Internet Engineering Task Force Baugher, McGrew (Cisco) AVT Working Group Carrara, Naslund, INTERNET-DRAFT Norrman (Ericsson) EXPIRES: December 2003 July 2003 The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol Status of this memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or cite them other than as "work in progress". The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html Abstract This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction.......................................................3 1.1. Notational Conventions.........................................4 2. Goals and Features.................................................4 2.1 Features........................................................5 3. SRTP Framework.....................................................5 3.1 Secure RTP......................................................6 3.2 SRTP Cryptographic Contexts.....................................8 3.2.1 Transform-independent parameters............................8 3.2.2 Transform-dependent parameters.............................10 3.2.3 Mapping SRTP Packets to Cryptographic Contexts.............10 3.3 SRTP Packet Processing.........................................11 3.3.1 Packet Index Determination, and ROC, s_l Update............13 3.3.2 Replay Protection..........................................15 3.4 Secure RTCP....................................................16 4. Pre-Defined Cryptographic Transforms..............................19 4.1 Encryption.....................................................20 4.1.1 AES in Counter Mode........................................21 4.1.2 AES in f8-mode.............................................23 4.1.3 NULL Cipher................................................25 4.2 Message Authentication and Integrity...........................26 4.2.1 HMAC-SHA1..................................................26 4.3 Key Derivation.................................................27 4.3.1 Key Derivation Algorithm...................................27 4.3.2 SRTCP Key Derivation.......................................29 4.3.3 AES-CM PRF.................................................29 5. Default and mandatory-to-implement Transforms.....................29 5.1 Encryption: AES-CM and NULL....................................30 5.2 Message Authentication/Integrity: HMAC-SHA1....................30 5.3 Key Derivation: AES-CM PRF.....................................30 6. Adding SRTP Transforms............................................30 7. Rationale.........................................................31 7.1 Key derivation.................................................31 7.2 Salting key....................................................32 7.3 Message Integrity from Universal Hashing.......................32 7.4 Data Origin Authentication Considerations......................32 7.5 Short and Zero-length Message Authentication...................33 8. Key Management Considerations.....................................34 8.1. Re-keying.....................................................35 8.1.1 Use of the for re-keying........................35 8.2. Key Management parameters.....................................36 9. Security Considerations...........................................37 9.1 SSRC collision and two-time pad................................37 9.2 Key Usage......................................................38 9.3 Confidentiality of the RTP Payload.............................40 9.4 Confidentiality of the RTP Header..............................41 Baugher, et al. [Page 2] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 9.5 Integrity of the RTP payload and header........................41 9.5.1. Risks of Weak or Null Message Authentication..............42 9.5.2 Implicit Header Authentication.............................44 10. Interaction with Forward Error Correction mechanisms.............44 11. Scenarios........................................................44 11.1 Unicast.......................................................44 11.2 Multicast (one sender)........................................45 11.3 Re-keying and access control..................................46 11.4 Summary of basic scenarios....................................47 12. IANA Considerations..............................................47 13. Acknowledgements.................................................47 14. Author's Addresses...............................................48 15. References.......................................................48 16. Intellectual Property Right Considerations.......................51 17. Full Copyright Statement.........................................52 Appendix A: Pseudocode for Index Determination.......................53 Appendix B: Test Vectors.............................................53 B.1 AES-f8 Test Vectors............................................53 B.2 AES-CM Test Vectors............................................54 B.3 Key Derivation Test Vectors....................................55 1. Introduction This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, RTCP (the Real-time Transport Control Protocol) [RTPNEW]. SRTP provides a framework for encryption and message authentication of RTP and RTCP streams (Section 3). SRTP defines a set of default cryptographic transforms (Sections 4 and 5), and it allows new transforms to be introduced in the future (Section 6). With appropriate key management (Sections 7 and 8), SRTP is secure (Sections 9) for unicast and multicast RTP applications (Section 11). SRTP can achieve high throughput and low packet expansion. SRTP proves to be a suitable protection for heterogeneous environments (mix of wired and wireless networks). To get such features, default transforms are described, based on an additive stream cipher for encryption, a keyed-hash based function for message authentication, and an "implicit" index for sequencing/synchronization based on the RTP sequence number for SRTP and an index number for Secure RTCP (SRTCP). Baugher, et al. [Page 3] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 1.1. Notational Conventions The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The terminology conforms to [RFC2828] with the following exception. For simplicity we use the term "random" throughout the document to denote randomly or pseudo-randomly generated values. Large amounts of random bits may be difficult to obtain, and for the security of SRTP, pseudo-randomness is sufficient. By convention, the adopted representation is the network byte order, i.e. the left most bit (octet) is the most significant one. By XOR we mean bitwise addition modulo 2 of binary strings, and || denotes concatenation. In other words, if C = A || B, then the most significant bits of C are the bits of A, and the least significant bits of C equal the bits of B. Hexadecimal numbers are prefixed by 0x. The word "encryption" includes also use of the NULL algorithm (which in practice does leave the data in the clear). With slight abuse of notation, we use the terms "message authentication" and "authentication tag" as is common practice, even though in some circumstances, e.g. group communication, the service provided is actually only integrity protection and not data origin authentication. 2. Goals and Features The security goals for SRTP are to ensure: * the confidentiality of the RTP and RTCP payloads, and * the integrity of the entire RTP and RTCP packets, together with protection against replayed packets. These security services are optional and independent from each other, except that SRTCP integrity protection is mandatory (malicious or erroneous alteration of RTCP messages could otherwise disrupt the processing of the RTP stream). Other, functional, goals for the protocol are: * a framework that permits upgrading with new cryptographic transforms, Baugher, et al. [Page 4] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 * low bandwidth cost, i.e., a framework preserving RTP header compression efficiency, and, asserted by the pre-defined transforms: * a low computational cost, * a small footprint (i.e. small code size and data memory for keying information and replay lists), * limited packet expansion to support the bandwidth economy goal, * independence from the underlying transport, network, and physical layers used by RTP, in particular high tolerance to packet loss and re-ordering. These properties ensure that SRTP is a suitable protection scheme for RTP/RTCP in both wired and wireless scenarios. 2.1 Features Besides the above mentioned direct goals, SRTP provides for some additional features. They have been introduced to lighten the burden on key management and to further increase security. They include: * A single "master key" can provide keying material for confidentiality and integrity protection, both for the SRTP stream and the corresponding SRTCP stream. This is achieved with a key derivation function (see Section 4.3), providing "session keys" for the respective security primitive, securely derived from the master key. * In addition, the key derivation can be configured to periodically refresh the session keys, which limits the amount of ciphertext produced by a fixed key, available for an adversary to cryptanalyze. * "Salting keys" are used to protect against pre-computation and time-memory tradeoff attacks [MF00,BS00]. Detailed rationale for these features can be found in Section 7. 3. SRTP Framework RTP is the Real-time Transport Protocol [RTPNEW]. We define SRTP as a profile of RTP. This profile is an extension to the RTP Audio/Video Profile [AVPNEW]. Except where explicitly noted, all Baugher, et al. [Page 5] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 aspects of that profile apply, with the addition of the SRTP security features. Conceptually, we consider SRTP to be a "bump in the stack" implementation which resides between the RTP application and the transport layer. SRTP intercepts RTP packets and then forwards an equivalent SRTP packet on the sending side, and intercepts SRTP packets and passes an equivalent RTP packet up the stack on the receiving side. Secure RTCP (SRTCP) provides the same security services to RTCP as SRTP does to RTP. SRTCP message authentication is MANDATORY and thereby protects the RTCP fields to keep track of membership, provide feedback to RTP senders, or maintain packet sequence counters. SRTCP is described in Section 3.4. 3.1 Secure RTP The format of an SRTP packet is illustrated in Figure 1. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ |V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | timestamp | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | synchronization source (SSRC) identifier | | +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | | contributing source (CSRC) identifiers | | | .... | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | RTP extension (OPTIONAL) | | +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | payload ... | | | | +-------------------------------+ | | | | RTP padding | RTP pad count | | +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ | ~ SRTP MKI (OPTIONAL) ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | : authentication tag (RECOMMENDED) : | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | +- Encrypted Portion* Authenticated Portion ---+ Figure 1. The format of an SRTP packet. *Encrypted Portion is the same size as the plaintext for the Section 4 pre-defined transforms. Baugher, et al. [Page 6] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 The "Encrypted Portion" of an SRTP packet consists of the encryption of the RTP payload (including RTP padding when present) of the equivalent RTP packet. The Encrypted Portion MAY be the exact size of the plaintext or MAY be larger. Figure 1 shows the RTP payload including any possible padding for RTP [RTPNEW]. None of the pre-defined encryption transforms uses any padding; for these, the RTP and SRTP payload sizes match exactly. New transforms added to SRTP (following Section 6) may require padding, and may hence produce larger payloads. RTP provides its own padding format (as seen in Fig. 1), which due to the padding indicator in the RTP header has merits in terms of compactness relative to paddings using prefix-free codes. This RTP padding SHALL be the default method for transforms requiring padding. Transforms MAY specify other padding methods, and MUST then specify the amount, format, and processing of their padding. It is important to note that encryption transforms that use padding are vulnerable to subtle attacks, especially when message authentication is not used [V02]. Each specification for a new encryption transform needs to carefully consider and describe the security implications of the padding that it uses. Message authentication codes define their own padding, so this default does not apply to authentication transforms. The OPTIONAL MKI and the RECOMMENDED authentication tag are the only fields defined by SRTP that are not in RTP. Only 8-bit alignment is assumed. MKI (Master Key Identifier): configurable length, OPTIONAL The MKI is defined, signaled, and used by key management. The MKI identifies the master key from which the session key(s) were derived that authenticate and/or encrypt the particular packet. Note that the MKI SHALL NOT identify the SRTP cryptographic context, which is identified according to Section 3.2.3. The MKI MAY be used by key management for the purposes of re-keying, identifying a particular master key within the cryptographic context (Section 3.2.1). Authentication tag: configurable length, RECOMMENDED The authentication tag is used to carry message authentication data. The Authenticated Portion of an SRTP packet consists of the RTP header followed by the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet. Thus, if both encryption and authentication are applied, encryption SHALL be applied before authentication on the sender side and conversely on the receiver side. The authentication tag provides authentication of the RTP header and payload, and it indirectly provides replay protection by authenticating the Baugher, et al. [Page 7] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 sequence number. Note that the MKI is not integrity protected as this does not provide any extra protection. 3.2 SRTP Cryptographic Contexts Each SRTP stream requires the sender and receiver to maintain cryptographic state information. This information is called the "cryptographic context". SRTP uses two types of keys: session keys and master keys. By a "session key", we mean a key which is used directly in a cryptographic transform (e.g. encryption or message authentication), and by a "master key", we mean a random bit string (given by the key management protocol) from which session keys are derived in a cryptographically secure way. The master key(s) and other parameters in the cryptographic context are provided by key management mechanisms external to SRTP, see Section 8. 3.2.1 Transform-independent parameters Transform-independent parameters are present in the cryptographic context independently of the particular encryption or authentication transforms that are used. The transform-independent parameters of the cryptographic context for SRTP consist of: * a 32-bit unsigned rollover counter (ROC), which records how many times the 16-bit RTP sequence number has been reset to zero after passing through 65,535. Unlike the sequence number (SEQ), which SRTP extracts from the RTP packet header, the ROC is maintained by SRTP as described in Section 3.3.1. We define the index of the SRTP packet corresponding to a given ROC and RTP sequence number to be the 48-bit quantity i = 2^16 * ROC + SEQ. * for the receiver only, a 16-bit sequence number s_l, which can be thought of as the highest received RTP sequence number (see Section 3.3.1 for its handling), which SHOULD be authenticated since message authentication is RECOMMENDED, * an identifier for the encryption algorithm, i.e., the cipher and its mode of operation, * an identifier for the message authentication algorithm, * a replay list, maintained by the receiver only (when authentication and replay protection are provided), containing Baugher, et al. [Page 8] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 indices of recently received and authenticated SRTP packets, * an MKI indicator (0/1) as to whether an MKI is present in SRTP and SRTCP packets, * if the MKI indicator is set to one, the length (in octets) of the MKI field, and (for the sender) the actual value of the currently active MKI (the value of the MKI indicator and length MUST be kept fixed for the lifetime of the context), * the master key(s), which MUST be random and kept secret, * for each master key, there is a counter of the number of SRTP packets that have been processed (sent) with that master key (essential for security, see Sections 3.3.1 and 9), * non-negative integers n_e, and n_a, determining the length of the session keys for encryption, and message authentication. In addition, for each master key, an SRTP stream MAY use the following associated values: * a master salt, to be used in the key derivation of session keys. This value, when used, MUST be random, but MAY be public. Use of master salt is strongly RECOMMENDED, see Section 9.2. A "NULL" salt is treated as 00...0. * an integer in the set {1,2,4,...,2^24}, the "key_derivation_rate", where an unspecified value is treated as zero. The constraint to be a power of 2 simplifies the session-key derivation implementation, see Section 4.3. * an MKI value, * <"From", "To"> values, specifying the lifetime for a master key, expressed in terms of the two 48-bit index values inside whose range (including the range end-points) the master key is valid. For the use of , see Section 8.1.1. <"From", "To"> is an alternative to the MKI and assumes that a master key is in one-to- one correspondence with the SRTP session key on which the <"From", "To"> range is defined. SRTCP SHALL by default share the crypto context with SRTP, except: * no rollover counter and s_l-value need to be maintained as the RTCP index is explicitly carried in each SRTCP packet, * a separate replay list is maintained (when replay protection is Baugher, et al. [Page 9] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 provided), * SRTCP maintains a separate counter for its master key (even if the master key is the same as that for SRTP, see below), as a means to maintain a count of the number of SRTCP packets that have been processed with that key. Note in particular that the master key(s) MAY be shared between SRTP and the corresponding SRTCP, if the pre-defined transforms (including the key derivation) are used but the session key(s) MUST NOT be so shared. In addition, there can be cases (see Sections 8 and 9.1) where several SRTP streams within a given RTP session, identified by their synchronization source (SSRCs, which is part of the RTP header), share most of the crypto context parameters (including possibly master and session keys). In such cases, just as in the normal SRTP/SRTCP parameter sharing above, separate replay lists and packet counters for each stream (SSRC) MUST still be maintained. Also, separate SRTP indices MUST then be maintained. A summary of parameters, pre-defined transforms, and default values for the above parameters (and other SRTP parameters) can be found in Sections 5 and 8.2. 3.2.2 Transform-dependent parameters All encryption, authentication/integrity, and key derivation parameters are defined in the transforms section (Section 4). Typical examples of such parameters are block size of ciphers, session keys, data for the Initialization Vector (IV) formation, etc. Future SRTP transform specifications MUST include a section to list the additional cryptographic context's parameters for that transform, if any. 3.2.3 Mapping SRTP Packets to Cryptographic Contexts Recall that an RTP session for each participant is defined [RTPNEW] by a pair of destination transport addresses (one network address plus a port pair for RTP and RTCP), and that a multimedia session is defined as a collection of RTP sessions. For example, a particular multimedia session could include an audio RTP session, a video RTP session, and a text RTP session. A cryptographic context SHALL be uniquely identified by the triplet context identifier: Baugher, et al. [Page 10] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 context id = where the destination network address and the destination transport port are the ones in the SRTP packet. It is assumed that, when presented with this information, the key management returns a context with the information as described in Section 3.2. As noted above, SRTP and SRTCP by default share the bulk of the parameters in the cryptographic context. Thus, retrieving the crypto context parameters for an SRTCP stream in practice may imply a binding to the correspondent SRTP crypto context. It is up to the implementation to assure such binding, since the RTCP port may not be directly deducible from the RTP port only. Alternatively, the key management may choose to provide separate SRTP- and SRTCP- contexts, duplicating the common parameters (such as master key(s)). The latter approach then also enables SRTP and SRTCP to use, e.g., distinct transforms, if so desired. Similar considerations arise when multiple SRTP streams, forming part of one single RTP session, share keys and other parameters. If no valid context can be found for a packet corresponding to a certain context identifier, that packet MUST be discarded from further processing. 3.3 SRTP Packet Processing The following applies to SRTP. SRTCP is described in Section 3.4. Assuming initialization of the cryptographic context(s) has taken place via key management, the sender SHALL do the following to construct an SRTP packet: 1. Determine which cryptographic context to use as described in Section 3.2.3. 2. Determine the index of the SRTP packet using the rollover counter, the highest sequence number in the cryptographic context, and the sequence number in the RTP packet, as described in Section 3.3.1. 3. Determine the master key and master salt. This is done using the index determined in the previous step or the current MKI in the cryptographic context, according to Section 8.1. 4. Determine the session keys and session salt (if they are used by the transform) as described in Section 4.3, using master key, master Baugher, et al. [Page 11] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 salt, key_derivation_rate, and session key-lengths in the cryptographic context with the index, determined in Steps 2 and 3. 5. Encrypt the RTP payload to produce the Encrypted Portion of the packet (see Section 4.1, for the defined ciphers). This step uses the encryption algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context, the session encryption key and the session salt (if used) found in Step 4 together with the index found in Step 2. 6. If the MKI indicator is set to one, append the MKI to the packet. 7. For message authentication, compute the authentication tag for the Authenticated Portion of the packet, as described in Section 4.2. This step uses the current rollover counter, the authentication algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context, and the session authentication key found in Step 4. Append the authentication tag to the packet. 8. If necessary, update the ROC as in Section 3.3.1, using the packet index determined in Step 2. To authenticate and decrypt an SRTP packet, the receiver SHALL do the following: 1. Determine which cryptographic context to use as described in Section 3.2.3. 2. Run the algorithm in Section 3.3.1 to get the index of the SRTP packet. The algorithm uses the rollover counter and highest sequence number in the cryptographic context with the sequence number in the SRTP packet, as described in Section 3.3.1. 3. Determine the master key and master salt. If the MKI indicator in the context is set to one, use the MKI in the SRTP packet, otherwise use the index from the previous step, according to Section 8.1. 4. Determine the session keys, and session salt (if used by the transform) as described in Section 4.3, using master key, master salt, key_derivation_rate and session key-lengths in the cryptographic context with the index, determined in Steps 2 and 3. 5. For message authentication and replay protection, first check if the packet has been replayed (Section 3.3.2), using the Replay List and the index as determined in Step 2. If the packet is judged to be replayed, then the packet MUST be discarded, and the event SHOULD be logged. Baugher, et al. [Page 12] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 Next, perform verification of the authentication tag, using the rollover counter from Step 2, the authentication algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context, and the session authentication key from Step 4. If the result is "AUTHENTICATION FAILURE" (see Section 4.2), the packet MUST be discarded from further processing and the event SHOULD be logged. 6. Decrypt the Encrypted Portion of the packet (see Section 4.1, for the defined ciphers), using the decryption algorithm indicated in the cryptographic context, the session encryption key and salt (if used) found in Step 4 with the index from Step 2. 7. Update the rollover counter and highest sequence number, s_l, in the cryptographic context as in Section 3.3.1, using the packet index estimated in Step 2. If replay protection is provided, also update the Replay List as described in Section 3.3.2. 8. When present, remove the MKI and authentication tag fields from the packet. 3.3.1 Packet Index Determination, and ROC, s_l Update SRTP implementations use an "implicit" packet index for sequencing, i.e., not all of the index is explicitly carried in the SRTP packet. For the pre-defined transforms, the index i is used in replay protection (Section 3.3.2), encryption (Section 4.1), message authentication (Section 4.2), and for the key derivation (Section 4.3). When the session starts, the sender side MUST set the rollover counter, ROC, to zero. Each time the RTP sequence number, SEQ, wraps modulo 2^16, the sender side MUST increment ROC by one, modulo 2^32 (see security aspects below). The sender's packet index is then defined as i = 2^16 * ROC + SEQ. Receiver-side implementations use the RTP sequence number to determine the correct index of a packet, which is the location of the packet in the sequence of all SRTP packets. A robust approach for the proper use of a rollover counter requires its handling and use to be well defined. In particular, out-of-order RTP packets with sequence numbers close to 2^16 or zero must be properly handled. The index estimate is based on the receiver's locally maintained ROC and s_l values. At the setup of the session, the ROC MUST be set to zero. Receivers joining an on-going session MUST be given the Baugher, et al. [Page 13] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 current ROC value using out-of-band signaling such as key-management signaling. Furthermore, the receiver SHALL initialize s_l to the RTP sequence number (SEQ) of the first observed SRTP packet (unless the initial value is provided by out of band signaling such as key management). On consecutive SRTP packets, the receiver SHOULD estimate the index as i = 2^16 * v + SEQ, where v is chosen from the set { ROC-1, ROC, ROC+1 } (modulo 2^32) such that i is closest (in modulo 2^48 sense) to the value 2^16 * ROC + s_l (see Appendix A for pseudocode). After the packet has been processed and authenticated (when enabled for SRTP for SRTP packets for the session), the receiver MUST use v to conditionally update its s_l and ROC variables as follows. If v=(ROC-1) mod 2^32, then there is no update to s_l or ROC. If v=ROC, then s_l is set to SEQ if and only if SEQ is larger than the current s_l; there is no change to ROC. If v=(ROC+1) mod 2^32, then s_l is set to SEQ and ROC is set to v. After a re-keying occurs (changing to a new master key), the rollover counter always maintains its sequence of values, i.e., it MUST NOT be reset to zero. As the rollover counter is 32 bits long and the sequence number is 16 bits long, the maximum number of packets belonging to a given SRTP stream that can be secured with the same key is 2^48 using the pre-defined transforms. After that number of SRTP packets have been sent with a given (master or session) key, the sender MUST NOT send any more packets with that key. (There exists a similar limit for SRTCP, which in practice may be more restrictive, see Section 9.2.) This limitation enforces a security benefit by providing an upper bound on the amount of traffic that can pass before cryptographic keys are changed. Re-keying (see Section 8.1) MUST be triggered, before this amount of traffic, and MAY be triggered earlier, e.g., for increased security and access control to media. Recurring key derivation by means of a non-zero key_derivation_rate (see Section 4.3), also gives stronger security but does not change the above absolute maximum value. On the receiver side, there is a caveat to updating s_l and ROC: if message authentication is not present, neither the initialization of s_l, nor the ROC update can be made completely robust. The receiver's "implicit index" approach works for the pre-defined transforms as long as the reorder and loss of the packets are not too great and bit-errors do not occur in unfortunate ways. In Baugher, et al. [Page 14] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 particular, 2^15 packets would need to be lost, or a packet would need to be 2^15 packets out of sequence before synchronization is lost. Such drastic loss or reorder is likely to disrupt the RTP application itself. The algorithm for the index estimate and ROC update is a matter of implementation, and should take into consideration the environment (e.g., packet loss rate) and the cases when synchronization is likely to be lost, e.g. when the initial sequence number (randomly chosen by RTP) is not known in advance (not sent in the key management protocol) but may be near to wrap modulo 2^16. A more elaborate and more robust scheme than the one given above is the handling of RTP's own "rollover counter", see Appendix A.1 of [RTPNEW]. 3.3.2 Replay Protection Secure replay protection is only possible when integrity protection is present. It is RECOMMENDED to use replay protection, both for RTP and RTCP, as integrity protection alone cannot assure security against replay attacks. A packet is "replayed" when it is stored by an adversary, and then re-injected into the network. When message authentication is provided, SRTP protects against such attacks through a Replay List. Each SRTP receiver maintains a Replay List, which conceptually contains the indices of all of the packets which have been received and authenticated. In practice, the list can use a "sliding window" approach, so that a fixed amount of storage suffices for replay protection. Packet indices which lag behind the packet index in the context by more than SRTP-WINDOW-SIZE can be assumed to have been received, where SRTP-WINDOW-SIZE is a receiver-side, implementation- dependent parameter and MUST be at least 64, but which MAY be set to a higher value. The receiver checks the index of an incoming packet against the replay list and the window. Only packets with index ahead of the window, or, inside the window but not already received, SHALL be accepted. After the packet has been authenticated (if necessary the window is first moved ahead), the replay list SHALL be updated with the new index. The Replay List can be efficiently implemented by using a bitmap to represent which packets have been received, as described in the Security Architecture for IP [RFC2401]. Baugher, et al. [Page 15] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 3.4 Secure RTCP Secure RTCP follows the definition of Secure RTP. SRTCP adds three mandatory new fields (the SRTCP index, an "encrypt-flag", and the authentication tag) and one optional field (the MKI) to the RTCP packet definition. The three mandatory fields MUST be appended to an RTCP packet in order to form an equivalent SRTCP packet. The added fields follow any other profile-specific extensions. According to Section 6.1 of [RTPNEW], there is a REQUIRED packet format for compound packets. SRTCP MUST be given packets according to that requirement in the sense that the first part MUST be a sender report or a receiver report. However, the RTCP encryption prefix (a random 32-bit quantity) specified in that Section MUST NOT be used since, as is stated there, it is only applicable to the encryption method specified in [RTPNEW] and is not needed by the cryptographic mechanisms used in SRTP. Baugher, et al. [Page 16] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ |V=2|P| RC | PT=SR or RR | length | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | SSRC of sender | | +>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | | ~ sender info ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ report block 1 ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ report block 2 ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ ... ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | |V=2|P| SC | PT=SDES=202 | length | | | +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | | | SSRC/CSRC_1 | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ SDES items ~ | | +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | | ~ ... ~ | +>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | | |E| SRTCP index | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ | ~ SRTCP MKI (OPTIONAL) ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | : authentication tag : | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | +-- Encrypted Portion Authenticated Portion -----+ Figure 2. An example of the format of a Secure RTCP packet, consisting of an underlying RTCP compound packet with a Sender Report and SDES packet. The Encrypted Portion of an SRTCP packet consists of the encryption (Section 4.1) of the RTCP payload of the equivalent compound RTCP packet, from the first RTCP packet, i.e., from the ninth (9) octet to the end of the compound packet. The Authenticated Portion of an SRTCP packet consists of the entire equivalent (eventually compound) RTCP packet, the E flag, and the SRTCP index (after any encryption has been applied to the payload). The added fields are: Baugher, et al. [Page 17] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 E-flag: 1 bit, REQUIRED The E-flag indicates if the current SRTCP packet is encrypted or unencrypted. Section 9.1 of [RTPNEW] allows the split of a compound RTCP packet into two lower-layer packets, one to be encrypted and one to be sent in the clear. The E bit set to "1" indicates encrypted packet, and "0" indicates non- encrypted packet. SRTCP index: 31 bits, REQUIRED The SRTCP index is a 31-bit counter for the SRTCP packet. The index is explicitly included in each packet, in contrast to the "implicit" index approach used for SRTP. The SRTCP index MUST be set to zero before the first SRTCP packet is sent, and MUST be incremented by one, modulo 2^31, after each SRTCP packet is sent. In particular, after a re-key, the SRTCP index MUST NOT be reset to zero again (Section 3.3.1). Authentication Tag: configurable length, REQUIRED The authentication tag is used to carry message authentication data. MKI: configurable length, OPTIONAL The MKI is the Master Key Indicator, and functions according to the MKI definition in Section 3. SRTCP uses the cryptographic context parameters and packet processing of SRTP by default, with the following changes: * The receiver does not need to "estimate" the index, as it is explicitly signaled in the packet. * Pre-defined SRTCP encryption is as specified in Section 4.1, but using the definition of the SRTCP Encrypted Portion given in this section, and using the SRTCP index as the index i. The encryption transform and related parameters SHALL by default be the same selected for the protection of the associated SRTP stream(s), while the NULL algorithm SHALL be applied to the RTCP packets not to be encrypted. SRTCP may have a different encryption transform than the one used by the corresponding SRTP. The expected use for this feature is when the former has NULL-encryption and the latter has a non NULL-encryption. The E-flag is assigned a value by the sender depending on whether the packet was encrypted or not. * SRTCP decryption is performed as in Section 4, but only if the E flag is equal to 1. If so, the Encrypted Portion is decrypted, Baugher, et al. [Page 18] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 using the SRTCP index as the index i. In case the E-flag is 0, the payload is simply left unmodified. * SRTCP replay protection is as defined in Section 3.3.2, but using the SRTCP index as the index i and a separate Replay List that is specific to SRTCP. * The pre-defined SRTCP authentication tag is specified as in Section 4.2, but with the Authenticated Portion of the SRTCP packet given in this section (which includes the index). The authentication transform and related parameters (e.g., key size) SHALL by default be the same as selected for the protection of the associated SRTP stream(s)). * In the last step of the processing, only the sender needs to update the value of the SRTCP index by incrementing it modulo 2^31 and for security reasons the sender MUST also check the number of SRTCP packets processed, see Section 9.2. Message authentication for RTCP is REQUIRED, as it is the control protocol (e.g., it has a BYE packet) for RTP. Precautions must be taken so that the packet expansion in SRTCP (due to the added fields) does not cause SRTCP messages to use more than their share of RTCP bandwidth. To avoid this, the following two measures MUST be taken: 1. When initializing the RTCP variable "avg_rtcp_size" defined in chapter 6.3 of [RTPNEW], it MUST include the size of the fields that will be added by SRTCP (index, E-bit, authentication tag, and when present, the MKI). 2. When updating the "avg_rtcp_size" using the variable packet_size" (section 6.3.3 of [RTPNEW]), the value of "packet_size" MUST include the size of the additional fields added by SRTCP. With these measures in place the SRTCP messages will not use more than the allotted bandwidth. The effect of the size of the added fields on the SRTCP traffic will be that messages will be sent with longer packet intervals. The increase in the intervals will be directly proportional to size of the added fields. For the pre- defined transforms, the size of the added fields will be at least 14 octets, and upper bounded depending on MKI and the authentication tag sizes. 4. Pre-Defined Cryptographic Transforms While there are numerous encryption and message authentication Baugher, et al. [Page 19] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 algorithms that can be used in SRTP, we define below default algorithms in order to avoid the complexity of specifying the encodings for the signaling of algorithm and parameter identifiers. The defined algorithms have been chosen as they fulfill the goals listed in Section 2. Recommendations on how to extend SRTP with new transforms are given in Section 6. 4.1 Encryption The following parameters are common to both pre-defined, non-NULL, encryption transforms specified in this section. * BLOCK_CIPHER-MODE indicates the block cipher used and its mode of operation * n_b is the bit-size of the block for the block cipher * k_e is the session encryption key * n_e is the bit-length of k_e * k_s is the session salting key * n_s is the bit-length of k_s * SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH is the octet length of the keystream prefix, an non-negative integer, specified by the message authentication code in use. The distinct session keys and salts for SRTP/SRTCP are by default derived as specified in Section 4.3. The encryption transforms defined in SRTP map the SRTP packet index and secret key into a pseudo-random keystream segment. Each keystream segment encrypts a single RTP packet. The process of encrypting a packet consists of generating the keystream segment corresponding to the packet, and then bitwise exclusive-oring that keystream segment onto the payload of the RTP packet to produce the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet. In case the payload size is not an integer multiple of n_b bits, the excess (least significant) bits of the keystream are simply discarded. Decryption is done the same way, but swapping the roles of the plaintext and ciphertext. Baugher, et al. [Page 20] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 +----+ +------------------+---------------------------------+ | KG |-->| Keystream Prefix | Keystream Suffix |---+ +----+ +------------------+---------------------------------+ | | +---------------------------------+ v | Payload of RTP Packet |->(*) +---------------------------------+ | | +---------------------------------+ | | Encrypted Portion of SRTP Packet|<--+ +---------------------------------+ Figure 3: Default SRTP Encryption Processing. Here KG denotes the keystream generator, and (*) denotes bitwise exclusive-or. The definition of how the keystream is generated, given the index, depends on the cipher and its mode of operation. Below, two such keystream generators are defined. The NULL cipher is also defined, to be used when encryption of RTP is not required. The SRTP definition of the keystream is illustrated in Figure 3. The initial octets of each keystream segment MAY be reserved for use in a message authentication code, in which case the keystream used for encryption starts immediately after the last reserved octet. The initial reserved octets are called the "keystream prefix" (not to be confused with the "encryption prefix" of [RTPNEW, Section 6.1]), and the remaining octets are called the "keystream suffix". The keystream prefix MUST NOT be used for encryption. The process is illustrated in Figure 3. The number of octets in the keystream prefix is denoted as SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH. The keystream prefix is indicated by a positive, non-zero value of SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH. This means that, even if confidentiality is not to be provided, the keystream generator output may still need to be computed for packet authentication, in which case the default keystream generator (mode) SHALL be used. The default cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and we define two modes of running AES, (1) Segmented Integer Counter Mode AES and (2) AES in f8-mode. In the remainder of this section, let E(k,x) be AES applied to key k and input block x. 4.1.1 AES in Counter Mode Conceptually, counter mode [AES-CTR] consists of encrypting successive integers. The actual definition is somewhat more Baugher, et al. [Page 21] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 complicated, in order to randomize the starting point of the integer sequence. Each packet is encrypted with a distinct keystream segment, which SHALL be computed as follows. A keystream segment SHALL be the concatenation of the 128-bit output blocks of the AES cipher in the encrypt direction, using key k = k_e, in which the block indices are in increasing order. Symbolically, each keystream segment looks like E(k, IV) || E(k, IV + 1 mod 2^128) || E(k, IV + 2 mod 2^128) ... where the 128-bit integer value IV SHALL be defined by the SSRC, the SRTP packet index i, and the SRTP session salting key k_s, as below. IV = (k_s * 2^16) XOR (SSRC * 2^64) XOR (i * 2^16) Each of the three terms in the XOR-sum above is padded with as many leading zeros as needed to make the operation well-defined, considered as a 128-bit value. The inclusion of the SSRC allows the use of the same key to protect distinct SRTP streams within the same RTP session, see the security caveats in Section 9.1. In the case of SRTCP, the SSRC of the first header of the compound packet MUST be used, i SHALL be the 31-bit SRTCP index and k_e, k_s SHALL be replaced by the SRTCP session key and salt. Note that the initial value, IV, is fixed for each packet and is formed by "reserving" 16 zeros in the least significant bits for the purpose of the counter. The number of blocks of keystream generated for any fixed value of IV MUST NOT exceed 2^16 to avoid key stream re-use, see below. The AES has a block size of 128 bits, so 2^16 output blocks are sufficient to generate the 2^23 bits of keystream needed to encrypt the largest possible RTP packet (except for IPv6 "jumbograms" [RFC2675], which are not likely to be used for RTP- based multimedia traffic). This restriction on the maximum bit-size of the packet that can be encrypted ensures the security of the encryption method by limiting the effectiveness of probabilistic attacks [BDJR]. For a particular Counter Mode key, each IV value used as an input MUST be distinct, in order to avoid the security exposure of a two- time pad situation (Section 9.1). To satisfy this constraint, an implementation MUST ensure that the values of the SRTP packet index of ROC || SEQ, and the SSRC used in the construction of the IV are distinct for any particular key. The failure to ensure this uniqueness could be catastrophic for Secure RTP. This is in Baugher, et al. [Page 22] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 contrast to the situation for RTP itself, which may be able to tolerate such failures. It is RECOMMENDED that, if a dedicated security module is present, the RTP sequence numbers and SSRC either be generated or checked by that module (i.e., sequence-number and SSRC processing in an SRTP system needs to be protected as well as the key). 4.1.2 AES in f8-mode To encrypt UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, as 3G networks) data, a solution (see [f8-a], [f8-b]) known as the f8- algorithm has been developed. On a high level, the proposed scheme is a variant of Output Feedback Mode (OFB) [HAC], with a more elaborate initialization and feedback function. As in normal OFB, the core consists of a block cipher. We also define here the use of AES as a block cipher to be used in what we shall call "f8-mode of operation" RTP encryption. The AES f8-mode SHALL use the same default sizes for session key and salt as AES counter mode. Figure 4 shows the structure of block cipher, E, running in f8-mode. Baugher, et al. [Page 23] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 IV | v +------+ | | +--->| E | | | | | +------+ | | m -> (*) +-----------+-------------+-- ... ------+ | IV' | | | | | | j=1 -> (*) j=2 -> (*) ... j=L-1 ->(*) | | | | | | | +-> (*) +-> (*) ... +-> (*) | | | | | | | | | v | v | v | v | +------+ | +------+ | +------+ | +------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | k_e ---+--->| E | | | E | | | E | | | E | | | | | | | | | | | | +------+ | +------+ | +------+ | +------+ | | | | | | | +------+ +--------+ +-- ... ----+ | | | | | v v v v S(0) S(1) S(2) . . . S(L-1) Figure 4. f8-mode of operation (asterisk, (*), denotes bitwise XOR). The figure represents the KG in Figure 3, when AES-f8 is used. 4.1.2.1 f8 Keystream Generation The Initialization Vector (IV) SHALL be determined as described in Section 4.1.2.2 (and in Section 4.1.2.3 for SRTCP). Let IV', S(j), and m denote n_b-bit blocks. The keystream, S(0) || ... || S(L-1), for an N-bit message SHALL be defined by setting IV' = E(k_e XOR m, IV), and S(-1) = 00..0. For j = 0,1,..,L-1 where L = N/n_b (rounded up to nearest integer) compute S(j) = E(k_e, IV' XOR j XOR S(j-1)) Notice that the IV is not used directly. Instead it is fed through E under another key to produce an internal, "masked" value (denoted IV') to prevent an attacker from gaining known input/output pairs. Baugher, et al. [Page 24] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 The role of the internal counter, j, is to prevent short keystream cycles. The value of the key mask m SHALL be m = k_s || 0x555..5, i.e. the session salting key, appended by the binary pattern 0101.. to fill out the entire desired key size, n_e. The sender SHOULD NOT generate more than 2^32 blocks, which is sufficient to generate 2^39 bits of keystream. Unlike counter mode, there is no absolute threshold above (below) which f8 is guaranteed to be insecure (secure). The above bound has been chosen to limit, with sufficient security margin, the probability of degenerative behavior in the f8 keystream generation. 4.1.2.2 f8 SRTP IV Formation The purpose of the following IV formation is to provide a feature which we call implicit header authentication (IHA), see Section 9.5. The SRTP IV for 128-bit block AES-f8 SHALL be formed in the following way: IV = 0x00 || M || PT || SEQ || TS || SSRC || ROC M, PT, SEQ, TS, SSRC SHALL be taken from the RTP header; ROC is from the cryptographic context. The presence of the SSRC as part of the IV allows AES-f8 to be used when a master key is shared between multiple streams within the same RTP session, see Section 9.1. 4.1.2.3 f8 SRTCP IV Formation The SRTCP IV for 128-bit block AES-f8 SHALL be formed in the following way: IV= 0..0 || E || SRTCP index || V || P || RC || PT || length || SSRC where V, P, RC, PT, length, SSRC SHALL be taken from the first header in the RTCP compound packet. E and SRTCP index are the 1-bit and 31-bit fields added to the packet. 4.1.3 NULL Cipher The NULL cipher is used when no confidentiality for RTP/RTCP is requested. The keystream can be thought of as "000..0", i.e. the Baugher, et al. [Page 25] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 encryption SHALL simply copy the plaintext input into the ciphertext output. 4.2 Message Authentication and Integrity Throughout this section, M will denote data to be integrity protected. In the case of SRTP, M SHALL consist of the Authenticated Portion of the packet (as specified in Figure 1) concatenated with the ROC, M = Authenticated Portion || ROC; in the case of SRTCP, M SHALL consist of the Authenticated Portion (as specified in Figure 2) only. Common parameters: * AUTH_ALG is the authentication algorithm * k_a is the session message authentication key * n_a is the bit-length of the authentication key * n_tag is the bit-length of the output authentication tag * SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH is the octet length of the keystream prefix as defined above, a parameter of AUTH_ALG The distinct session authentication keys for SRTP/SRTCP are by default derived as specified in Section 4.3. The values of n_a, n_tag, and SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH MUST be fixed for any particular fixed value of the key. We describe the process of computing authentication tags as follows. The sender computes the tag of M and appends it to the packet. The SRTP receiver verifies a message/authentication tag pair by computing a new authentication tag over M using the selected algorithm and key, and then compares it to the tag associated with the received message. If the two tags are equal, then the message/tag pair is valid; otherwise, it is invalid and the error audit message "AUTHENTICATION FAILURE" MUST be returned. 4.2.1 HMAC-SHA1 The pre-defined authentication transform for SRTP is HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104]. With HMAC-SHA1, the SRTP_PREFIX_LENGTH (Figure 3) SHALL be 0. For SRTP (respectively SRTCP), the HMAC SHALL be applied to the session authentication key and M as specified above, i.e. HMAC(k_a, M). The HMAC output SHALL then be truncated to the n_tag left-most bits. Baugher, et al. [Page 26] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 4.3 Key Derivation 4.3.1 Key Derivation Algorithm Regardless of the encryption or message authentication transform that is employed (it may be an SRTP pre-defined transform or newly introduced according to Section 6), interoperable SRTP implementations MUST use the SRTP key derivation to generate session keys. Once the key derivation rate is properly signaled at the start of the session, there is no need for extra communication between the parties that use SRTP key derivation. packet index ---+ | v +-----------+ master +--------+ session encr_key | ext | key | |----------> | key mgmt |-------->| key | session auth_key | (optional | | deriv |----------> | rekey) |-------->| | session salt_key | | master | |----------> +-----------+ salt +--------+ Figure 5: SRTP key derivation. At least one initial key derivation SHALL be performed by SRTP, i.e., the first key derivation is REQUIRED. Further applications of the key derivation MAY be performed, according to the "key_derivation_rate" value in the cryptographic context. The key derivation function SHALL be initially invoked before the first packet and then, if derivation rate is r > 0, further invoked on every r-th packet, and produce session keys according to the non- zero key derivation rate. This can be thought of as "refreshing" the session keys. The value of "key_derivation_rate" MUST be kept fixed for the lifetime of the associated master key. Interoperable SRTP implementations MAY also derive session salting keys for encryption transforms, as is done in both of the pre- defined transforms. Let m and n be positive integers. A pseudo-random function family is a set of keyed functions {PRF_n(k,x)} such that for the (secret) random key k, given m-bit x, PRF_n(k,x) is an n-bit string, computationally indistinguishable from random n-bit strings, see [HAC]. For the purpose of key derivation in SRTP, a secure PRF with m = 128 (or more) MUST be used, and a default PRF transform is defined in Section 4.3.3. Baugher, et al. [Page 27] INTERNET-DRAFT SRTP July, 2003 Let "a DIV t" denote integer division of a by t, rounded down, and with the convention that "a DIV 0 = 0" for all a. We also make the convention of treating "a DIV t" as a bit string of the same length as a, and thus "a DIV t" will in general have leading zeros. Key derivation SHALL be defined as follows in terms of