.3" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI keyIke(1) -- the hybrid ISAKMP/Oakley -- Diffie-Hellman key -- exchange } IpsecDoiAhTransform ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IPSEC DOI AH Transform Identifier is an 8-bit value which identifies a particular algorithm to be used to provide integrity protection for AH. It is used in the Tranform-ID field of a ISAKMP Transform Payload for the IPSEC DOI, when the Protocol-Id of the associated Proposal Payload is 2 (AH). The values 249-255 are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 sections 4.4.3 and 6.4" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI reserved1(1), -- reserved ahMd5(2), -- generic AH transform -- using MD5 ahSha(3), -- generic AH transform -- using SHA-1 ahDes(4) -- generic AH transform -- using DES } IPSec Working Group [Page 6] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 IpsecDoiEspTransform ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IPSEC DOI ESP Transform Identifier is an 8-bit value which identifies a particular algorithm to be used to provide secrecy protection for ESP. It is used in the Tranform-ID field of a ISAKMP Transform Payload for the IPSEC DOI, when the Protocol-Id of the associated Proposal Payload is 2 (AH), 3 (ESP), and 4 (IPCOMP). The values 249-255 are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 sections 4.4.4 and 6.5" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI espDesIv64(1), -- DES-CBC transform defined -- in RFC 1827 and RFC 1829 -- using a 64-bit IV espDes(2), -- generic DES transform -- using DES-CBC esp3Des(3), -- generic triple-DES -- transform espRc5(4), -- RC5 transform espIdea(5), -- IDEA transform espCast(6), -- CAST transform espBlowfish(7), -- BLOWFISH transform esp3Idea(8), -- reserved for triple-IDEA espDesIv32(9), -- DES-CBC transform defined -- in RFC 1827 and RFC 1829 -- using a 32-bit IV espRc4(10), -- reserved for RC4 espNull(11) -- no confidentiality -- provided by ESP } IpsecDoiAuthAlgorithm ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The ESP Authentication Algorithm used in the IPSEC DOI as a SA Attributes definition in the Transform Payload of Phase II of an IKE negotiation. This set of values defines the AH authentication algorithm, when the associated Proposal Payload has a Protocol-ID of 2 (AH). This set of values defines the ESP authentication algorithm, when the associated Proposal Payload has a Protocol-ID IPSec Working Group [Page 7] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 of 3 (ESP). Values 5-61439 are reserved to IANA. Values 61440-65535 are for private use. In a MIB, a value of 0 indicates that ESP has been negotiated without authentication." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 section 4.5" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI hmacMd5(1), hmacSha(2), desMac(3), kpdk(4) } IpsecDoiIpcompTransform ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IPSEC DOI IPCOMP Transform Identifier is an 8-bit value which identifies a particular algorithm to be used to provide IP-level compression before ESP. It is used in the Tranform-ID field of a ISAKMP Transform Payload for the IPSEC DOI, when the Protocol-Id of the associated Proposal Payload is 4 (IPCOMP). The values 1-47 are reserved for algorithms for which an RFC has been approved for publication. The values 48-63 are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems. The values 64-255 are reserved for future expansion." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 sections 4.4.5 and 6.6" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI ipcompOui(1), -- proprietary compression -- transform ipcompDeflate(2), -- "zlib" deflate algorithm ipcompLzs(3) -- Stac Electronics LZS } IpsecDoiEncapsulationMode ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current IPSec Working Group [Page 8] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 DESCRIPTION "The Encapsulation Mode used as an IPSEC DOI SA Attributes definition in the Transform Payload of a Phase II IKE negotiation. This set of values defines encapsulation modes used for AH, ESP, and IPCOMP when the associated Proposal Payload has a Protocol-ID of 3 (ESP). Values 3-61439 are reserved to IANA. Values 61440-65535 are for private use." SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI tunnel(1), transport(2) } IpsecDoiIdentType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The IPSEC DOI Identification Type is an 8-bit value which is used in the ID Type field as a discriminant for interpretation of the variable-length Identification Payload. The values 249-255 are reserved for private use amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2407 sections 4.4.5, 4.6.2.1, and 6.9" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI idIpv4Addr(1), -- a single four (4) octet -- IPv4 address idFqdn(2), -- fully-qualified domain -- name string idUserFqdn(3), -- fully-qualified username -- string idIpv4AddrSubnet(4), -- a range of IPv4 addresses, -- represented by two -- four (4) octet values, -- where the first is an -- address and the second -- is a mask idIpv6Addr(5), -- a single sixteen (16) -- octet IPv6 address idIpv6AddrSubnet(6), -- a range of IPv6 addresses, -- represented by two IPSec Working Group [Page 9] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 -- sixteen (16) octet values, -- where the first is an -- address and the second -- is a mask idIpv4AddrRange(7), -- a range of IPv4 addresses, -- represented by two -- four (4) octet values, -- where the first is the -- beginning IPv4 address -- and the second is the -- ending IPv4 address idIpv6AddrRange(8), -- a range of IPv6 addresses, -- represented by two -- sixteen (16) octet values, -- where the first is the -- beginning IPv6 address -- and the second is the -- ending IPv6 address idDerAsn1Dn(9), -- the binary DER encoding of -- ASN1 X.500 -- DistinguishedName idDerAsn1Gn(10), -- the binary DER encoding of -- ASN1 X.500 GeneralName idKeyId(11) -- opaque byte stream which -- may be used to pass -- vendor-specific -- information } -- The second group of textual conventions are based on defintions -- the ISAKMP protocol, RFC 2408. IsakmpDOI ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "These are the domain of interpretation values for the ISAKMP Protocol. They are a 32-bit value used in the Domain of Interpretation field of the Security Association Payload. Values 2-4294967295 are reserved to the IANA." REFERENCE "RFC 2048 section 3.4." SYNTAX INTEGER { isakmp(0), -- generic ISAKMP SA in -- Phase 1, which can be -- used for any protocol -- in Phase 2 IPSec Working Group [Page 10] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 ipsecDOI(1) -- the IPsec DOI as -- specified in RFC 2407 } IsakmpCertificateEncoding ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "These are the values for the types of certificate-related information contained in the Certificate Data field of a Certificate Payload. They are used in the Cert Encoding field of the Certificate Payload. Values 11-255 are reserved." REFERENCE "RFC 2408 section 3.9" SYNTAX INTEGER { pkcs7(1), -- PKCS #7 wrapped -- X.509 certificate pgp(2), -- PGP Certificate dnsSignedKey(3), -- DNS Signed Key x509Signature(4), -- X.509 Certificate: -- Signature x509KeyExchange(5), -- X.509 Certificate: -- Key Exchange kerberosTokens(6), -- Kerberos Tokens crl(7), -- Certificate Revocation -- List (CRL) arl(8), -- Authority Revocation -- List (ARL) spki(9), -- SPKI Certificate x509Attribute(10) -- X.509 Certificate: -- Attribute } IsakmpNotifyMessageType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "These are the values for the types of notification messages. They are used as the Notify Message Type field in the Notification Payload. This textual convention merges the types for error types (in the range 1-16386) and for notification types (in the range 16384-65535). This textual convention is also a merge of values defined by ISAKMP with additional values defined IPSec Working Group [Page 11] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 in the IPSEC DOI. The values 16001-16383 are reserved for private use as error types amongst cooperating systems. The values 32001-32767 are reserved for private use as notification types amongst cooperating systems." REFERENCE "RFC 2408 section 3.14.1 and RFC 2407 sections 4.6.3 and 6.10" SYNTAX INTEGER { -- Values defined for errors in ISAKMP -- reserved(0), -- reserved in DOI invalidPayloadType(1), doiNotSupported(2), situationNotSupported(3), invalidCookie(4), invalidMajorVersion(5), invalidMinorVersion(6), invalidExchangeType(7), invalidFlags(8), invalidMessageId(9), invalidProtocolId(10), invalidSpi(11), invalidTransformId(12), attributesNotSupported(13), noProposalChosen(14), badProposalSyntax(15), payloadMalformed(16), invalidKeyInformation(17), invalidIdInformation(18), invalidCertEncoding(19), invalidCertificate(20), certTypeUnsupported(21), invalidCertAuthority(22), invalidHashInformation(23), authenticationFailed(24), invalidSignature(25), addressNotification(26), notifySaLifetime(27), certificateUnavailable(28), unsupportedExchangeType(29), unequalPayloadLengths(30), -- values defined for errors in IPSEC DOI -- (none) IPSec Working Group [Page 12] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 -- values defined for notification in ISAKMP -- (none) -- values defined for notification in IPSEC -- DOI responderLifetime(24576), -- used to communicate IPSEC -- SA lifetime chosen by the -- responder replayStatus(24577), -- used for positive -- confirmation of the -- responder's election on -- whether or not he is to -- perform anti-replay -- detection initialContact(24578) -- used when one side wishes -- to inform the other that -- this is the first SA being -- established with the -- remote system } -- The third group of textual conventions are based on defintions -- the IKE key exchange protocol, RFC 2409. IkeEncryptionAlgorithm ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Values for encryption algorithms negotiated for the ISAKMP SA by IKE in Phase I. These are values for SA Attrbute type Encryption Algorithm (1). Values 7-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties." REFERENCE "RFC 2409 appendix A" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in IKE desCbc(1), -- RFC 2405 ideaCbc(2), IPSec Working Group [Page 13] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 blowfishCbc(3), rc5R16B64Cbc(4), -- RC5 R16 B64 CBC tripleDesCbc(5), -- 3DES CBC castCbc(6) } IkeHashAlgorithm ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Values for hash algorithms negotiated for the ISAKMP SA by IKE in Phase I. These are values for SA Attrbute type Hash Algorithm (2). Values 4-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties." REFERENCE "RFC 2409 appendix A" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in IKE md5(1), -- RFC 1321 sha(2), -- FIPS 180-1 tiger(3) } IkeAuthMethod ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Values for authentication methods negotiated for the ISAKMP SA by IKE in Phase I. These are values for SA Attrbute type Authentication Method (3). Values 6-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties." REFERENCE "RFC 2409 appendix A, draft-ietf-ipsec-dhless-enc-mode-00.txt Appendix A" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in IKE preSharedKey(1), dssSignatures(2), rsaSignatures(3), encryptionWithRsa(4), revisedEncryptionWithRsa(5), IPSec Working Group [Page 14] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 dhLessRsaEncryption(6) } IkeGroupDescription ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Values for Oakley key computation groups for Diffie-Hellman exchange negotiated for the ISAKMP SA by IKE in Phase I. They are also used in Phase II when perfect forward secrecy is in use. These are values for SA Attrbute type Group Description (4)." REFERENCE "RFC 2409 appendix A, http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in IKE modp768(1), -- default 768-bit MODP group modp1024(2), -- alternate 1024-bit MODP -- group ec2nGalois2P155(3), -- EC2N group on Galois -- Field GF[2^155] ec2nGalois2P185(4), -- EC2N group on Galois -- Field GF[2^185] modp1536(5) -- alternate 1536-bit MODP -- group } IkeGroupType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Values for Oakley key computation group types negotiated for the ISAKMP SA by IKE in Phase I. They are also used in Phase II when perfect forward secrecy is in use. These are values for SA Attribute type Group Type (5)." REFERENCE "RFC 2409 appendix A" SYNTAX INTEGER { reserved(0), -- reserved in IKE modp(1), -- modular eponentiation -- group ecp(2), -- elliptic curve group over -- Galois Field GF[P] ec2n(3) -- elliptic curve group over -- Galois Field GF[2^N] } IkePrf ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION IPSec Working Group [Page 15] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 DISPLAY-HINT "d" STATUS current DESCRIPTION "Values for Pseudo-Random Functions used with with the hash algorithm negotiated for the ISAKMP SA by IKE in Phase I. There are currently no pseudo-random functions defined, the default HMAC is always used. These are values for SA Attribute type PRF (13). Values 1-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties." REFERENCE "RFC 2409 appendix A" SYNTAX Unsigned32 (0..65535) END 5. Security Considerations Since this MIB defines only textual conventions, there are no security considerations. Security considerations exist only when managed objects are defined with these textual conventions. 6. IANA Considerations This document is the MIB definitions corresponding to a group of "magic numberes" that are maintained by the IANA. The IANA will maintain the MIB in this document as they assign new values of these magic numbers. This MIB will be maintained in the same manner as the IANAifType-MIB. 7. Acknowledgements Thanks are extended to Tim Jenkins for modifying his MIBs to use these textual conventions. 8. Revision History This section will be removed before publication. February 3, 1999. Initial release as draft-shriver-doi-tc-mib- 00.txt, due to issues as to whether the MIB was an IPsec or IPsecond work item. IPSec Working Group [Page 16] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 March 22, 1999. Released as draft-ietf-ipsec-doi-tc-mib-00.txt. Added IsakmpDOI textual convention. 9. References [IPDOI] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC2407, November 1998 [SECARCH] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC2401, November 1998 [IKE] Harkins, D., Carrel, D., "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC2409, November 1998 [ISAKMP] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and Turner, J., "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC2408, November 1998 [1902] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Structure of Management Information for version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1902, January 1996. [2271] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2271, January 1998 [1155] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", RFC 1155, May 1990 [1212] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", RFC 1212, March 1991 [1215] M. Rose, "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP", RFC 1215, March 1991 [1903] SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1903, January 1996. [1904] SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Conformance Statements for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1904, January 1996. IPSec Working Group [Page 17] Internet Draft IPSec DOI Textual Conventions MIB March 1999 [1157] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple Network Management Protocol", RFC 1157, May 1990. [1901] SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Introduction to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, January 1996. [1906] SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, January 1996. [2272] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2272, January 1998. [2274] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", RFC 2274, January 1998. [1905] SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, January 1996. [2273] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, MPv3 Applications", RFC 2273, SNMP Research, Inc., Secure Computing Corporation, Cisco Systems, January 1998. [2275] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 2275, January 1998. 10. Author's Address John Shriver Intel Corporation 28 Crosby Drive Bedford, MA 01730 Phone: 781-687-1329 EMail: John.Shriver@intel.com IPSec Working Group [Page 18]