Network Working Group Michele Bustos INTERNET-DRAFT IXIA Expires in: August 2003 Tim Van Herck Cisco Merike Kaeo Merike, Inc. Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This purpose of this document is to define terminology specific to measuring the performance of IPsec devices. It builds upon the tenets set forth in RFC 1242, RFC 2544, RFC 2285 and other IETF Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) documents used for benchmarking routers and switches. This document seeks to extend these efforts specific to the IPsec paradigm. The BMWG produces two major classes of documents: Benchmarking Terminology documents and Benchmarking Methodology documents. The Terminology documents present the benchmarks and other related terms. The Methodology documents define the procedures required to collect the benchmarks cited in the corresponding Terminology documents. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 1] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...................................................4 1.1. IPsec Fundamentals...........................................4 1.2. IPsec Operation..............................................6 1.2.1. Security Associations.....................................6 1.2.2. Key Management............................................6 1.2.3. Using the term 'Tunnel'...................................8 2. DOCUMENT SCOPE.................................................8 3. DEFINITION FORMAT..............................................8 4. KEY WORDS TO REFLECT REQUIREMENTS..............................9 5. EXISTING DEFINITIONS...........................................9 6. TERM DEFINITIONS..............................................10 6.1. IPsec.......................................................10 6.2. IPsec Device................................................10 6.3. ISAKMP......................................................11 6.4. IKE.........................................................11 6.5. Initiator...................................................12 6.6. Responder...................................................12 6.7. Security Association (SA)...................................13 6.8. IKE Phase 1.................................................13 6.8.1. Phase 1 Main Mode........................................13 6.8.2. Phase 1 Aggressive Mode..................................14 6.9. IKE Phase 2.................................................14 6.9.1. Phase 2 Quick Mode.......................................14 6.9.2. IPsec Tunnel.............................................15 6.10. Compound Tunnels...........................................15 6.10.1. Nested Tunnels...........................................15 6.10.2. Transport Adjacency......................................16 6.11. Transform Protocols........................................17 6.11.1. Authentication protocols.................................17 6.11.2. Encryption protocols.....................................17 6.12. IPsec Protocols............................................18 6.12.1. Authentication Header (AH)...............................18 6.12.2. Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)......................18 6.13. Selectors..................................................19 6.14. NAT Traversal (NAT-T)......................................19 6.15. IP Compression.............................................20 6.16. Security Context...........................................20 6.17. Performance Metrics........................................21 6.17.1. Tunnels Per Second (TPS).................................21 6.17.2. Tunnel Flaps Per Second (TFPS)...........................21 6.17.3. Tunnels Attempted Per Second (TAPS)......................22 7. TEST TERMINOLOGY..............................................22 7.1. Framesizes..................................................22 7.1.1. Layer3 Clear Framesize...................................22 Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 2] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 7.1.2. Layer3 Encrypted Framesize...............................22 7.1.3. Layer2 Clear Framesize...................................23 7.1.4. Layer2 encrypted framesize...............................24 7.2. Internet Mix Traffic (IMIX).................................24 7.3. Throughput..................................................25 7.3.1. IPsec Tunnel Throughput..................................25 7.3.2. IPsec Tunnel Encryption Throughput.......................25 7.3.3. IPsec Tunnel Decryption Throughput.......................26 7.4. Latency.....................................................26 7.4.1. IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency..........................26 7.4.2. IPsec Tunnel Decryption Latency..........................27 7.4.3. Time To First Packet (TTFP)..............................28 7.5. Frame Loss Rate.............................................28 7.5.1. IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss Rate..................28 7.5.2. IPsec Tunnel Decryption Frame Loss Rate..................29 7.6. Back-to-Back................................................29 7.6.1. Encryption Back-to-Back Frames...........................29 7.6.2. Decryption Back-to-back frames...........................29 7.7. Tunnel Setup Rate Behavior..................................30 7.7.1. Tunnel Setup Rate........................................30 7.7.2. IKE Tunnel Setup Rate....................................30 7.7.3. IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate..................................31 7.8. Tunnel Rekey................................................31 7.8.1. Phase 1 Rekey Time.......................................31 7.8.2. Phase 2 Rekey Time.......................................31 7.9. Tunnel Flapping.............................................32 7.9.1. Tunnel Flap Rate.........................................32 7.10. Tunnel Failover Time (TFT).................................33 7.11. IKE DOS Resilience Rate....................................33 8. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.......................................34 9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..............................................34 10. CONTRIBUTORS.................................................34 11. REFERENCES...................................................34 12. CONTACT INFORMATION..........................................37 13. FULL COPYRIGHT STATEMENT.....................................37 Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 3] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 1. Introduction Despite the need to secure communications over a public medium there is no standard method of performance measurement nor a standard in the terminology used to develop such hardware/software solutions. This results in varied implementations which challenge interoperability and direct performance comparisons. Standardized IPsec terminology and performance test methodologies will enable users to decide if the IPsec device they select will withstand relatively heavy loads of secured traffic. To appropriately define the parameters and scope of this document, this section will give a brief overview of the IPsec standard. 1.1. IPsec Fundamentals IPsec is a framework of open standards that provides data confidentiality, data integrity, and data authentication between participating peers. IPsec provides these security services at the IP layer. IPsec uses IKE to handle negotiation of protocols and algorithms based on local policy, and to generate the encryption and authentication keys to be used. IPsec can be used to protect one or more data flows between a pair of hosts, between a pair of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. The IPsec protocol suite set of standards is documented in RFC's 2401 through 2412 and RFC 2451. The reader is assumed to be familiar with these documents. Some Internet Drafts supersede these RFC's and will be taken into consideration. Mainly it will encompass current work in progress on NAT Traversal and updates to AH, ESP, and IKE. IPsec itself defines the following: Authentication Header (AH): A security protocol, defined in RFC 2402, which provides data authentication and optional anti-replay services. AH ensures the integrity and data origin authentication of the IP datagram as well as the invariant fields in the outer IP header. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): A security protocol, defined in RFC 2406, which provides confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service and limited traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services provided depends on options selected at the time of Security Association (SA) establishment and on the location of the implementation in a network topology. ESP authenticates only headers and data after the IP header. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 4] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Internet Key Exchange (IKE): A hybrid protocol which implements Oakley and SKEME key exchanges inside the ISAKMP framework. While IKE can be used with other protocols, its initial implementation is with the IPsec protocol. IKE provides authentication of the IPsec peers, negotiates IPsec security associations, and establishes IPsec keys. Note that IKE is an optional protocol within the IPsec framework and keys can also be manually configured. The AH and ESP protocols each support two modes of operation: transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode, two hosts provide protection primarily for upper-layer protocols. The cryptographic endpoints (where the encryption and decryption take place) are the source and destination of the data packet. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol header appears immediately after the IP header and before any higher-layer protocols (such as TCP or UDP). In the case of AH in transport mode, all upper-layer information is protected, and all fields in the IPv4 header excluding the fields typically are modified in transit. The fields of the IPv4 header that are not included are, therefore, set to 0 before applying the authentication algorithm. These fields are as follows: o TOS o TTL o Header Checksum o Offset o Flags In the case of ESP in transport mode, security services are provide only for the higher-layer protocols, not for the IP header. A tunnel is a vehicle for encapsulating packets inside a protocol that is understood at the entry and exit points of a given network. These entry and exit points are defined as tunnel interfaces. Tunnel mode can be supported by data packet endpoints as well as by intermediate security gateways. In tunnel mode, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies the IPsec processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that specifies the ultimate destination for the packet. The source address in the outer IP header is the initiating cryptographic endpoint; the source address in the inner header is the true source address of the packet. The security protocol header appears after the outer IP header and before the inner IP header. If AH is employed in tunnel mode, portions of the outer IP header are given protection (those same fields as for transport mode, described earlier in this section), as well as all of the tunneled IP packet (that is, all of the inner IP header is protected as are the higher-layer protocols). If ESP is employed, the protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not to the outer header. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 5] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 1.2. IPsec Operation 1.2.1. Security Associations The concept of a Security Association (SA) is fundamental to IPsec. An SA is a relationship between two or more entities that describes how the entities will use security services to communicate securely. The SA includes: an encryption algorithm, an authentication algorithm and a shared session key. Because an SA is unidirectional, two SAs (one in each direction) are required to secure typical, bidirectional communication between two entities. The security services associated with an SA can be used for AH or ESP, but not for both. If both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, two (or more) SAs are created for each direction to protect the traffic stream. The SA is uniquely identified by the security parameter index (SPI) [RFC2408]. When a system sends a packet that requires IPsec protection, it looks up the SA in its database and applies the specified processing and security protocol (AH/ESP), inserting the SPI from the SA into the IPsec header. When the IPsec peer receives the packet, it looks up the SA in its database by destination address, protocol, and SPI and then processes the packet as required. 1.2.2. Key Management IPsec uses cryptographic keys for authentication/integrity and encryption services. Both manual and automatic distribution of keys is supported. IKE is specified as the public-key-based approach for automatic key management. IKE authenticates each peer involved in IPsec, negotiates the security policy, and handles the exchange of session keys. IKE is a hybrid protocol, combining parts of the following protocols to negotiate and derive keying material for SAs in a secure and authenticated manner: o ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol), which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent; that is, it is designed to support many different key exchanges. o Oakley, which describes a series of key exchanges, called modes, and details the services provided by each (for example, perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication). [RFC 2412] o SKEME (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet), which describes a versatile key exchange technique that provides anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 6] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 IKE creates an authenticated, secure tunnel between two entities and then negotiates the security association for IPsec. This is performed in two phases. In Phase 1, the two unidirectional SA's establish a secure, authenticated channel with which to communicate. Phase 1 has two distinct modes; Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Main Mode for Phase 1 provides identity protection. When identity protection is not needed, Aggressive Mode can be used. The completion of Phase 1 an IKE SA is established. The following attributes are used by IKE and are negotiated as part of the IKE SA: o Encryption algorithm o Hash algorithm o Authentication method (can be digital signature, public-key encryption, or pre-shared key) o Information about a group on which to perform Diffie- Hellman After the attributes are negotiated, both parties must be authenticated to each other. IKE supports multiple authentication methods. At this time, the following mechanisms are generally implemented: o Preshared keys. The same key is pre-installed on each host. IKE peers authenticate each other by computing and sending a keyed hash of data that includes the preshared key. If the receiving peer can independently create the same hash using its preshared key, it knows that both parties must share the same secret, and thus the other party is authenticated. o Public key cryptography. Each party generates a pseudo-random number (a nonce) and encrypts it and its ID using the other party's public key. The ability for each party to compute a keyed hash containing the other peer's nonce and ID, decrypted with the local private key, authenticates the parties to each other. This method does not provide nonrepudiation; either side of the exchange could plausibly deny that it took part in the exchange. o Digital signature. Each device digitally signs a set of data and sends it to the other party. This method is similar to the public-key cryptography approach except that it provides nonrepudiation. Note that both digital signature and public-key cryptography require the use of digital certificates to validate the public/private key mapping. IKE allows the certificate to be accessed independently or by having the two devices explicitly exchange certificates as part of IKE. Both parties must have a shared session key to encrypt the IKE tunnel. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to agree on a common session key. In Phase 2 of the process, IPsec SAs are negotiated on behalf of services such as IPsec AH or ESP. IPsec uses a different shared Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 7] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 key than does IKE. The IPsec shared key can be derived by using Diffie-Hellman again or by refreshing the shared secret derived from the original Diffie-Hellman exchange that generated the IKE SA by hashing it with nonces. After this step is complete, the IPsec SAs are established. Now the data traffic can be exchanged with the negotiated IPsec parameters. The completion of Phase 2 is called an IPsec SA. 1.2.3. Using the term 'Tunnel' The term "tunnel" is often used in a variety of contexts. To avoid any discrepancies, in this document we define the following distinctions between the word "tunnel": "IKE Tunnel": A bidirectional IKE Phase 1 SA, which is also referred to as ISAKMP SA. It sets up a secure authenticated "control channel" for further IKE communications. "IPsec Tunnel": A bidirectional IKE Phase 2 SA, which is also referred to as an IPsec SA. It creates the secure data exchange channel. "Tunnel": The combination of an IKE and an IPsec Tunnel 2. Document Scope The primary focus of this document is to establish useful performance testing terminology for IPsec devices. As such we want to constrain the terminology specified in this document to meet the requirements of the testing methodology. The testing will be constrained to devices acting as IPsec gateways and will pertain to both IPsec tunnel and transport mode. What is specifically out of scope is any testing that pertains to interoperability and/or conformance issues. Additionally, any testing involving L2TP, GRE and 2547 (MPLS VPNs) is out of scope. It is also out of scope to deal with anything that does not specifically relate to the establishment and tearing down of IPsec tunnels. It is assumed that all relevant networking parameters that facilitate in the running of these tests are pre-configured (this includes at a minimum ARP caches and routing tables). Pertinent to IKEv2, NAT Traversal has been included in the document, therefore NAT is not included in this document. All references to IKE connotate the inclusion of IKEv2 as well. 3. Definition Format The definition format utilized by this document is described in RFC 1242, Section 2. Term to be defined. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 8] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Definition: The specific definition for the term. Discussion: A brief discussion of the term, its application, or other information that would build understanding. [Measurement units:] Units used to record measurements of this term. This field is mandatory where applicable. This field is optional in this document. [Issues:] List of issues or conditions that affect this term. This field can present items the may impact the term's related methodology or otherwise restrict its measurement procedures. This field is optional in this document. [See Also:] List of other terms that are relevant to the discussion of this term. This field is optional in this document. 4. Key Words to Reflect Requirements The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. RFC 2119 defines the use of these key words to help make the intent of standards track documents as clear as possible. While this document uses these keywords, this document is not a standards track document. 5. Existing Definitions It is recommended that readers consult RFCs 1242, 2544 and 2285 before making use of this document. These and other IETF Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) router and switch documents contain several existing terms relevant to benchmarking the performance of IPsec devices. The conceptual framework established in these earlier RFCs will be evident in this document. This document also draws on existing terminology defined in other BMWG documents. Examples include, but are not limited to: Throughput [RFC 1242, section 3.17] Latency [RFC 1242, section 3.8] Frame Loss Rate [RFC 1242, section 3.6] Forwarding Rates [RFC 2285, section 3.6] Loads [RFC 2285, section 3.5] Note: "DUT/SUT" refers to a metric that may be applicable to a DUT (Device Under Test) or an SUT (System Under Test). Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 9] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 6. Term Definitions 6.1. IPsec Definition: IP Security protocol suite which comprises a set of standards used to provide privacy and authentication services at the IP layer. Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: 6.2. IPsec Device Definition: Any implementation that has the ability to process data flows according to the IPsec protocol suite specifications. Discussion: Implementations come in many forms and shapes. Not only can they be grouped by 'external' properties (e.g. software vs. hardware implementations) but more important is the subtle differences that implementations may have with relation to the IPsec Protocol Suite. Not all implementations will cover all RFCs that encompass the IPsec Protocol Suite, but the majority will support a large subset of features described in the suite. In that context, any implementation, that supports basic IP layer security services as described in the IPsec protocol suite shall be called an æIPsec Device'. Issues: Due to the fragmented nature of the IPsec Protocol Suite RFCs, it is not unlikely that IPsec implementations will not be able to interoperate. Therefore it is important to know which features and options are implemented in the IPsec Device. See Also: IPsec Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 10] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 6.3. ISAKMP Definition: The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol, which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent; that is, it is designed to support many different key exchanges. ISAKMP is defined in RFC 2407. Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: IKE 6.4. IKE Definition: A hybrid protocol, defined in RFC 2409, from the following 3 protocols: o ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol), which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent; that is, it is designed to support many different key exchanges. o Oakley, which describes a series of key exchanges, called modes, and details the services provided by each (for example, perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication). [RFC 2412] o SKEME (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet), which describes a versatile key exchange technique that provides anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment. Discussion: TBD Issues: During the first IPsec deployment experiences, many ambiguities were found in the original IKE specification, which lead to many interoperability problems. To resolve these issues, there is an ongoing effort to simplify the current IKE protocol and remove all unused features and options. This effort manifests itself in a new IKE version, called IKEv2. IKEv2 is an updated version of the current IKE stack and is code preserving a compatible with IKEv1. See Also: ISAKMP, Ipsec Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 11] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 6.5. Initiator Definition: IPsec devices which start the negotiation of IKE Phase 1 and IKE Phase 2 tunnels. Discussion: When a traffic flow is offered at an IPSec device and it is determined that the flow must be protected, but there is no active tunnel yet, it is the responsibility of the IPSec device to start a negotiation process. This process will establish an IKE Phase 1 SA and one or more IKE phase 2 SA_s, eventually resulting in secured data transport. The device that takes the action to start this negotiation process will be called an Initiator. Issues: IPSec devices/implementations can always be both an initiator as well as a responder. The distinction is useful only from a test perspective. See Also: Responder 6.6. Responder Definition: IPsec devices which reply to the incoming initiators IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2 tunnel requests and process these messages in order to establish a tunnel. Discussion: When an initiator attempts to establish SAs with another IPsec device, this peer will need to evaluate the proposals made by the initiator and either accept or deny them. In the former case, the traffic flow will be decrypted according to the negotiated parameters. Such a device will be called a Responder_. Issues: IPSec devices/implementations can usually be both an initiator as well as a responder. The distinction is useful only from a test perspective. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 12] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 See Also: Initiator 6.7. Security Association (SA) Definition: A simplex (unidirectional) logical connection, created for security purposes. All traffic traversing an SA is provided the same security processing. In IPsec, an SA is an Internet layer abstraction implemented through the use of AH or ESP. [RFC 2401] Discussion: A set of policy and key(s) used to protect information. It is a negotiation agreement between two IPsec devices, specifically the Initiator and Responder. Issues: See Also: 6.8. IKE Phase 1 Definition: The shared policy and key(s) used by negotiating peers to set up a secure authenticated "control channel" for further IKE communications. Discussion: TBD Issues: In other documents also referenced as ISAKMP SA or IKE SA. See Also: IKE, ISAKMP 6.8.1. Phase 1 Main Mode Definition: Main Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Identity Protect Exchange, defined in RFC 2409. Discussion: IKE Main Mode uses 3 separate message exchanges, for a total of 6 messages. The first two messages negotiate policy; the next two exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 13] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 data (e.g. nonces necessary for the exchange); and the last two messages authenticate the Diffie-Hellman Exchange. The authentication method negotiated as part of the initial IKE Phase 1 exchange influences the composition of the payloads but not their purpose. Issues: See Also: IKE, IKE Phase 1, Phase 1 Aggressive Mode 6.8.2. Phase 1 Aggressive Mode Definition: Aggressive Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Aggressive Exchange, defined in RFC 2409. Discussion: IKE Aggressive Mode uses 3 messages. The first two messages negotiate policy, exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data necessary for the exchange, and identities. In addition the second message authenticates the Responder. The third message authenticates the Initiator and provides a proof of participation in the exchange. Issues: See Also: IKE, IKE Phase 1, Phase 1 Main Mode 6.9. IKE Phase 2 Definition: Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: 6.9.1. Phase 2 Quick Mode Definition A SA negotiation and an exchange of nonces that provide replay protection. Discussion: Quick Mode is not a complete exchange itself (in that it is bound to a phase 1 exchange), but is used as part of the SA Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 14] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 negotiation process (phase 2) to derive keying material and negotiate shared policy for non-ISAKMP SA's. The ISAKMP SA protects the information exchanged along with Quick Mode, i.e. all payloads except the ISAKMP header are encrypted. Also, an optional Key Exchange payload can be exchanged to allow for an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and exponentiation per Quick Mode. Issues: See Also: 6.9.2. IPsec Tunnel Definition: A bidirectional IPsec SA that is set up as part of IKE phase 2. It creates the secure data exchange channel. Discussion: Manually established IPsec tunnels do exist, however, from a benchmarking perspective, they do not differ from IPsec tunnels that are negotiated by IKE. Note that some metrics will not be applicable due to the limited use of manually established IPsec tunnels. Issues: See Also: 6.10. Compound Tunnels 6.10.1. Nested Tunnels Definition: An SA bundle consisting of two or more 'tunnel mode' SAs. Discussion: The process of nesting tunnels can theoretically be repeated multiple times (for example, tunnels can be many levels deep), but for all practical purposes, most implementations limit the level of nesting. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 15] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Nested tunnels can use a mix of AH and ESP encapsulated traffic. [GW1] --- [GW2] ---- [IP CLOUD] ---- [GW3] --- [GW4] | | | | | | | | | +----{SA1 (ESP tunnel)}----+ | | | +--------------{SA2 (AH tunnel)}---------------+ In the IP Cloud a packet would have a format like this: [IP{2,3}][ESP][IP{1,4}][AH][IP][PAYLOAD][ESP TR][ESP AUTH] Nested tunnels can be deployed to provide additional security on already protected traffic. For example, the inner gateways (GW2 & GW3) are securing traffic between two branch offices and the outer gateways (GW1 & GW4) add an additional layer of security between departments within those branch offices. Issues: See Also: Transport adjacency, IPsec Tunnel 6.10.2. Transport Adjacency Definition: An SA bundle consisting of two or more transport mode SAs. Discussion: Transport adjacency is a form of tunnel nesting. In this case two or more transport mode IPsec tunnels are set side by side to enhance applied security properties. Transport adjacency can be used with a mix of AH and ESP tunnels although some combinations are not preferred. If AH and ESP are mixed, the ESP tunnel should always encapsulate the AH tunnel. The reverse combination is a valid combination but doesn't make cryptographical sense. [GW1] --- [GW2] ---- [IP CLOUD] ---- [GW3] --- [GW4] | | | | | | | | | +--{SA1 (ESP transport)}---+ | | | +-------------{SA2 (AH transport)}-------------+ Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 16] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 In the IP cloud a packet would have a format like this: [IP][ESP][AH][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH] Issues: See Also: Nested tunnels, IPsec Tunnel 6.11. Transform Protocols Definition: Encryption and authentication algorithms that provide cryptograhical services to the IPsec Protocols. Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: Authentication protocols, Encryption protocols 6.11.1. Authentication protocols Definition: Algorithms which provide data integrity and data source authentication. Discussion: Authentication protocols provide no confidentiality. Commonly used authentication algorithms/protocols are: o MD5-HMAC o SHA-HMAC o AES-HMAC Issues: See Also: Transform protocols, Encryption protocols 6.11.2. Encryption protocols Definition: Algorithms which provide data confidentiality. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 17] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Discussion: Encryption protocols provide no authentication. Commonly used encryption algorithms/protocols are: o NULL encryption o DES-CBC o 3DES-CBC o AES-CBC Issues: See Also: Transform protocols, Authentication protocols 6.12. IPsec Protocols 6.12.1. Authentication Header (AH) Definition: Provides authentication and data integrity (including replay protection) security services [RFC2402]. Discussion: Original IPv4 packet: [IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD] In transport mode: [IP ORIG][AH][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD] In tunnel mode: [IP NEW][AH][IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD] Issues: See Also: Transform protocols, IPsec protocols, Encapsulated Security Payload 6.12.2. Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) Definition: Provides three essential components needed for secure data exchange: authentication, integrity (including replay protection) and confidentiality [RFC2406]. Discussion: Original IPv4 packet: [IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD] In transport mode: [IP ORIG][ESP][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH] Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 18] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 In tunnel mode: [IP NEW][ESP][IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH] Issues: See Also: Transform protocols, IPsec protocols, Authentication Header 6.13. Selectors Definition: A mechanism required to classify traffic flows when IPsec is used to protect traffic between networks which are proxied between two or more participating peers. After classification, a decision can be made if the traffic needs to be encrypted/decrypted and how this should be done. Discussion: The selectors are a set of fields that will be extracted from the network and transport layer headers that provide the ability to classify the traffic flow and later associate it with an SA. Issues: See Also: 6.14. NAT Traversal (NAT-T) Definition: The capability to support IPsec functionality in the presence of NAT devices. Discussion: NAT-Traversal requires some modifications to IKE. Specifically, in phase 1, it requires detecting if the other end supports NAT-Traversal, and detecting if there are one or more NAT instances along the path from host to host. In IKE Quick Mode, there is a need to negotiate the use of UDP encapsulated IPsec packets. NAT-T also describes how to transmit the original source and destination addresses to the other end if needed. The original source and destination addresses are used in transport mode to incrementally update the TCP/IP checksums so that they will match after the NAT transform (The NAT cannot do this, because the TCP/IP checksum is inside the UDP encapsulated IPsec packet). Issues: Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 19] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 See Also: IKE 6.15. IP Compression Definition: TBD [IPPCP RFC2393] Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: 6.16. Security Context Definition: A security context is a collection of security parameters that describe the characteristics of the path that a tunnel will take, all of the tunnel parameters and the effects it has on the underlying protected traffic. Security Context encompasses protocol suite and security policy(ies). Discussion: In order to fairly compare multiple IPsec devices it is imperative that an accurate overview is given of all security parameters that were used to establish tunnels and to secure the traffic between protected networks. To avoid listing to much information when reporting metrics we have divided the security context into an IKE context and an IPsec context. When merely discussing the behavior of traffic flows through IPsec devices, an IPsec context MUST be provided. In other cases the scope of a discussion or report may focus on a more broad set of behavioral characteristics of the IPsec device, the both and IPsec and an IKE context MUST be provided. The IPsec context MUST consist of the following elements: o Number of active IPsec tunnels o IPsec tunnels per IKE tunnel (IKE/IPsec tunnel ratio) o IPsec protocol o IPsec mode (tunnel or transport) o Authentication protocol used by IPsec o Encryption protocol used by IPsec (if applicable) o IPsec SA lifetime (traffic and time based) Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 20] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 The IPsec context MAY also list: o Selectors o Fragmentation handling The IKE context MUST consist of the following elements: o Number of active IKE tunnels. o Authentication protocol used by IKE o Encryption protocol used by IKE o Key exchange mechanism (pre-shared key, Certificate, etc) o Key size (if applicable) o Diffie-Hellman group o IKE SA lifetime (time based) o Keepalive, heartbeat or DPD values o Compression (IPPCP RFC2393) o PFS Diffie-Hellman group The IKE context MAY also list: o Phase 1 mode (main or aggressive) o Available bandwidth and latency to Certificate Authority server (if applicable) Issues: A Security Context will be an important element in describing the environment where protected traffic is traveling through. See Also: IPsec Protocols, Transform Protocols, IKE Phase 1, IKE phase 2, Selectors, IPsec Tunnel 6.17. Performance Metrics 6.17.1. Tunnels Per Second (TPS) Definition: TBD Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: 6.17.2. Tunnel Flaps Per Second (TFPS) Definition: TBD Discussion: Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 21] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 TBD Issues: See Also: 6.17.3. Tunnels Attempted Per Second (TAPS) Definition: TBD Discussion: TBD Issues: See Also: 7. Test Terminology 7.1. Framesizes 7.1.1. Layer3 Clear Framesize Definition: The total size of the unencrypted L3 PDU. Discussion: In relation to IPsec this is the size of the IP header and its payload. It SHALL NOT include any encapsulations that MAY be applied before the PDU is processed for encryption. For example: 46 bytes PDU = 20 bytes IP header + 26 bytes payload. Measurement units: Bytes Issues: See Also: Layer3 Encrypted Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Encrypted Framesize. 7.1.2. Layer3 Encrypted Framesize Definition: The total size of the encrypted L3 PDU. Discussion: Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 22] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 The size of the IP packet and its payload after encapsulations MAY be applied and the PDU is being processed by the transform. For example, after a tunnel mode ESP 3DES/SHA1 transform has been applied, an unencrypted or clear Layer3 framesize of 46 bytes becomes 96 bytes: 20 bytes outer IP header (tunnel mode) 4 bytes SPI (ESP header) 4 bytes Sequence (ESP Header) 8 bytes IV (IOS ESP-3DES) 46 bytes payload 0 bytes pad (ESP-3DES 64 bit) 1 byte Pad length (ESP Trailer) 1 byte Next Header (ESP Trailer) 12 bytes ESP-HMAC SHA1 96 digest Measurement units: Bytes Issues: See Also: Layer3 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Encrypted Framesize. 7.1.3. Layer2 Clear Framesize Definition: The total size of the unencrypted L2 PDU. Discussion: This is the Layer 3 clear framesize plus the entire layer2 overhead. In the case of Ethernet this would be 18 bytes. For example, a 46 byte Layer3 clear framesize packet would become 64 bytes after Ethernet Layer2 overhead is added: 6 bytes destination MAC address 6 bytes source MAC address 2 bytes length/type field 46 bytes layer3 (IP) payload 4 bytes FCS Measurement units: Bytes Issues: If it is not mentioned explicitly what kind of framesize is used, the layer2 clear framesize will be the default. See Also: Layer3 clear framesize, Layer2 encrypted framesize, Layer2 encrypted framesize. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 23] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 7.1.4. Layer2 encrypted framesize Definition: The total size of the encrypted L2 PDU. Discussion: This is the Layer 3 encrypted framesize plus all the Layer2 overhead. In the case of Ethernet this would be 18 bytes. For example, a 96 byte Layer3 encrypted framesize packet would become 114 bytes after Ethernet Layer2 overhead is added: 6 bytes destination mac address 6 bytes source mac address 2 bytes length/type field 96 bytes layer3 (IPsec) payload 4 bytes FCS Measurement units: Bytes Issues: See Also: Layer3 Clear Framesize, Layer3 Encrypted Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize 7.2. Internet Mix Traffic (IMIX) Definition: A traffic pattern consisting of a preset mixture of framesizes used to emulate real-world traffic scenarios in a testing environment. Discussion: IMIX traffic patterns can be used to measure different forwarding behaviors of the IPsec device with pseudo live traffic. Several facilities, including the National Laboratory for Applied Network Research, have collected and reported traffic distribution by monitoring live Internet links. The study concluded that in a simulation environment, a small mix of packets in a preset ratio can resemble to a certain degree the live traffic that was monitored during the study. One of the mixes is called (simple) IMIX and consists of 7 parts 64 byte packets, 4 parts 570 byte packets and 1 1518 byte packet.[IMIX] Measurement units: TBD Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 24] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Issues: The ratio of frame sizes sent and traffic distribution to be determined by the test methodology. See Also: 7.3. Throughput 7.3.1. IPsec Tunnel Throughput Definition: The forwarding rate through an established IKE/IPsec tunnel at which none of the offered frames are dropped by the device under test. Discussion: The IPsec Tunnel Throughput is almost identically defined as Throughput in RFC 1242, section 3.17. The only difference is that the throughput is measured with a traffic flow that is getting encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec device. The Tunnel Throughput is an end-to-end measurement and is intended to characterize end-user forwarding behavior. The metric can be represented in two variants depending on where the in the SUT the measurement is taken. One can look at throughput from a cleartext point of view i.e. find the forwarding rate where clearpackets no longer get dropped. This forwarding rate can be recalculated with an encrypted framesize to represent the encryption forwarding rate. The latter is the preferred method of representation. Measurement units: Packets per seconds (pps), Mbps Issues: See Also: 7.3.2. IPsec Tunnel Encryption Throughput Definition: The maximum encryption rate through an established IPsec tunnel at which none of the offered cleartext frames are dropped by the device under test. Discussion: Since it is not necessarily the case that the encryption throughput is equal to the decryption throughput, both of the forwarding rates must be measured independently. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 25] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 The independent forwarding rates have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in RFC 1242, measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes. Measurement units: Packets per seconds (pps), Mbps Issues: See Also: 7.3.3. IPsec Tunnel Decryption Throughput Definition: The maximum decryption rate through an established IPsec tunnel at which none of the offered encrypted frames are dropped by the device under test. Discussion: Since it is not necessarily the case that the encryption throughput is equal to the decryption throughput, both of the forwarding rates must be measured independently. The independent forwarding rates have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec tunnels. As defined in RFC 1242, measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes. Measurement units: Packets per seconds (pps), Mbps Issues: Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in future methodology document. See Also: 7.4. Latency 7.4.1. IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency Definition: The IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency is the time interval starting when the end of the first bit of the cleartext frame reaches the input interface, through an established IPsec tunnel, and ending when the start of the first bit of the encrypted output frame is seen on the output interface. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 26] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Discussion: IPsec Tunnel Encryption latency is the latency that is introduced when encrypting traffic through an established IPsec tunnel. Like encryption/decryption throughput, it is not always the case that encryption latency equals the decryption latency. Therefore a distinction between the two has to be made in order to get a more accurate view of where the latency is the most pronounced. The independent encryption/decryption latencies have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in RFC 1242, measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes. Measurement units: Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement. Issues: See Also: 7.4.2. IPsec Tunnel Decryption Latency Definition: The IPsec Tunnel decryption Latency is the time interval starting when the end of the first bit of the encrypted frame reaches the input interface, through an established IPsec tunnel, and ending when the start of the first bit of the decrypted output frame is seen on the output interface. Discussion: IPsec Tunnel decryption latency is the latency that is introduced when decrypting traffic through an established IPsec tunnel. Like encryption/decryption throughput, it is not always the case that encryption latency equals the decryption latency. Therefore a distinction between the two has to be made in order to get a more accurate view of where the latency is the most pronounced. The independent encryption/decryption latencies have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in RFC 1242, measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 27] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Measurement units: Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement. Issues: See Also: 7.4.3. Time To First Packet (TTFP) Definition: The Time To First Packet (TTFP) is the time required to process a cleartext packet when no tunnel is present. Discussion: The TTFP addresses the issue of responsiveness of an IPsec device by looking how long it take to transmit a packet over a not yet established tunnel path. The TTFP MUST include the time to set up the tunnel that is triggered by the traffic flow (both phase 1 and phase 2 setup times are included) and the time it takes to encrypt and decrypt the packet on a corresponding peer. It must be noted that it is highly unlikely that the first packet of the traffic flow will be the packet that will be used to measure the TTFP. There MAY be several protocol layers in the stack before the tunnel is formed. Traffic is forwarded and several packets could be lost during negotiation, for example, ARP and/or IKE. Measurement units: Time units with enough precision to reflect a TTFP measurement. Issues: See Also: 7.5. Frame Loss Rate 7.5.1. IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss Rate Definition: Percentage of cleartext frames that should have been encrypted through an established IPsec tunnel under steady state (constant)load but were dropped. Discussion: TBD Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 28] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Measurement units: Percent (%) Issues: See Also: 7.5.2. IPsec Tunnel Decryption Frame Loss Rate Definition: Percentage of encrypted frames that should have been decrypted through an established IPsec tunnel under steady state (constant)load but were dropped. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Percent (%) Issues: See Also: 7.6. Back-to-Back 7.6.1. Encryption Back-to-Back Frames Definition: The number of cleartext frames, offered at a constant load that can be sent through an established IPsec tunnel without losing a single encrypted frame. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Frames Issues: See Also: Decryption Back-to-back frames 7.6.2. Decryption Back-to-back frames Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 29] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Definition: The number of encrypted frames, offered at a constant load, that can be sent through an established IPsec tunnel without losing a single cleartext frame. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Frames Issues: See Also: Encryption back-to-back frames 7.7. Tunnel Setup Rate Behavior 7.7.1. Tunnel Setup Rate Definition: The maximum number of tunnels (1 IKE SA + 2 IPsec SAs) per second that an IPsec device can successfully establish. Discussion: The tunnel setup rate SHOULD be measured at varying number of established tunnels on the DUT. Measurement units: Tunnels per second (TPS) Issues: See Also: 7.7.2. IKE Tunnel Setup Rate Definition: The maximum number of IKE tunnels per second that an IPsec device can be observed to successfully establish. Discussion: The tunnel setup rate SHOULD be measured at varying number of established tunnels on the DUT. Measurement units: Tunnels per second (TPS) Issues: Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 30] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 See Also: Rekey Time 7.7.3. IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate Definition: The maximum number of IPsec tunnels per second that a IPsec device can be observed to successfully establish. Discussion: The tunnel setup rate SHOULD be measured at varying number of established tunnels on the DUT. Measurement units: Tunnels per second (TPS) Issues: See Also: Tunnel Rekey 7.8. Tunnel Rekey 7.8.1. Phase 1 Rekey Time Definition: The interval necessary for a particular Phase 1 to re- establish after the previous Phase 1 lifetime [hard or soft] has expired. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Time units with enough precision to reflect rekey time measurement. Issues: See Also: Phase 2 Rekey Time, Tunnel Flapping 7.8.2. Phase 2 Rekey Time Definition: The interval necessary for a particular Phase 2 to re- establish after the previous Phase 2 lifetime [hard or soft] has expired. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 31] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Time units with enough precision to reflect rekey time measurement. Issues: See Also: Phase 1 Rekey Time , Tunnel Flapping 7.9. Tunnel Flapping Definition: A behavior observed where a tunnel is dropped and then re- established with the same parameters. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: TBD Issues: See Also: Phase 1 Rekey Time, Phase 2 Rekey Time 7.9.1. Tunnel Flap Rate Definition: The number of times per second a tunnel is dropped and re- established. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Tunnel flaps per second (TFPS) Issues: See Also: Phase 1 Rekey Time, Phase 2 Rekey Time Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 32] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 7.10. Tunnel Failover Time (TFT) Definition: Recovery time required to re-establish all tunnels on a standby node or other failsafe system after a tunnel failing event has occurred, such as a catastrophic IPsec device failure, including all traffic that previously ran through those tunnels. The recovery time is delta between the point of failure and when the first packet is seen on the last restored tunnel on the backup device. Discussion: TBD Measurement units: Tunnel flaps per second (TFPS) Issues: See Also: Tunnel Flapping 7.11. IKE DOS Resilience Rate Definition: The IKE Denial Of Service (DOS) Resilience Rate provides a rate of invalid or mismatching IKE tunnels setup attempts at which it is no longer possible to set up a valid IKE tunnel. Discussion: The IKE DOS Resilience Rate will provide a metric to how robust and hardened an IPsec device is against malicious attempts to set up a tunnel. IKE DOS attacks can pose themselves in various forms and do not necessarily have to have a malicious background. It is sufficient to make a typographical error in a shared secret in an IPsec aggregation device to be susceptible to a large number of IKE attempts that need to be turned down. Due to the intense computational nature of an IKE exchange every single IKE tunnel attempt that has to be denied will take a non-negligible time an a CPU in the IPsec device. Depending on how many of these messages have to be processed, a system might end up in a state that it is only doing key exchanges and burdening the CPU for any other processes that might be running in the IPsec device. At this point it will be no longer be possible to process a valid IKE tunnel setup request and thus IKE DOS is in effect. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 33] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 Measurement units: Tunnel attempts per second (TAPS) Issues: See Also: 8. Security Considerations As this document is solely for the purpose of providing test benchmarking terminology and describes neither a protocol nor a protocol's implementation; there are no security considerations associated with this document. 9. Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge the following individual for their help and participation of the compilation and editing of this document û Debby Stopp, Ixia. 10. Contributors The authors would like to acknowledge the following individual for their help and contributions to this document û Sunil Kalidindi, Ixia. 11. References Normative References [RFC1242] Bradner, S., "Benchmarking terminology for network interconnection devices", RFC 1242, July 1991. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2285] Mandeville, R., "Benchmarking Terminology for LAN Switching Devices", RFC 2285, February 1998. [RFC2393] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, R. and M. Thomas, "IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 2393, December 1998. [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. [RFC2402] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 34] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 [RFC2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998. [RFC2407] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998. [RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schneider, M. and M. Schertler, "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol(ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998. [RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. [RFC2412] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", RFC 2412, November 1998. [RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998. [RFC2544] Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for Network Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544, March 1999. [RFC2547] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS VPNs", RFC 2547, March 1999. [SKEME] Krawczyk, H., "SKEME: A Versatile Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet", from IEEE Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security, URL http://www.research.ibm.com/security/skeme.ps, 1996. [IMIX] National Library for Applied Network Research (NLANR), February 2001, ANI-9807479 Informative References [RFC2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998. [RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998. [RFC2405] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998. [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998. [RFC2411] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N. and R. Glenn, "IP Security Document Roadmap", RFC 2411, November 1998. [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-04 (work in progress), January 2003. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 35] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 [I-D.ietf-ipsec-nat-reqts] Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-NAT Compatibility Requirements", draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-reqts-03 (work in progress), January 2003. [I-D.ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike] Kivinen, T., "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-05 (work in progress),January 2003. [I-D.ietf-ipsec-properties] Krywaniuk, A., "Security Properties of the IPsec Protocol Suite", draft-ietf-ipsec-properties-02 (work in progress), July 2002. [I-D.ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps] Huttunen, A., "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets", draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06 (work in progress) [FIPS.186-1.1998] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS PUB 186-1, December 1998, . [Hu95] Huitema, C., "Routing in the Internet", Prentice Hall, 1995. January 2003. Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 36] INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices Aug. 2003 12. Contact Information Michele Bustos IXIA 26601 W. Agoura Rd. Calabasas, CA 91302 USA Phone: 818 444 3244 Email: mbustos@ixiacom.com Tim Van Herck Cisco Systems 170 W. Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA Phone: 408 527 2461 Email: herckt@cisco.com Merike Kaeo 123 Ross Street Santa Cruz, CA 95060 USA Phone: 831 818 4864 Email: kaeo@merike.com 13. Full Copyright Statement "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into.ö Bustos, Van Herck & Kaeo [Page 37]