Last Modified: 2003-01-27
The group will strive to improve the interoperability of these systems while improving security.
Specifically, the Working Group will:
* Clarify and amplify the Kerberos specification (RFC 1510) to make sure interoperability problems encountered in the past that occurred because of unclear specifications do not happen again. The output of this process should be suitable for Draft Standard status.
* Select from existing proposals on new or extended functionality those that will add significant value while improving interoperability and security, and publish these as one or more Proposed Standards.
|DEC 00||Submit the Kerberos Extensions document to the IESG for consideration as a Proposed standard.|
|DEC 00||Charter Review, update of milestones and refinement of goals.|
|JAN 01||Submit the PKINIT document to the IESG for consideration as a Proposed Standard.|
|MAR 01||Charter Review, update of milestones and refinement of goals.|
The Kerberos WG met on 3/17/3 for about 1 and a half hours. In attendance where approximately 53 people. Doug Engert the chairman open the meeting, and a scribe was selected. But since the scribe's computer broke during the meeting, we don't have the official notes, so this this is a compilation of notes from others. So if there is something missing, please get the comments to the list. Sam gave a presentation on the recent Kerberos 4 vulnerabilities. Steve Bellovin wrote a paper on this subject in 1991 or 92, but was one paragraph short of describing the attack. Cliff, and Ken talked on the three key drafts: Clarifications, KCRYPTO, and AES as they need to progress together to WG last call. Clarifications and AES are now ready for last call, KCRYPTO needs some minor changes and should be ready in a few days. Clarifications has already gone through a last call, so it expected to progress. These three drafts need to progress together, and need to progress before many of the other drafts, including the Extensions draft. Wyllys talked on the major revision of the change-set-password draft, which is being positioned to work with Clarifications and Extensions. Jeff Altman, talked about the UTF-8 draft, and the SASL equivalent draft. He will be looking at merging them, with help from the SASL chair. This should be a win-win situation for both WGs. Sasha addressed Packet Cable issues: - PacketCable (VoIP security) is using a frozen version of Kerberos revisions draft, before some features (e.g., keyed checksums) were removed for interoperability with RFC 1510. - When Kerberos extensions is defined with those features removed from clarifications, PacketCable may be able to at least optionally support an IETF RFC for Kerberos extensions. - PacketCable is also using latest versions of PKINIT and PKCROSS IETF drafts. - I didn't have any changes to report on the PKINIT draft; still have same issues to address on UTF8 string encoding and translation from X.500 names to Kerberos principal names and realms. Need to reference latest crypto and clarifications drafts. I talked on the IAKERB about how it had been before the IESG, for over a year, but there has been some concerns about it. It has being withdrawn, and will be considered again if there is substantial interest. It should be update with regards to Extensions. (Since then I realize I should not have made this statement. I and the AD have been in contact with the author on this, and it is expected the draft will be resubmitted.) Sam further commented: "I don't believe that iakerb is likely to have any issues with clarifications, but the mode of iakerb that has reduced number of round trips is likely to be incompatible with extensions because extensions will integrity-protect the request to make sure no changes are made." "I believe that one of iakerb, EAP krb5, , EAP GSS should actually go forward. Eap krb5 has been sketched out (although not publicly) but does not really exist within the IETF context. EAP GSS has significant security issues and I hope it does not go forward at all. Iakerb has significant esthetic issues that we have discussed to death here. I think we should wait until there is clear interest either from the wireless or dialup community that they want to use Kerberos and then work on one of these mechanisms."