# HIP, IPv6 AND MOBILITY

#### Some random rants

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# **Host Mobility vs Host Multihoming**

- IP addresses are bound to topological locations
- Thus, a host in move must change its IP address(es)
- To avoid triangular routing, all peers should be informed
- The basic security problem:
  - How does the peer know that the mobile host is really moving?
  - How does it know that it is the same host at the new location?
- Compare to Host Multihoming:
  - How does it know that the address(es) belong to the same host?
  - How does it know that the host is reachable at the address(es)?
- Ergo: From security point of view, host mobility and host multihoming could (and maybe should) be handled together

## Name Spaces and Mobility

- Current IP (v4 and v6) uses addresses to identify hosts
- MIPv6 creates temporary "host routes" at peer hosts
  - The Mobile Node (MN) sends a Binding Update (BU)
  - The peer creates a Binding Cache Entry, i.e. a temporary route Home Address -> Care-of-Address
  - Result: the Home Address is "shadowed"; all packets destinated to the Home Address are actually sent to the Care-of-Address
  - I.e. the peer performs "source routing" before sending the packet
- Consequence: the address "ownership" problem
  - i.e. who is authorized to create BCEs for a given Home Address (see draft-nikander-ipng-address-ownership-00.txt)
- With separate name spaces this problem doesn't exist
  - Mobility merely means that the HI -> Address(es) mapping is changed as requested by the HI "owner"

### **HIP and mobility**

- HIP creates an ESP SA between peers
- Thus, the addresses don't matter so much any more
  - If the ESP integrity protection verifies OK, the packet was sent by the peer no matter what the src and dst addresses are
  - Thus, by binding IPsec SPIs to HIs instead of addresses, the destination address becomes pure routinting information, and the source address becomes almost obsolete
  - (Consider these as observations, not suggestions)
- Basic mobility can be made very easy
  - Using the ESP SA, the mobile node sends the new address
  - The next message is sent to the new address
  - If there is response, the new address is valid
  - If there are no response, we may fall back to the old address
  - Authorization is implicit, no specific protocol needed

### Tackling the double jump

- What if both nodes move at the same time and miss the packets containing the new addresses?
- Maybe we can use a link local router as a forwarder?
  - Piggypack Host Identity to the Neighbor Soliciation message during Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
  - As a result, the link local router learns the Host Identity, i.e. the Mobile Node's public key
  - When the Mobile Node moves, it sends a Forwarding Request to the previous link local router, signed by its Host Identity key
- Remaining problem: How does the local router authenticate the Host Identity during DAD?
  - Maybe it can run HIP with the Mobile Node (this costs), or
  - Maybe we can use the 64 bit Interface Identifier as a HIT? (see the next slide)

### A possibility: HIT in Interface Identifier

- RFC3041 specifies random Interface Identifiers
  - 62 of the low order 64 bits of an IPv6 address can be random
- Maybe we could use these as a short HIT?
  - I.e. the address itself contains info about the host's public key
  - (Compare this to Mobile IPv6 SUCV / CAM / etc)
- Benefit: Can be authenticated without any protocol
  - i.e. no need to do check before receiving a forwarding request
- Collisions can be resolved if needed
  - Interface identifier = HASH ( Public Key, random number )
  - Host Identity = SIGN<sub>Private Kev</sub> ( Public Key, random number )
  - Upon collision, generate a new random number
- Be warned: there may be IPR problems with this scheme
  - To my knowledge, both Ericsson and Microsoft have filed patent applications that may or may not be related

### **Backward compatibility**

- For IPv6 hosts that don't support HIP it is always possible to use standard Mobile IPv6
- As a minimal requirement, a stationary HIP host MUST support Home Address destination options
  - It seems OK to ignore Binding Updates on the cost of suffering from triangular routing
- A mobile HIP host may either support sending Binding Updates towards non-HIP hosts or rely on a gateway
  - If it sends Binding Updates, it must also support Mobile IPv6 security mechanisms (that are to be defined)
  - If it relies on a gateway, it will always suffer from non-optimal routing

#### Stuff to read

- draft-nikander-ipng-address-ownership-00.txt
- draft-perkins-bake-01.txt
- draft-montenegro-sucv-01.txt
- "CAM: Childproof Authentication for Mobile IPv6," in Computer and Communications Review (CCR), April 2001
- RFC3041
- http://www.tml.hut.fi/~pnr/publications/draft-nikanderipng-pbk-addresses-00.txt