DNSEXT Working Group Yuji Kamite INTERNET-DRAFT NTT Communications Masaya Nakayama Expires: Sep. 3, 2003 The University of Tokyo Mar. 3, 2003 TKEY Secret Key Renewal Mode Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html Abstract This document defines a new mode in TKEY [RFC2930] and proposes an atomic method for changing secret keys used for TSIG [RFC2845] periodically. Originally, TKEY provides methods of setting up shared secrets other than manual exchange, but it cannot control timing of key renewal very well though it can add or delete shared keys separately. This proposal is a systematical key renewal procedure intended for preventing signing DNS messages with old and non-safe keys permanently. Kamite, et. al. [Page 1] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 Table of Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1 Defined Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 New Format and Assigned Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3 Overview of Secret Key Renewal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 Shared Secret Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1 Key Usage Time Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2 Partial Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3 Key Renewal Message Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3.1 TKEY RR structure for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4 Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4.1 Query for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4.2 Response for Key Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.5 Keying Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.5.1 DH Exchange for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.5.2 Server Assigned Keying for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5.3 Resolver Assigned Keying for Key Renewal . . . . . . . . 13 2.6 Considerations about Non-compliant Hosts . . . . . . . . . . 14 3 Secret Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 Compulsory Key Revocation by Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 Special Considerations for Two Servers' Case . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1 To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests . . . . . . . . . 16 6 Key Name Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7 Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Kamite, et. al. [Page 2] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 1. Introduction TSIG [RFC2845] provides DNS message integrity and the request/transaction authentication by means of message authentication codes (MAC). TSIG is a practical solution in view of calculation speed and availability. However, TSIG does not have exchanging mechanism of shared secret keys between server and resolver, and administrators might have to exchange secret keys manually. TKEY [RFC2930] is introduced to solve such problem and it can exchange secrets for TSIG via networks. In various modes of TKEY, a server and a resolver can add or delete a secret key be means of TKEY message exchange. However, the existing TKEY does not care fully about the management of keys which became too old, or dangerous after long time usage. It is ideal that the number of secret which a pair of hosts share should be limited only one, because having too many keys for the same purpose might not only be a burden to resolvers for managing and distinguishing according to servers to query, but also does not seem to be safe in terms of storage and protection against attackers. Moreover, perhaps holding old keys long time might give attackers chances to compromise by scrupulous calculation. Therefore, when a new shared secret is established by TKEY, the previous old secret should be revoked immediately. To accomplish this, DNS servers must support a protocol for key renewal. This document specifies procedure to refresh secret keys between two hosts which is defined within the framework of TKEY, and it is called "TKEY Secret Key Renewal Mode". The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 1.1. Defined Words * Inception Time: Beginning of the shared secret key lifetime. This value is determined when the key is generated. * Expiry Limit: Time limit of the key's validity. This value is determined when a new key is generated. After Expiry Limit, server and client (resolver) must not authenticate TSIG signed with the key. Therefore, Renewal to the next key should be carried out before Expiry Limit. * Partial Revocation Time: Time when server judges the key is too old Kamite, et. al. [Page 3] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 and must be updated. It must be between Inception Time and Expiry Limit. This value is determined by server freely following its security policy. e.g., If the time from Inception to Partial Revocation is short, renewal will be carried out more often, which might be safer. * Revocation Time: Time when the key becomes invalid and can be removed. This value is not determined in advance because it is the actual time when revocation is completed. * Adoption Time: Time when the new key is adopted as the next key formally. After Adoption, the key is valid and server and client can generate or verify TSIG making use of it. Adoption Time also means the time when it becomes possible to remove the previous key, so Revocation and Adoption are usually done at the same time. Partial Inception Revocation Revocation Expiry Limit | | | | |----------------|- - - - - - >>|- (revoked) -| | | | | previous key | | | |- - - -|-------------------->> time | | new key Inception Adoption 1.2. New Format and Assigned Numbers TSIG ERROR = (PartialRevoke), to be defined TKEY Mode = (server assignment for key renewal), to be defined Mode = (Diffie-Hellman exchange for key renewal), to be defined Mode = (resolver assignment for key renewal), to be defined Mode = (key adoption), to be defined 1.3. Overview of Secret Key Renewal Mode When a server receives a query from a client signed with a TSIG key, It always checks if the present time is within the range of usage duration it considers safe. If it is judged that the key is too old, i.e., after Partial Revocation Time, the server comes to be in Partial Revocation state about the key, and this key is called Kamite, et. al. [Page 4] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 partially revoked. In this state, whenever a client sends a normal query (e.g., question about A RR) other than TKEY Renewal request with TSIG signed with the old key, the server returns an error message to notify that the time to renew has come. This is called "PartialRevoke" error message. The client which got this error is able to notice that it is necessary to refresh the secret. To make a new shared secret, it sends a TKEY Renewal request, in which several keying methods are available. It can make use of TSIG authentication signed with the partially revoked key mentioned above. After new secret establishment, the client sends a TKEY Adoption request for renewal confirmation. This can also be authenticated with the partially revoked key. If this is admitted by the server, the new key is formally adopted, and at the same time the corresponding old secret is invalidated. Then the client can send the first query again signed with the new key. Key renewal procedure is executed based on two-phase commit mechanism. The first phase is the TKEY Renewal request and its response, which means preparatory confirmation for key update. The second phase is Adoption request and its response. If the server gets request and client receives the response successfully, they can finish renewal process. If any error happens and renewal process fails during these phases, client should roll back to the beginning of the first phase, and send TKEY Renewal request again. This rollback can be done until the Expiry Limit of the key. 2. Shared Secret Key Renewal Suppose a server and a client agree to change their TSIG keys periodically. Key renewal procedure is defined between two hosts. 2.1. Key Usage Time Check Whenever a server receives a query with TSIG and can find a key that is used for signing it, the server checks its Inception Time, Partial Revocation Time and Expiry Limit (this information is usually memorized by the server). When the present time is before Inception Time, the server MUST NOT verify TSIG with the key, and server acts the same way as when no valid key is found, following [RFC2845]. Kamite, et. al. [Page 5] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 When the present time is equal to Inception Time, or between Inception Time and Partial Revocation Time, the behavior of the server is the same as when a valid key is found, required in [RFC2845]. When the present time is the same as the Partial Revocation Time, or between the Partial Revocation Time and Expiry Limit, the server comes to be in Partial Revocation state about the TSIG key and behaves according to the next section. When the present time is the same as the Expiry Time or after it, the server MUST NOT verify TSIG with the key, and returns error messages in the same way as when no valid key is found, following [RFC2845]. 2.2. Partial Revocation In Partial Revocation state, we say the server has partially revoked the key and the key has become a "partially revoked key". If server has received a query signed with the partially revoked key for TKEY Renewal request (See section 2.3.) or "key adoption" request (See section 2.4.), then server does proper process following each specification. If server receives other types of query signed with the partially revoked key and the corresponding MAC is verified, then server SHOULD return TSIG error message for response whose error code is "PartialRevoke" (See section 9.). However, if it is for TKEY key deletion request ([RFC2930] 4.2), server MAY process usual deletion operation defined therein. PartialRevoke error messages have the role to inform clients of the keys' partial revocation and urge them to send TKEY Renewal requests. These error responses MUST be signed with those partial revoked keys if the queries are signed with them. They are sent only when the keys used for queries' TSIG are found to be partially revoked. If the MAC of TSIG cannot be verified with the partially revoked keys, servers MUST NOT return PartialRevoke error with MAC, but should return another error such as "BADSIG" without MAC; in other words, a server informs its key's partial revocation only when the MAC in the received query is valid. 2.3. Key Renewal Message Exchange If a client has received a PartialRevoke error and authenticated the response based on TSIG MAC, it sends a TKEY query for Key Renewal (in Kamite, et. al. [Page 6] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 this document, we call it Renewal request, too.) to the server. The request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) [RFC2931] for authentication. If TSIG is selected, the client can sign it with the partial revoked key. Key Renewal can use one of several keying methods which is indicated in "Mode" field of TKEY RR, and its message structure is dependent on that method. The server which has received Key Renewal request first tries to verify TSIG or SIG(0) accompanying it. If the TSIG is signed and verified with the partially revoked key, the request MUST be authenticated. After authentication, server must check existing old key's validity. If the partially revoked key indicated in the request TKEY's OldName and OldAlgorithm field (See section 2.3.1.) does not really exist at the server, "BADKEY" [RFC2845] is given in Error field for response. If any other error happens, server returns appropriate error messages following the specification described in section 2.5. If there are no errors, server returns a Key Renewal answer. This answer MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) for authentication. When this answer is successfully returned and no error is detected by client, a new shared secret can be established. The details of concrete keying procedure are given in the section 2.5. As a result of this message exchange, client comes to know the newly generated key's attributes such as key's name, Inception Time and Expiry Limit. They are decided finally by the server, and are told to the client; in particular, however, once the server has decided Expiry Limit and returned a response, it should obey the decision as far as it can. In other words, they SHOULD NOT change time values for checking Expiry Limit in the future without any special reason, such as security issue like "Emergency Compulsory Revocation" described in section 8. On the other hand, Partial Revocation Time of this generated key is not decided based on the request, and not informed to the client. The server can determine any value as long as it is between Inception Time and Expiry Limit. However, it is recommended that the period from Inception to Partial Revocation should be fixed as the server side's configuration or should be set the same as the corresponding old key's one. Note: Even after the response is returned to client, possibly server sometimes receives another Renewal TKEY request whose OldName Kamite, et. al. [Page 7] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 indicates the same partial revoked key. Mostly such messages originate in client's resending or rollback because of some kinds of errors. In this case, the server processes keying again and MUST replace the associated secret with the newest produced secret. The secret key produced before comes to be invalid and should be removed from memory; this process is called secret overwrite. Moreover, This regenerated key's name MUST always be different from the one which it overwrites for secret key's uniqueness and distinction. See section 6, too. Even if client sends Key Renewal request though the key described in OldName has not been partially revoked yet, server must do renewal processes. But at the moment when the server accepts such requests with valid authentication, it MUST forcibly consider the key is already partially revoked, that is, the key's Partial Revocation Time must be changed into the present time (i.e., the time when the server receives the request). 2.3.1. TKEY RR structure for Key Renewal TKEY RR for Key Renewal message has the structure given below. In principle, format and definition for each field follows [RFC2930]. Note that each keying scheme sometimes needs different interpretation of RDATA field; for detail, see section 2.5. Field Type Comment ------- ------ ------- NAME domain used for a new key, see below TYPE u_int16_t (defined in [RFC2930]) CLASS u_int16_t (defined in [RFC2930]) TTL u_int32_t (defined in [RFC2930]) RDLEN u_int16_t (defined in [RFC2930]) RDATA: Algorithm: domain algorithm for a new key Inception: u_int32_t about the keying material Expiration: u_int32_t about the keying material Mode: u_int16_t scheme for key agreement see section 9. Error: u_int16_t see description below Key Size: u_int16_t see description below Key Data: octet-stream Other Size: u_int16_t (defined in [RFC2930]) size of other data Other Data: newly defined: see description below Kamite, et. al. [Page 8] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 For "NAME" field, both non-root and root name are allowed. It may be used for a new key's name in the same manner as [RFC2930] 2.1. "Algorithm" specifies which algorithm is used for agreed keying material, which is used for identification of the next key. "Inception" and "Expiration" are used for the valid period of keying material. The meanings differ somewhat according to whether the message is request or answer, and its keying scheme. "Key Data" has different meanings according to keying schemes. "Mode" field stores the value in accordance with the keying method, and see section 2.5. Servers and clients supporting TKEY Renewal method MUST implement "Diffie-Hellman exchange for key renewal" scheme. All other modes are OPTIONAL. "Error" is an extended RCODE which includes "PartialRevoke" value too. See section 9. "Other Data" field has the structure given below. They describe attributes of the key to be renewed. in Other Data filed: Field Type Comment ------- ------ ------- OldNAME domain name of the old key OldAlgorithm domain algorithm of the old key "OldName" indicates the name of the previous key (usually, this is partially revoked key's name that client noticed by PartialRevoke answer from server), and "OldAlogirthm" indicates its algorithm. 2.4. Key Adoption 2.4.1. Query for Key Adoption After receiving a TKEY Renewal answer, the client gets the same secret as the server. Then, it sends a TKEY Adoption request. The request's question section's QNAME field is the same as the NAME filed of TKEY written below. In additional section, there is one TKEY RR that has the structure and values described below. Kamite, et. al. [Page 9] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 "NAME" field is the new key's name to be adopted which was already generated by Renewal message exchange. "Algorithm" is its algo- rithm. "Inception" means the key's Inception Time, and "Expiration" means Expiry Limit. "Mode" field is the value of "key adoption". See section 9. "Other Data" field in Adoption has the same structure as that of Renewal request message. "OldName" means the previous old key, and "OldAlogirthm" means its algorithm. Key Adoption request MUST be signed with TSIG or SIG(0) for authentication. The client can sign TSIG with the previous key. Note that until Adoption is finished, the new key is treated as invalid, thus it cannot be used for authentication immediately. 2.4.2. Response for Key Adoption The server which has received Adoption request, it verifies TSIG or SIG(0) accompanying it. If the TSIG is signed with the partially revoked key and can be verified, the message MUST be authenticated. If the next new key indicated by the request TKEY's "NAME" is not really present at the server, BADNAME [RFC2845] is given in Error field and the error message is returned. If the next key really exists and it has not been adopted formally yet, the server confirms the previous key's existence indicated by the "OldName" and "OldAlgorithm" field. If it succeeds, the server executes Adoption of the next key and Revocation of the previous key. Response message duplicates the request's TKEY RR with NOERROR, including "OldName" and "OldAlgorithm" that indicate the revoked key. If the next key exists but it is already adopted, the server returns a response message regardless of the substance of the request TKEY's "OldName". In this response, Response TKEY RR has the same data as the request's one except as to its "Other Data" that is changed into null (i.e., "Other Size" is zero), which is intended for telling the client that the previous key name was ignored, and the new key is already available. Client sometimes has to retry Adoption request. Suppose the client sent request signed with the partially revoked key, but its response did not return successfully (e.g., due to the drop of UDP packet). Client will probably retry Adoption request; however, the request will be refused in the form of TSIG "BADKEY" error because the previous key was already revoked. In this case, client should Kamite, et. al. [Page 10] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 retransmit Adoption request signed with the next key, and expect a response which has null "Other Data" for confirming the completion of renewal. 2.5. Keying Schemes In Renewal message exchanges, there are no limitations as to which keying method is actually used. The specification of keying algorithms is independent of the general procedure of Renewal that is described in section 2.3. Now this document specifies three algorithms in this section, but other future documents can make extensions defining other methods. 2.5.1. DH Exchange for Key Renewal This scheme is defined as an extended method of [RFC2930] 4.1. This specification only describes the difference from it and special notice; assume that all other points, such as keying material computation, are the exactly same as the specification of [RFC2930] 4.1. Query In Renewal request for type TKEY with this mode, there is one TKEY RR and one KEY RR in the additional information section. KEY RR is the client's Diffie-Hellman public key [RFC2539]. QNAME in question section is the same as that of "NAME" field in TKEY RR, i.e., it means the requested new key's name. TKEY "Mode" field stores the value of "DH exchange for key renewal". See section 9. TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" are those requested for the keying material, that is, requested usage period of a new key. TKEY "Key Data" is used as a random, following [RFC2930] 4.1. Response The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is checked, following section 2.3. If any incompatible DH key is found in the request, "BADKEY" [RFC2845] is given in Error field for response. "FORMERR" is given if the query included no DH KEY. If there are no errors, the server processes a response according Kamite, et. al. [Page 11] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 to Diffie-Hellman algorithm and returns the answer. In this answer, there is one TKEY RR in answer section and KEY RR(s) in additional section. As long as no error has occurred, all values of TKEY are equal to that of the request message except TKEY NAME, TKEY RDLEN, RDATA's Inception, Expiration, Key Size and Key Data. TKEY "NAME" field in the answer specifies the name of newly produced key which the client will have to use. TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit. TKEY "Key Data" is used as an additional nonce, following [RFC2930] 4.1. The resolver supplied Diffie-Hellman KEY RR SHOULD be echoed in the additional section and a server Diffie-Hellman KEY RR will also be present in the answer section, following [RFC2930] 4.1. 2.5.2. Server Assigned Keying for Key Renewal This scheme is defined as an extended method of [RFC2930] 4.4. This specification only describes the difference from it and special notice; assume that all other points, such as secret encrypting method, are the exactly same as the specification of [RFC2930] 4.4. Query In Renewal request for type TKEY with this mode, there is one TKEY RR and one KEY RR in the additional information section. KEY RR is used in encrypting the response. QNAME in question section is the same as that of "NAME" field in TKEY RR, i.e., it means the requested new key's name. TKEY "Mode" field stores the value of "server assignment for key renewal". See section 9. TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" are those requested for the keying material, that is, requested usage period of a new key. TKEY "Key Data" is provided following the specification of [RFC2930] 4.4. Kamite, et. al. [Page 12] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 Response The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or SIG(0). Resolver KEY RR is also authenticated by means of verifying that TSIG or SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is checked, following section 2.3. "FORMERR" is given if the query specified no encryption key. If there are no errors, the server response contains one TKEY RR in the answer section, and echoes the KEY RR provided in the query in the additional information section. TKEY "NAME" field in the answer specifies the name of newly produced key which the client will have to use. TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit. TKEY "Key Data" is the assigned keying data encrypted under the public key in the resolver provided KEY RR, which is the same as [RFC2930] 4.4. 2.5.3. Resolver Assigned Keying for Key Renewal This scheme is defined as an extended method of [RFC2930] 4.5. This specification only describes the difference from it and special notice; assume that all other points, such as secret encrypting method, are the exactly same as the specification of [RFC2930] 4.5. Query In Renewal request for type TKEY with this mode, there is one TKEY RR and one KEY RR in the additional information section. TKEY RR has the encrypted keying material and KEY RR is the server public key used to encrypt the data. QNAME in question section is the same as that of "NAME" field in TKEY RR, i.e., it means the requested new key's name. TKEY "Mode" field stores the value of "resolver assignment for key renewal". See section 9. TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" are those requested for the keying material, that is, requested usage period of a new key. TKEY "Key Data" is the encrypted keying material. Kamite, et. al. [Page 13] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 Response The server which received this request first verifies the TSIG or SIG(0). After authentication, the old key's existence validity is checked, following section 2.3. "FORMERR" is given if the server does not have the corresponding private key for the KEY RR that was shown in the request. If there are no errors, the server returns response. The response must have a TKEY RR in the answer section to tell the shared key's name and its usage time values. TKEY "NAME" field in the answer specifies the name of newly produced key which the client will have to use. TKEY "Inception" and "Expiration" mean the periods of the produced key usage. "Inception" should be set to be the time when the new key is actually generated or the time before it, and it will be regarded as Inception Time. "Expiration" is determined by the server, and it will be regarded as Expiry Limit. 2.6. Considerations about Non-compliant Hosts Key Renewal requests and responses must be exchanged between hosts which can understand them and do proper processes. "PartialRevoke" error messages will be only ignored if they should be returned to non-compliant hosts. Note that server does not inform actively the necessity of renewal to clients, but inform it as responses invoked by client's query. Server needs not care whether the "PartialRevoke" errors has reached client or not. If client has not received yet because of any reasons such as packet drops, it will resend the queries, and finally will be able to get "PartialRevoke" information. 3. Secret Storage Every server should keep all secrets and attached information, e.g., Inception Time, Expiry Limit, etc. safely to be able to recover from unexpected stop. To accomplish this, formally adopted keys should be memorized not only on memory, but also be stored in the form of some files. Make sure that this should be protected strongly not to be read by others. If possible, they should be stored in encrypted form. Kamite, et. al. [Page 14] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 4. Compulsory Key Revocation by Server There is a rare but possible case that although servers have already partially revoked keys, clients do not try to send any Renewal requests. If this state continues, in the future it will become the time of Expiry Limit. After Expiry Limit, the keys will be expired and completely removed, so this is called Compulsory Key Revocation by server. If Expiry Limit is too distant from the Partial Revocation Time, then even though very long time passes, clients will be able to refresh secrets only if they add TSIG signed with those old partially revoked keys into requests, which is not safe. On the other hand, if Expiry Limit is too close to Partial Revocation Time, perhaps clients might not be able to notice their keys' Partial Revocation by getting "PartialRevoke" errors. Therefore, servers should set proper Expiry Limit to their keys, considering both their keys' safety, and enough time for clients to send requests and process renewal. 4.1. Example It might be ideal to provide both SIG(0) and TSIG as authentication methods. For example: A client and a server start SIG(0) authentication at first, to establish TSIG shared keys by means of "Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying" as described in [RFC2930] 4.1. Once they get shared secret, they keep using TSIG for usual queries and responses. After a while the server returns a "ParitalRevoke" error and they begin a key renewal process. Both TSIG signed with partially revoked keys and SIG(0) are okay for authentication, but TSIG would be easier to use considering calculation efficiency. If any troubles should happen such as client host's long suspension against expectation, the server will do Compulsory Revocation. After recovery if the client sends a key Renewal request to refresh the old key, it will fail because the key is removed from the server. So, the client will send "Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying" with SIG(0) to make a new shared key again. Kamite, et. al. [Page 15] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 5. Special Considerations for Two servers' Case This section refers to the case where both two hosts are DNS servers which can act as full resolvers as well. If one server (called Server A) comes to want to refresh a shared key (called "Key A-B"), it will await a TKEY Renewal request from the other server (called Server B). But perhaps Server A will have to send queries with TSIG immediately to Server B to resolve some queries if it is asked by other clients. At this time, Server A is allowed to send a Renewal request to Server B, if Server A finds the key to use now is too old and should be renewed. To provide this function, both servers should be able to receive and process key renewal request from each other if they agree to refresh their shared secret keys. Note that the initiative in key renewal belongs to Server A because it can notice the Partial Revocation Time and decide key renewal. If Server B has information about Partial Revocation Time as well, it can also decide for itself to send Renewal request to Server A. But it is not essential for both two servers have information about key renewal timing. 5.1. To Cope with Collisions of Renewal Requests At least one of two hosts which use Key Renewal must know their key renewal information such as Partial Revocation Time. It is okay that both hosts have it. Provided that both two servers know key renewal timing information, there is possibility for them to begin partial revocation and sending Renewal requests to each other at the same time. Such collisions will not happen so often because Renewal requests are usually invoked when hosts want to send queries, but it is possible. When one of two servers try to send Renewal requests, it must protect old secrets that it has partially revoked and prevent it from being refreshed by any requests from the other server (i.e., it must lock the old secret during the process of renewal). While the server is sending Renewal requests and waiting responses, it ignores the other server's Renewal requests. Therefore, servers might fail to change secrets by means of their own requests to others. After failure they will try to resend, but they should wait for random delays by the next retries. If they get any Renewal requests from others while they are waiting, their shared keys may be refreshed, then they do not need to send any Renewal requests now for themselves. Kamite, et. al. [Page 16] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 6. Key Name Considerations Since both servers and clients have only to distinguish new secrets and old ones, keys' names do not need to be specified strictly. But it is recommended that some serial number or key generation time should be added to the name and that the names of keys between the same pair of hosts should have some common labels among their keys. For example, suppose A.example.com. and B.example.com. share the key ".A.example.com.B.example.com." such as "10010.A.example.com.B.example.com.". After key renewal, they change their secret and name into "10011.A.example.com.B.example.com." If secret overwrite occurs as a result of client's retransmission, server must change the next key's name somehow; for example, server increases serial number forcibly, or add some random numbers to the name. Servers and clients must be able to use keys properly according to servers to query. Because TSIG secret keys themselves do not have any particular IDs to be distinguished and would be identified by their names and algorithm, it must be understood correctly what keys are refreshed. 7. Example Usage of Secret Key Renewal Mode This is an example of Renewal mode usage where a Server, server.example.com, and a Client, client.exmple.com have an initial shared secret key named "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". (1) The time values about key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" was set as follows: Inception Time is at 6:00, Expiry Limit is at 11:00. (2) At Server, a time value about renewal timing has been set too: Partial Revocation Time is at 8:00. (3) Suppose the present time is 7:00. If Client sends a query signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" to ask the IP address of "www.somedomain.com", finally it will get a proper answer from Server with valid TSIG (NOERROR). (4) At 9:00. Client sends a query signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" to ask the IP address of "www.otherdomain.com". But it will not get a proper answer from Server. The response does not have any IP address information about "www.otherdomain.com". Instead, it includes valid TSIG MAC signed with "00.client.example.com.server.example.com", and its Error Code indicates PartialRevoke. Kamite, et. al. [Page 17] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 (5) At 9:01. Client sends a Renewal request to Server. This request is signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It includes data such as: Question Section: QNAME = 01.client.example.com. (Client can set this freely) TYPE = TKEY Additional Section: 01.client.example.com. TKEY Algorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int. Inception = (value which means 8:55) Expiration = (value which means 14:00) Mode = (DH exchange for key renewal) OldName = 00.client.example.com.server.example.com. OldAlgorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int. Additional Section also contains a KEY RR for DH and a TSIG RR. (6) As soon as Server receives this request, it verifies TSIG. It is signed with the partially revoked key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". and Server accepts the request. It creates a new key by Diffie-Hellman calculation and returns an answer which includes data such as: Answer Section: 01.client.example.com.server.example.com. TKEY Algorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int. Inception = (value meaning 8:55) Expiration = (value meaning 14:00) Mode = (DH exchange for key renewal) OldName = 00.client.example.com.server.example.com. OldAlgorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int. Answer Section also contains KEY RRs for DH. Additional Section also contains a TSIG RR. This response is signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com" without error. At the same time, Server decides to set the Partial Revocation Time of this new key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com." as 11:00. (7) Client gets the response and checks TSIG MAC, and calculates Diffie-Hellman. It will get a new key, and it has been named "01.client.example.com.server.example.com" by Server. Kamite, et. al. [Page 18] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 (8) At 9:02. Client sends an Adoption request to Server. This request is signed with the previous key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com". It includes: Question Section: QNAME = 01.client.example.com.server.example.com. TYPE = TKEY Additional Section: 01.client.example.com.server.example.com. TKEY Algorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int. Inception = (value which means 8:55) Expiration = (value which means 14:00) Mode = (key adoption) OldName = 00.client.example.com.server.example.com. OldAlgorithm = hmac-md5-sig-alg.reg.int. Additional Section also contains a TSIG RR. (9) Server verifies the query's TSIG. It is signed with the previous key and authenticated. It returns a response whose TKEY RR is the same as the request's one. The response is signed with key "00.client.example.com.server.example.com.". As soon as the response is sent, Server revokes and removes the previous key. At the same time, key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com." is validated. (10) Client acknowledges the success of Adoption by receiving the response. Then, it will retry to send an original question about "www.otherdomain.com". It is signed with the adopted key "01.client.example.com.server.example.com", so Server authenticates it and returns an answer. (11) This key is used until 11:00. After that, it will be partially revoked again. 8. Security Considerations This document considers about how to refresh shared secret. Secret changed by this method is used at servers in support of TSIG [RFC2845]. [RFC2104] says that current attacks to HMAC do not indicate a specific recommended frequency for key changes but periodic key refreshment is a fundamental security practice that helps against potential weaknesses of the function and keys, and limits the damage of an exposed key. TKEY Secret Key Renewal provides the method of Kamite, et. al. [Page 19] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 periodical key refreshment. TKEY Secret Key Renewal forbids clients to send queries as long as they do not change old keys. This means that when keys become old, clients must spend rather lots of time to get answers they wanted originally because at first they must send key Renewal requests. Thus the usage period of secrets should be considered carefully based on both TKEY processing performance and security. This document specifies the procedure of periodical key renewal, but actually there is possibility for servers to have no choice other than revoking their secret keys immediately especially when the keys are found to be compromised by attackers. This is called "Emergency Compulsory Revocation". For example, suppose the original Expiry Limit was set at 15:00, Partial Revocation Time at 12:00 and Inception Time at 10:00. if at 11:00 the key is found to be compromised, the server sets Expiry Limit forcibly to be 11:00 or before it. Consequently, once Compulsory Revocation (See section 4.) is carried out, normal renewal process described in this document cannot be done any more as far as the key is concerned. But, after such accidents happened, the two hosts are able to establish secret keys and begin renewal procedure only if they have other (non-compromised) shared TSIG keys or safe SIG(0) keys for the authentication of initial secret establishment such as Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying. 9. IANA Considerations IANA needs to allocate a value for "DH exchange for key renewal", "server assignment for key renewal", "resolver assignment for key renewal" and "key adoption" in the mode filed of TKEY. It also needs to allocate a value for "PartialRevoke" from the extended RCODE space. 10. References [RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M.Bellare, R. Canetti, "Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC2104, February 1997. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. Kamite, et. al. [Page 20] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 [RFC2539] D. Eastlake 3rd, "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999. [RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B. Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000. [RFC2930] D. Eastlake 3rd, ``Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)'', RFC 2930, September 2000. [RFC2931] D. Eastlake 3rd, "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000. Kamite, et. al. [Page 21] INTERNET-DRAFT Mar. 2003 Authors' Addresses Yuji Kamite NTT Communications Corporation Innovative IP Architecture Center, Tokyo Opera City Tower 21F, 20-2, 3-chome, Nishi-Shinjuku, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 163-1421, Japan. EMail: y.kamite@ntt.com Masaya Nakayama The University of Tokyo Information Technology Center, 2-11-16 Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-8658, Japan. EMail: nakayama@nc.u-tokyo.ac.jp Kamite, et. al. [Page 22]