Last Modifield: 05/30/2002
The Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) working group is chartered to define a framework and protocols to both authorize and invoke distributed application services while maintaining the network's robustness and end-to-end data integrity. These services may be server-centric (i.e., an administrative domain that includes the origin server) and they may be client-centric (i.e., an administrative domain that includes the user agent).
Services provided in the OPES framework should be traceable by the application endpoints of an OPES-involved transaction, thus helping both service providers and end-users detect and respond to inappropriate behavior by OPES components. In particular, services provided in the OPES framework should be reversible by mutual agreement of the application endpoints. Furthermore, the OPES protocol must include authorization as one if its steps, and this must be by at least one of the of the application-layer endpoints (i.e. either the content provider or the content consumer).
In a first step, this working group will investigate and propose to the Area Directors whether the architecture to be developed must be compatible with the use of end-to-end integrity and encryption. Based on this decision, it will examine the requirements for both authorization and invocation of application services inside the network. The group will create an architecture for OPES services applied to application messages, and specify the protocol for HTTP and RTP/RTSP. The working group will define one or more methods for specification of policies, as well as the rules that enable application endpoints to control execution of such services.
The working group will have a design goal that policies affecting the control and authorization rules be compatible with existing policy work within the IETF (e.g. IETF Policy Framework) and be able to interface with systems automating distribution of policies to multiple endpoints, but it will be out of scope for this work to develop the policy framework and specify multiple-endpoint policy distribution.
With the requirements, the working group will specify a protocol or suite of protocols for invocation and tracking of OPES services inside the net, including the authorization and enforcement elements for one endpoint.
The working group will consider the ICAP protocol drafts as an OPES precursor and will will support development of an analysis that explains the limitations of ICAP, to accompany informational publication of that protocol. The working group will coordinate with other groups such as AVT and MMUSIC (in regard to RTP/RTSP) and WEBI (in regard to HTTP).
The group's work items can be listed as:
- Develop scenarios and use case document.
- Draft high-level, overall example OPES architecture.
- Define requirements for service invocation and tracing (callout).
- Define policy specification method(s) and rules for controlling execution of OPES services.
- Define callout and tracing protocol(s).
- Develop a vulnerability assessment and use this to guide each type of security service to be included in the protocols developed.
As each deliverable is developed, it must address the IAB considerations specified in RFC 3238.
- OPES scenarios and use case document.
- General OPES architecture/framework.
- Requirements for authorization and enforcement of OPES services.
- Requirements for invocation and tracking of OPES services.
- Vulnerability assessment document for OPES services.
- Mechanisms and protocols for service invocation and service tracking.
|APR 02||Submit OPES scenarios document and architecture document to IESG for Informational.|
|APR 02||Submit document on protocol (callout and tracing) requirements to IESG for Informational.|
|APR 02||Submit document on endpoint authorization and enforcement requirements to IESG for Informational.|
|APR 02||Submit document on threat/risk model for OPES services to IESG for Informational.|
|JUL 02||Initial protocol document for OPES services including their authorization, invocation, tracking, and enforcement of authorization|
|SEP 02||Consider additional OPES work such as extension to traffic beyond HTTP and RTSP and present new charter to IESG, or conclude working group.|
|SEP 02||Submit protocol document for OPES services including their authorization, invocation, tracking, and enforcement of authorization to IESG for Proposed Standard|
Monday, November 18 at 1300-1500 ================================= CHAIRS: Marshall Rose <firstname.lastname@example.org> Markus Hofmann <email@example.com> - Introduction, minutes taker, blue sheets Marshall Rose to take minutes. - Agenda bashing No comments. - Discussion of WG documents - Status of documents submitted to IESG (hofmann) - draft-ietf-opes-scenarios-00.txt - draft-ietf-opes-architecture-02.txt - draft-ietf-opes-protocol-reqs-01.txt The design teams met to address the IESG comments. Markus enumerated the issues, along with the suggested approach. Comments: Channels in the callout protocol: why are they there? they introduce security issues. They deal with state, but aren't clearly (enough) described. How many OPES callout protocols are there? How do you pick which one? There is one, but you can negotiate parameters when using it. More comments will be sent to mailing list/authors! - Security Threats and Risks for Open Pluggable Edge Services (bindignavile) - draft-ietf-opes-threats-00.txt Top-level taxonomy: in-band (datastream) and out-of-band (otherwise) threats. In-band threats: fundamentally, have to use hop-by-hop security to deal with opes flow network/application level threats. Authorization is also a large issue. Out-of-band threats: caused by weakness in implementation. Comments: There are other types of DOS besides overloading. The notion of "key manipulation" is puzzling. Why would an encrypted link have a generic threat in this area? It is not necessarily the case that keys will be sent across OPES, besides the notion of key distribution is out of scope. A reminder: we must focus only on threats introduced by OPES. - Requirements for Policy, Authorization and Enforcement of OPES Services (beck) - draft-ietf-opes-authorization-00.txt Top-level taxonomy: requirements for opes policy architecture and opes service authorization Comments: Reminder: look for a common solution to these requirements, instead of trying to come up with a specific solution. Does it matter if the intermediary is acting on behalf of the client or the origin server? Technically, no, in the sense that the requirements deal with OPES endpoints. Further, conflicting rules from different endpoints have to be dealt with, but that the actual algorithm for conflict resolution is out of scope for OPES. - Summary and wrap up of the ICAP discussion to accompany possible informational publication of that protocol (berzau) - draft-elson-icap-01.txt - draft-stecher-opes-icap-eval-00.txt The ICAP I-D is an individual specification that will be published as an RFC to document current practice. First there was ICAP 0.9, then 0.95, then 1.0 (Summer, 2001) which is stable and deployed. Various issues have arisen as a result of this experience. Comments: What about the "it's an RFC" problem? There's the "IESG note" to clarify the relationship of the draft to the standards track. - Next WG items to be worked on (hofmann) - OPES protocol Either we identify an existing protocol and declare victory, or we modify an existing protocol, or we create a new one. There are lots of things to choose from: HTTP, ICAP, SOAP, BEEP, etc., etc. Given the group's metabolism, have to be careful in terms of allocating resources. Let's start with the OPES Callout Protocol Requirements draft. Comments: Also include the OPES Policy/Authorization draft as a part of this. - Methods for specification of rules/policies (beck) How much can we learn from similar IETF efforts (e.g., CPL)? Also, what about IRML (an older individual I-D submission)? Is this a good start? Comments: Perhaps, but there are a lot of uses to be considered. Do we need more detailed requirements for a specification language? Perhaps this falls out of the policy requirements draft, (implying that we need to put more details into the policy requirements drafts, rather than having a separate document). - Adjourn.