Network Working Group R. Sparks, Ed. Internet-Draft dynamicsoft Expires: January 12, 2005 A. Hawrylyshen Jasomi Networks A. Johnston MCI J. Rosenberg dynamicsoft H. Schulzrinne Columbia University July 14, 2004 Session Initiation Protocol Torture Test Messages draft-ietf-sipping-torture-tests-04 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 12, 2005. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This informational document gives examples of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) test messages designed to exercise and "torture" a SIP Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 1] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 implementation. Table of Contents 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Representing Long Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. SIP Test Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1 Parser tests (syntax) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1 Valid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism . . . . . . 9 3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape . . . . . . . . 11 3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < . . 11 3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram . . . . . 14 3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part . 15 3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1.1.12 Unusual reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1.2 Invalid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 23 3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values . . . 24 3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name . . . . 24 3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) . . . . . 26 3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements . . . 27 3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line . . . . . . 28 3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI . . . . . . . 29 3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field . . . . . 29 3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> . . . . . 30 3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name . . . . . . 31 3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch . . . . . . 32 3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch . . . . 32 3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2 Transaction layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3 Application layer semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 2] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme . . . . . . 35 3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields . . . 38 3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter . . . . . . 41 3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header . . . . . . . . . 43 3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.4 Backward compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A. Bit-exact archive of each test message . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.1 Encoded Reference Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 52 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 3] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 1. Overview This document is informational, and is NOT NORMATIVE on any aspect of SIP. This document contains test messages based on the current version (2.0) of the Session Initiation Protocol as defined in [RFC3261]. Some messages exercise SIP's use of SDP as described in [RFC3264]. These messages were developed and refined at the SIPIt interoperability test events. The test messages are organized into several sections. Some stress only a SIP parser and others stress both the parser and the application above it. Some messages are valid, and some are not. Each example clearly calls out what makes any invalid messages incorrect. This document does not attempt to catalog every way to make an invalid message, nor does it attempt to be comprehensive in exploring unusual, but valid, messages. Instead, it tries to focus on areas that have caused interoperability problems or have particularly unfavorable characteristics if they are handled improperly. This document is a seed for a test plan, not a test plan in itself. The messages are presented in the text using a set of markup conventions to avoid ambiguity and meet Internet-Draft layout requirements. To resolve any remaining ambiguity, a bit-accurate version of each message is encapsulated in an appendix. 2. Document Conventions This document contains many example SIP messages. Although SIP is a text-based protocol, many of these examples cannot be unambiguously rendered without additional markup due to the constraints placed on the formatting of RFCs. This document defines and uses the markup defined in this section to remove that ambiguity. This markup uses the start and end tag conventions of XML, but does not define any XML document type. The appendix contains an encoded binary form of all the messages and the algorithm needed to decode them into files. 2.1 Representing Long Lines Several of these examples contain unfolded lines longer than 72 characters. These are captured between tags. The single unfolded line is reconstructed by directly concatenating all Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 4] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 lines appearing between the tags (discarding any line-feeds or carriage returns). There will be no whitespace at the end of lines. Any whitespace appearing at a fold-point will appear at the beginning of a line. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue, third value Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue , third value Header-name: first value, reallylong second value, third value Note that this is NOT SIP header line folding where different strings of bits have equivalent meaning. 2.2 Representing Non-printable Characters Several examples contain binary message bodies or header field values containing non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded characters. These are rendered here as a pair of hexadecimal digits per octet between tags. This rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. The following represent the same string of bits: Header-name: value one Header-name: value206F6Ee The following is a Subject header field containing the euro symbol: Subject: E282AC 2.3 Representing Long Repeating Strings Several examples contain very large data values created with Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 5] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 repeating bit strings. Those will be rendered here using value. As with this rendering applies even inside quoted-strings. For example, the value "abcabcabc" can be rendered as abc. A display name of "1000000 bottles of beer" could be rendered as To: "130 bottles of beer" and a Max-Forwards header field with a value of one google will be rendered here as Max-Forwards: 10 3. SIP Test Messages 3.1 Parser tests (syntax) 3.1.1 Valid messages 3.1.1.1 A short tortuous INVITE This short, relatively human-readable message contains: o line folding all over o escaped characters within quotes o an empty subject o LWS between colons, semicolons, header field values, and other fields o both comma separated and separate listing of header field values o mix or short and long form for the same header field name o unknown header fields o unknown header field with a value that would be syntactically invalid if it were defined in terms of generic-param o unusual header field ordering o unusual header field name character case o unknown parameters of a known header field o uri parameter with no value o header parameter with no value o integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros All elements should treat this as a well-formed request. The UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue header field deserves special attention. If this header field were defined in terms of comma separated values with semicolon separated parameters (as many of the existing defined header fields), this would be invalid. However, Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 6] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 since the receiving element does not know the definition of the syntax for this field, it must parse it as a header-value. Proxies would forward this header field unchanged. Endpoints would ignore the header field. Message Details : wsinv INVITE sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com;unknownparam SIP/2.0 TO : sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com ; tag = 1918181833n from : "J Rosenberg \\\"" ; tag = 98asjd8 MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068 Call-ID: wsinv.ndaksdj@192.0.2.1 Content-Length : 151 cseq: 0009 INVITE Via : SIP / 2.0 /UDP 192.0.2.2;branch=390skdjuw s : NewFangledHeader: newfangled value continued newfangled value UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue: ;;,,;;,; Content-Type: application/sdp Route: v: SIP / 2.0 / TCP spindle.example.com ; branch = z9hG4bK9ikj8 , SIP / 2.0 / UDP 192.168.255.111 ; branch= z9hG4bK30239 m:"Quoted string \"\"" ; newparam = newvalue ; secondparam ; q = 0.33 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 7] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.1.1.2 Wide range of valid characters This message exercises a wider range of characters in several key syntactic elements than implementations usually see. Of particular note: o The Method contains non-alpha characters from token. Note that % is not an escape character for this field. A method of IN%56ITE is an unknown method. It is not the same as a method of INVITE o The Request-URI contain unusual, but legal, characters o A branch parameter contains all non-alphanum characters from token o The To header field value's quoted-string contains quoted-pair expansions, including a quoted NULL character o The name part of name-addr in the From header field value contains multiple tokens (instead of a quoted string) with all non-alphanum characters from the token production rule. That value also has an unknown header parameter whose name contains the non-alphanum token characters and whose value is a non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded string. The tag parameter on this value contains the non-alphanum token characters o The Call-ID header field value contains the non-alphanum characters from word. Notice that in this production: * % is not an escape character. (It is only an escape character in productions matching the rule "escaped") * " does not start a quoted-string. None of ',` or " imply that there will be a matching symbol later in the string * The characters []{}()<> do not have any grouping semantics. They are not required to appear in balanced pairs o There is an unknown header field (matching extension-header) with non-alphanum token characters in its name and a UTF8-NONASCII value If this unusual URI has been defined at a proxy, the proxy will forward this request normally. Otherwise a proxy will generate a 404. Endpoints will generate a 501 listing the methods they understand in an Allow header field. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 8] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : intmeth !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;* :&it+has=1,weird!*pas$wo~d_too.(doesn't-it) @example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-.!%66*_+`'~ To: "BEL:\07 NUL:\00 DEL:\7F" From: token1~` token2'+_ token3*%!.- ;fromParam''~+*_!.-%= "D180D0B0D0B1D0BED182D0B0D18ED189D0B8D0B9" ;tag=_token~1'+`*%!-. Call-ID: intmeth.word%ZK-!.*_+'@word`~)(><:\/"][?}{ CSeq: 139122385 !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~ Max-Forwards: 255 extensionHeader-!.%*+_`'~: EFBBBFE5A4A7E5819CE99BBB Content-Length: 0 3.1.1.3 Valid use of the % escaping mechanism This INVITE exercises the % HEX HEX escaping mechanism in several places. The request is syntactically valid. Interesting features include: o The request-URI has sips:user@example.com embedded in its userpart. What that might mean to example.net is beyond the scope of this document. o The From and To URIs have escaped characters in their userparts. o The Contact URI has escaped characters in the URI parameters. Note that the "name" uri-parameter has a value of "value%41" which is NOT equivalent to "valueA". Per [RFC2396], unescaping URI components is never performed recursively. A parser must accept this as a well-formed message. The application using the message must treat the % HEX HEX expansions as equivalent to the character being encoded. The application must not try to Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 9] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 interpret % as an escape character in those places where % HEX HEX ("escaped" in the grammar) is not a valid part of the construction. In [RFC3261], "escaped" only occurs in the expansions of SIP-URI, SIPS-URI, and Reason-Phrase Message Details : esc01 INVITE sip:sips%3Auser%40example.com@example.net SIP/2.0 To: sip:%75se%72@example.com From: ;tag=938 Max-Forwards: 87 i: esc01.239409asdfakjkn23onasd0-3234 CSeq: 234234 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw C: application/sdp Contact: Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.4 Escaped nulls in URIs This register request contains several URIs with nulls in the userpart. The message is well formed - parsers must accept this message. Implementations must take special care when unescaping the AOR in this request to not prematurely shorten the username. This request registers two distinct contact URIs. Message Details : escnull REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:null-%00-null@example.com From: sip:null-%00-null@example.com;tag=839923423 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: escnull.39203ndfvkjdasfkq3w4otrq0adsfdfnavd CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: Contact: Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 10] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 L:0 3.1.1.5 Use of % when it is not an escape Most of the places % can appear in a SIP message, it is not an escape character. This can surprise the unwary implementor. The following well-formed request has these properties: o The request method is unknown. It is NOT equivalent to REGISTER o The display-name portion of the To and From header fields is "%Z%45". Note that this is not the same as %ZE o This message has two Contact header field values, not three. %lt;sip:alias2@host2.example.com%gt; is a C%6Fntact header field value A parser should accept this message as well formed. A proxy would forward or reject the message depending on what the Request-URI meant to it. An endpoint would reject this message with a 501. Message Details : esc02 RE%47IST%45R sip:registrar.example.com SIP/2.0 To: "%Z%45" From: "%Z%45" ;tag=f232jadfj23 Call-ID: esc02.asdfnqwo34rq23i34jrjasdcnl23nrlknsdf Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK209%fzsnel234 CSeq: 29344 RE%47IST%45R Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: C%6Fntact: Contact: l: 0 3.1.1.6 Message with no LWS between display name and < This OPTIONS request is not valid per the grammar in RFC 3261. since there is no LWS between the quoted string in the display name and < in the From header field value. This has been identified as a specification bug that will be removed when RFC 3261 is revised. Elements should accept this request as well formed. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 11] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : lwsdisp OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: "caller";tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: lwsdisp.1234abcd@funky.example.com CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP funky.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.7 Long values in header fields This well-formed request contains header fields with many values and values that are very long. Features include: o The To header field has a long display name, and long uri parameter names and values o The From header field has long header parameter names and values, in particular a very long tag o The Call-ID is one long token Message Details : longreq INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "I have a user name of extreme proportion" longvalue; longparamname=shortvalue; verylongParameterNameWithNoValue> F: sip: amazinglylongcallername@example.net ;tag=12982424 ;unknownheaderparamname= unknowheaderparamvalue ;unknownValuelessparamname Call-ID: longreq.onereallylongcallid CSeq: 3882340 INVITE Unknown-Long-Name: unknown-long-value; unknown-long-parameter-name = Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 12] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 unknown-long-parameter-value Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip33.example.com v: SIP/2.0/TCP sip32.example.com V: SIP/2.0/TCP sip31.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip30.example.com ViA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip29.example.com VIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip28.example.com VIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip27.example.com via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip26.example.com viA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip25.example.com vIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip24.example.com vIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip23.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip22.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip21.example.com V : SIP/2.0/TCP sip20.example.com v : SIP/2.0/TCP sip19.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip18.example.com Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip17.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip16.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip15.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip14.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip13.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip12.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip11.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip10.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip9.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip8.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip7.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip6.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip5.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip4.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip3.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip2.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip1.example.com Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;received=192.0.2.5; branch=verylongbranchvalue Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: amazinglylongcallername @host5.example.net> Content-Type: application/sdp l: 151 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 13] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.8 Extra trailing octets in a UDP datagram This message contains a single SIP REGISTER request, which ostensibly arrived over UDP in a single datagram. The packet contained extra octets after the body (which in this case has zero length). Those octets happen to look like a SIP INVITE request, but (per section 18.3 of [RFC3261]) they are just spurious noise that must be ignored. A SIP element receiving this datagram would handle the REGISTER request normally and ignore the extra bits that look like an INVITE request. If the element is a proxy choosing to forward the REGISTER, the INVITE octets would not appear in the forwarded request. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 14] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : dblreq REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=43251j3j324 Max-Forwards: 8 I: dblreq.0ha0isndaksdj99sdfafnl3lk233412 Contact: sip:j.user@host.example.com CSeq: 8 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.125;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw23492 Content-Length: 0 INVITE sip:joe@example.com SIP/2.0 t: sip:joe@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=141334 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: dblreq.0ha0isnda977644900765@192.0.2.15 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw380234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m =video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.9 Semicolon separated parameters in URI user part This request has a semicolon-separated parameter contained in the "user" part of the Request-URI (whose value contains an escaped @ symbol). Receiving elements will accept this as a well formed message. The Request-URI will parse such that the user part is "user;par=u@example.net". Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 15] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : semiuri OPTIONS sip:user;par=u%40example.net@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: semiuri.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime, multipart/mixed, multipart/signed, message/sip, message/sipfrag Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.1.10 Varied and unknown transport types This request contains Via header field values with all known transport types and exercises the transport extension mechanism. Parsers must accept this message as well formed. Elements receiving this message would process it exactly as if the 2nd and subsequent header field values specified UDP (or other transport). Message Details : transports OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: ;tag=323 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: transports.kijh4akdnaqjkwendsasfdj Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 60 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP t1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Via: SIP/2.0/SCTP t2.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKklasjdhf Via: SIP/2.0/TLS t3.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK2980unddj Via: SIP/2.0/UNKNOWN t4.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKasd0f3en Via: SIP/2.0/TCP t5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK0a9idfnee l: 0 3.1.1.11 S/MIME signed message This is a signed INVITE request. The signature is binary encoded. The body contains null (0x00) characters. Receivers must take care to properly frame the received message. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 16] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Parsers must accept this message as well formed, even if the application above the parser does not support multipart/signed. Message Details : smime01 INVITE sip:receiver@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.org;branch=z9hG4bK923rnasdkl3 To: From: ;tag=2390234seiu3 Call-ID: smime01.uoqeiuavnklafekjq34iu43uawe CSeq: 282398492 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: Content-Length: 3134 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs-7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary="----EABF38A0AAE8704C560F10418BA807CF" ------EABF38A0AAE8704C560F10418BA807CF Content-Type: message/sip INVITE sip:receiver@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.org;branch=z9hG4bK923rnasdkl3 To: From: ;tag=2390234seiu3 Call-ID: smime01.uoqeiuavnklafekjq34iu43uawe CSeq: 282398492 INVITE Max-Forwards: 70 Contact: Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime, multipart/mixed, multipart/signed, message/sip, message/sipfrag Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 149 v=0 o=sender 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC ------EABF38A0AAE8704C560F10418BA807CF Content-Type: application/pkcs-7-signature; name="smime.p7s" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 17] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s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parks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 18] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July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nusual reason phrase This 200 response contains a reason phrase other than "OK". The reason phrase is intended for human consumption, and may contain any string produced by Reason-Phrase = *(reserved / unreserved / escaped / UTF8-NONASCII / UTF8-CONT / SP / HTAB) This particular response contains unreserved and non-ASCII UTF-8 characters.This response is well formed. A parser must accept this message. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 19] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : unreason SIP/2.0 200 = 2**3 * 5**2 D0BDD0BE20D181D182 D0BE20D0B4D0B5D0B2D18FD0BDD0BED181D182D0BE20D0B4 D0B5D0B2D18FD182D18C202D20D0BFD180D0BED181D182D0 BED0B5 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Call-ID: unreason.1234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 159 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198/127 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.1.13 Empty reason phrase This well formed response contains no reason phrase. A parser must accept this message. The space character after the reason code is required. If it were not present, this message could be rejected as invalid (a liberal receiver would accept it anyway). Message Details : noreason SIP/2.0 10020 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: noreason.asndj203insdf99223ndf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: ;tag=39ansfi3 To: ;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 20] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.1.2 Invalid messages This section contains several invalid messages reflecting errors seen at interoperability events and exploring important edge conditions that can be induced through malformed messages. This section does not attempt to be a comprehensive list of all types of invalid messages. 3.1.2.1 Extraneous header field separators The Via and header field of this request contains contain additional semicolons and commas without parameters or values. The Contact header field contains additional semicolons without parameters. This message is syntactically invalid. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Message Details : badinv01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=134161461246 Max-Forwards: 7 Call-ID: badinv01.0ha0isndaksdjasdf3234nas CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;;,;,, Contact: "Joe" ;;;; Content-Length: 153 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.2 Content length larger than message This is a request message with a Content Length that is larger than the length of the body. When sent UDP (as this message ostensibly was), the receiving element should respond with a 400 Bad Request error. If this message were Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 21] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 received over a stream-based transport such as TCP, there's not much you can do but wait for more data on the stream and close the connection if none is forthcoming in a reasonable period of time. Message Details : clerr INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 80 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93942939o2 Contact: Call-ID: clerr.0ha0isndaksdjweiafasdk3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-39234-23523 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 9999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.155 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.155 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.3 Negative Content-Length This request has a negative value for Content-Length. An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed. The same behavior is appropriate for messages that arrive without a numeric value in the Content-Length header field such as: Content-Length: five Implementors should take extra precautions if the technique they choose for converting this ascii field into an integral form can return a negative value. In particular, the result must not be used as a counter or array index. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 22] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : ncl INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 254 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=32394234 Call-ID: ncl.0ha0isndaksdj2193423r542w35 CSeq: 0 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.53;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: -999 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.53 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.53 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.4 Request scalar fields with overlarge values This request contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o the Max-Forwards value is >255. o the Expires value is >2**32-1. o the Contact expires parameter value is >2**32-1. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request due to the CSeq error. If only the Max-Forwards field were in error, the element could choose process the request as if the field were absent. If only the expiry values were in error, the element could treat them as if they contained the default values for expiration (3600 in this case). Other scalar request fields that may contain aberrant values include, but are not limited to, the Contact q value, the Timestamp value, and the Via ttl parameter. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 23] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : scalar02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK342sdfoi3 To: From: ;tag=239232jh3 CSeq: 36893488147419103232 REGISTER Call-ID: scalar02.23o0pd9vanlq3wnrlnewofjas9ui32 Max-Forwards: 300 Expires: 10 Contact: ;expires=280297596632815 Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.5 Response scalar fields with overlarge values This response contains several scalar header field values outside their legal range. o the CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1. o The Retry-After field is unreasonably large (note that RFC 3261 does not define a legal range for this field). o The Warning field has a warning-value with more than 3 digits An element receiving this response will simply discard it. Message Details : scalarlg SIP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z0hG4bKzzxdiwo34sw To: From: ;tag=2easdjfejw CSeq: 9292394834772304023312 OPTIONS Call-ID: scalarlg.noase0of0234hn2qofoaf0232aewf2394r Retry-After: 949302838503028349304023988 Warning: 1812 overture "In Progress" Content-Length: 0 3.1.2.6 Unterminated quoted string in display-name This is a request with an unterminated quote in the display name of the To field. An element receiving this request should return an 400 Bad Request error. An element could attempt to infer a terminating quote and accept the Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 24] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 message. Such an element needs to take care that it makes a reasonable inference when it encounters To: "Mr J. User Message Details : quotbal INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: "Mr. J. User From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93334 Max-Forwards: 10 Call-ID: quotbal.aksdj Contact: CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.59:5050;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 153 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.7 <> enclosing Request-URI This INVITE request is invalid because the Request-URI has been enclosed within in "<>". It is reasonable to always reject a request with this error with a 400 Bad Request. Elements attempting to be liberal with what they accept may choose to ignore the brackets. If the element forwards the request, it must not include the brackets in the messages it sends. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 25] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : ltgtruri INVITE SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=39291 Max-Forwards: 23 Call-ID: ltgtruri.1@192.0.2.5 CSeq: 1 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.5 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 160 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.8 Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) This INVITE has illegal LWS within the Request-URI. An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element could attempt to ignore the embedded LWS for those schemes (like sip) where that would not introduce ambiguity. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 26] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : lwsruri INVITE sip:user@example.com; lr SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com;tag=3xfe-9921883-z9f From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=231413434 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: lwsruri.asdfasdoeoi2323-asdfwrn23-asd834rk423 CSeq: 2130706432 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2395 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 160 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=3149328700 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.9 Multiple SP separating Request-Line elements This INVITE has illegal multiple SP characters between elements of the start line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 27] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : lwsstart INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Max-Forwards: 8 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8814 Call-ID: lwsstart.dfknq234oi243099adsdfnawe3@example.com CSeq: 1893884 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw3923 Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.10 SP characters at end of Request-Line This OPTIONS request contains SP characters between the SIP-Version field and the CRLF terminating the Request-Line. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed. An element that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP characters while processing the request. If the element forwards the request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the messages it sends. Message Details : trws OPTIONS sip:remote-target@example.com SIP/2.02020 Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.examle.com;branch=z9hG4bK299342093 To: From: ;tag=329429089 Call-ID: trws.oicu34958239neffasdhr2345r Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 238923 OPTIONS Max-Forwards: 70 Content-Length: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 28] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.1.2.11 Escaped headers in SIP Request-URI This INVITE is malformed as the SIP Request-URI contains escaped headers. It is acceptable for an element to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request. An element could choose to be liberal in what it accepts and ignore the escaped headers. If the element is a proxy, the escaped headers must not appear in the Request-URI of forwarded request (and most certainly must not be translated into the actual header of the forwarded request). Message Details : escruri INVITE sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:example.com%3E SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=341518 Max-Forwards: 7 Contact: Call-ID: escruri.23940-asdfhj-aje3br-234q098w-fawerh2q-h4n5 CSeq: 149209342 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host-of-the-hour.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.12 Invalid timezone in Date header field This INVITE is invalid as it contains a non GMT time zone in the SIP Date header field. It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed (though an element shouldn't do that unless the contents of the Date header field were actually important to its processing). An element wishing to be liberal in what it accepts could ignore this value altogether if it wasn't going to use the Date header field anyhow. Otherwise, it could attempt to interpret this date and adjust it to GMT. RFC 3261 explicitly defines the only acceptable timezone designation Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 29] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 as "GMT". "UT", while synonymous with GMT per [RFC2822], is not valid. "UTC" and "UCT" are also invalid. Message Details : baddate INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2234923 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: baddate.239423mnsadf3j23lj42--sedfnm234 CSeq: 1392934 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 16:00:00 EST Contact: Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Length: 151 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.13 Failure to enclose name-addr URI in <> This REGISTER request is malformed. The SIP URI contained in the Contact Header field has an escaped header, so the field must be in name-addr form (which implies the URI must be enclosed in <>). It is reasonable for an element receiving this request to respond with a 400 Bad Request. An element choosing to be liberal in what it accepts could infer the angle brackets since there is no ambiguity in this example. In general, that won't be possible. Message Details : regbadct REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=998332 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regbadct.k345asrl3fdbv@10.0.0.1 CSeq: 1 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 135.180.130.133:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 30] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 l: 0 3.1.2.14 Spaces within addr-spec This request is malformed since the addr-spec in the To header field contains spaces. Parsers receiving this request must not break. It is reasonable to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response. Elements attempting to be liberal may ignore the spaces. Message Details : badaspec OPTIONS sip:user@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host4.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdju43234 Max-Forwards: 70 From: "Bell, Alexander" ;tag=433423 To: "Watson, Thomas" < sip:t.watson@example.org > Call-ID: badaspec.sdf0234n2nds0a099u23h3hnnw009cdkne3 Accept: application/sdp CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.15 Non-token characters in display-name This OPTIONS request is malformed since the display names in the To and From header fields contain non-token characters but are unquoted. It is reasonable to always reject this kind of error with a 400 Bad Request response. An element may attempt to be liberal in what it receives and infer the missing quotes. If this element were a proxy, it must not propagate the error into the request it forwards. As a consequence, if the fields are covered by a signature, there's not much point in trying to be liberal - the message should be simply rejected. Message Details : baddn OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP c.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: Bell, Alexander ;tag=43 To: Watson, Thomas Call-ID: baddn.31415@c.example.com Accept: application/sdp Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 31] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.16 Unknown protocol version To an element implementing [RFC3261], this request is malformed due to its high version number. The element should respond to the request with a 505 Version Not Supported error. Message Details : badvers OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/7.0 Via: SIP/7.0/UDP c.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: A. Bell ;tag=qweoiqpe To: T. Watson Call-ID: badvers.31417@c.example.com CSeq: 1 OPTIONS l: 0 3.1.2.17 Start line and CSeq method mismatch This request has mismatching values for the method in the start line and the CSeq header field. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 400 Bad Request. Message Details : mismatch01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch01.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw l: 0 3.1.2.18 Unknown Method with CSeq method mismatch This message has an unknown method, and a CSeq method tag which does not match it. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 32] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Any element receiving this response will should respond with a 501 Not Implemented. A 400 Bad Request is also acceptable, but choosing a 501 (particularly at proxies) has better future-proof characteristics. Message Details : mismatch02 NEWMETHOD sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525 Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: mismatch02.dj0234sxdfl3 CSeq: 8 INVITE Contact: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/sdp l: 139 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.1.2.19 Overlarge response code This response has a response code larger than 699. An element receiving this response should simply drop it. Message Details : bigcode SIP/2.0 4294967301 better not break the receiver Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe Call-ID: bigcode.asdof3uj203asdnf3429uasdhfas3ehjasdfas9i CSeq: 353494 INVITE From: ;tag=39ansfi3 To: ;tag=902jndnke3 Content-Length: 0 Contact: 3.2 Transaction layer semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and transaction layer logic. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 33] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.2.1 Missing transaction identifier This request indicates support for RFC 3261-style transaction identifiers by providing the z9hG4bK prefix to the branch parameter, but it provides no identifier. A parser must not break when receiving this message. An element receiving this request could reject the request with a 400 Response (preferably statelessly, as other requests from the source are likely to also have a malformed branch parameter), or it could fall back to the RFC 2543 style transaction identifier. Message Details : badbranch OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242 Max-Forwards: 3 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bK Accept: application/sdp Call-ID: badbranch.sadonfo23i420jv0as0derf3j3n CSeq: 8 OPTIONS l: 0 3.3 Application layer semantics This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser and application layer logic. 3.3.1 Missing Required Header Fields This request contains no Call-ID, From, or To header fields. An element receiving this message must not break because of the missing information. Ideally, it will respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 34] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : insuf INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 CSeq: 193942 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.95;branch=z9hG4bKkdj.insuf Content-Type: application/sdp l: 153 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.95 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.95 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.2 Request-URI with unknown scheme This OPTIONS contains an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. An element receiving this request will reject it with a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. Some early implementations attempt to look at the contents of the To header field to determine how to route this kind of request. That is an error. Despite the fact that the To header field and the Request URI frequently look alike in simplistic first-hop messages, the To header field contains no routing information. Message Details : unkscm OPTIONS nobodyKnowsThisScheme:totallyopaquecontent SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: unkscm.nasdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.3 Request-URI with known but atypical scheme This OPTIONS contains an Request-URI with an IANA registered scheme Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 35] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 that does not commonly appear Request-URIs of SIP requests. A parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request. If an element will never accept this scheme as meaningful in a request-URI, it is appropriate to treat it as unknown and return a 416 Unsupported URI Scheme response. If the element might accept some URIs with this scheme, then a 404 Not Found is appropriate for those URIs it doesn't accept. Message Details : novelsc OPTIONS soap.beep://192.0.2.103:3002 SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384 Max-Forwards: 3 Call-ID: novelsc.asdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34 CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234 Content-Length: 0 3.3.4 Unknown URI schemes in header fields This message contains registered schemes in the To, From and Contact header fields of a request. The message is syntactically valid. Parsers must not fail when receiving this message. Proxies should treat this message as they would any other request for this URI. A registrar would reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response since the To: header field is required to contain a SIP or SIPS URI as an AOR. Message Details : unksm2 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: isbn:2983792873 From: ;tag=3234233 Call-ID: unksm2.daksdj@hyphenated-host.example.com CSeq: 234902 REGISTER Max-Forwards: 70 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.21:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Contact: l: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 36] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.3.5 Proxy-Require and Require This request tests proper implementation of SIP's Proxy-Require and Require extension mechanisms. Any element receiving this request will respond with a 420 Bad Extension response containing an Unsupported header field listing these features from either the Require or Proxy-Require header field depending on the role in which the element is responding. Message Details : bext01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=242etr Max-Forwards: 6 Call-ID: bext01.0ha0isndaksdj Require: nothingSupportsThis, nothingSupportsThisEither Proxy-Require: noProxiesSupportThis, norDoAnyProxiesSupportThis CSeq: 8 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/TLS fold-and-staple.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 0 3.3.6 Unknown Content-Type This INVITE request contains a body of unknown type. It is syntactically valid. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy receiving this request would process it just like any other INVITE. An endpoint receiving this request would reject it with a 415 Unsupported Media Type error. Message Details : invut INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Contact: To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8392034 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: invut.0ha0isndaksdjadsfij34n23d CSeq: 235448 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP somehost.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Type: application/unknownformat Content-Length: 40 3.3.7 Unknown authorization scheme This REGISTER request contains an Authorization header field with an unknown scheme. The request is well-formed. A parser must not fail when receiving it. A proxy will treat this request as any other REGISTER. If it forwards the request, it will include this Authorization header field unmodified in the forwarded messages. A registrar that does not care about challenge-response authentication will simply ignore the Authorization header field, processing this registration as if the field were not present. A registrar that does care about challenge-response authentication will reject this request with a 401, issuing a new challenge with a scheme it understands. Endpoints choosing not to act as registrars will simply reject the request. A 405 Method Not Allowed is appropriate. Message Details : regaut01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j.user@example.com From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=87321hj23128 Max-Forwards: 8 Call-ID: regaut01.0ha0isndaksdj CSeq: 9338 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.253;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Authorization: NoOneKnowsThisScheme opaque-data=here Content-Length:0 3.3.8 Multiple values in single value required fields The message contains a request with multiple Call-ID, To, From, Max-Forwards and CSeq values. An element receiving this request must not break. An element receiving this request would respond with a 400 Bad Request error. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 38] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : multi01 INVITE sip:user@company.com SIP/2.0 Contact: Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.25;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 CSeq: 5 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 59 INVITE Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.2 From: sip:caller@example.com;tag=3413415 To: sip:user@example.com To: sip:other@example.net From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2923420123 Content-Type: application/sdp l: 155 Contact: Max-Forwards: 5 v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.25 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.25 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.9 Multiple Content-Length values Multiple conflicting Content-Length header field values appear in this request. From a framing perspective, this situation is equivalent to an invalid Content-Length value (or no value at all). An element receiving this message should respond with an error. This request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can simply be discarded. If a request like this arrives over TCP, the framing error is not recoverable and the connection should be closed. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 39] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : mcl01 OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bK293423 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:other@example.net;tag=3923942 Call-ID: mcl01.fhn2323orihawfdoa3o4r52o3irsdf CSeq: 15932 OPTIONS Content-Length: 13 Max-Forwards: 60 Content-Length: 5 Content-Type: text/plain There's no way to know how many octets are supposed to be here. 3.3.10 200 OK Response with broadcast Via header field value This message is a response with a 2nd Via header field value's sent-by containing 255.255.255.255. The message is well formed - parsers must not fail when receiving it. Per [RFC3261] an endpoint receiving this message should simply discard it. If a proxy followed normal response processing rules blindly, it would forward this response to the broadcast address. To protect against this being used as an avenue of attack, proxies should drop such responses. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 40] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : bcast SIP/2.0 200 OK Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 255.255.255.255;branch=z9hG4bK1saber23 Call-ID: bcast.0384840201234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf CSeq: 35 INVITE From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343 To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229 Content-Length: 159 Content-Type: application/sdp Contact: v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198/127 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.3.11 Max-Forwards of zero This is a legal SIP request with the Max-Forwards header field value set to zero. A proxy should not forward the request and respond 483 (Too Many Hops). An endpoint should process the request as if the Max-Forwards field value were still positive. Message Details : zeromf OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=3ghsd41 Call-ID: zeromf.jfasdlfnm2o2l43r5u0asdfas CSeq: 39234321 OPTIONS Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2349i Max-Forwards: 0 Content-Length: 0 3.3.12 REGISTER with a contact header parameter This register request contains a contact where the 'unknownparam' Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 41] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 parameter must be interpreted as being a contact-param and not a url-param. This REGISTER should succeed. The response must not include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter for this binding. Likewise, "unknownparam" must not appear as part of the binding during subsequent fetches. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known contact-param parameter names. Message Details : cparam01 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=DkfVgjkrtMwaerKKpe To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam01.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 2 REGISTER Contact: sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam l: 0 3.3.13 REGISTER with a url parameter This register request contains a contact where the URI has an unknown parameter. The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter. Behavior is the same, of course, for any known url-parameter names. Message Details : cparam02 REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Max-Forwards: 70 From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=838293 To: sip:watson@example.com Call-ID: cparam02.70710@saturn.example.com CSeq: 3 REGISTER Contact: l: 0 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 42] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 3.3.14 REGISTER with a url escaped header This register request contains a contact where the URI has an escaped header. The register should succeed and a subsequent retrieval of the registration must include the escaped Route header in the contact URI for this binding. Message Details : regescrt REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:user@example.com From: sip:user@example.com;tag=8 Max-Forwards: 70 Call-ID: regescrt.k345asrl3fdbv@192.0.2.1 CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw M: L:0 3.3.15 Unacceptable Accept offering This request indicates the response must contain a body in an unknown type. In particular, since the Accept header field does not contain application/sdp, the response may not contain an SDP body. The recipient of this request could respond with a 406 Not Acceptable with a Warning/399 indicating that a response cannot be formulated in the formats offered in the Accept header field. It is also appropriate to respond with a 400 Bad Request since all SIP UAs supporting INVITE are required to support application/sdp. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 43] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : sdp01 INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0 To: sip:j_user@example.com Contact: From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=234 Max-Forwards: 5 Call-ID: sdp01.ndaksdj9342dasdd Accept: text/nobodyKnowsThis CSeq: 8 INVITE Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw Content-Length: 151 Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 12 m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31 a=rtpmap:31 LPC 3.4 Backward compatibility 3.4.1 INVITE with RFC2543 syntax This is a legal message per RFC 2543 (and several bis versions) which should be accepted by RFC 3261 elements which want to maintain backwards compatibility. o There is no branch parameter at all on the Via header field value o There is no From tag o There is no explicit Content-Length (The body is assumed to be all octets in the datagram after the null-line) o There is no Max-Forwards header field Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 44] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Message Details : inv2543 INVITE sip:UserB@example.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP iftgw.example.com From: Record-Route: To: sip:+16505552222@ss1.example.net;user=phone Call-ID: inv2543.1717@ift.client.example.com CSeq: 56 INVITE Content-Type: application/sdp v=0 o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5 s=- c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5 t=0 0 m=audio 492170 RTP/AVP 0 4. Security Considerations This document presents NON NORMATIVE examples of SIP session establishment. The security considerations in [RFC3261] apply. Parsers must carefully consider edge conditions and malicious input as part of their design. Attacks on many Internet systems use crafted input to cause implementations to behave in undesirable ways. Many of the messages in this draft are designed to stress a parser implementation at points traditionally used for such attacks. This document does not, however, attempt to be comprehensive. It should be considered a seed to stimulate thinking and planning, not simply a set of tests to be passed. 5. IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA. 6. Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of earlier versions of this document: Aseem Agarwal, Rafi Assadi, Gonzalo Camarillo, Ben Campbell, Cullen Jennings, Vijay Gurbani, Sunitha Kumar, Rohan Mahy, Jon Peterson, Marc Petit-Huguenin, Vidhi Rastogi, Adam Roach, Bodgey Yin Shaohua and Tom Taylor. Thanks to Neil Deason for contributing several messages and Kundan Singh for performing parser validation of messages in earlier Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 45] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 versions. The following individuals provided significant comments during the early phases of the development of this document: Jean-Francois Mule, Hemant Agrawal, Henry Sinnreich, David Devanatham, Joe Pizzimenti, Matt Cannon, John Hearty, the whole MCI WorldCom IPOP Design team, Scott Orton, Greg Osterhout, Pat Sollee, Doug Weisenberg, Danny Mistry, Steve McKinnon, and Denise Ingram, Denise Caballero, Tom Redman, Ilya Slain, Pat Sollee, John Truetken, and others from MCI WorldCom, 3Com, Cisco, Lucent and Nortel. 7 Informative References [RFC2396] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August 1998. [RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001. [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M. and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. [RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June 2002. Authors' Addresses Robert J. Sparks (editor) dynamicsoft 5100 Tennyson Parkway Suite 1200 Plano, TX 75024 EMail: rsparks@dynamicsoft.com Alan Hawrylyshen Jasomi Networks 2033 Gateway Place Suite 500 San Jose, CA 95110 EMail: alan@jasomi.com Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 46] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Alan Johnston MCI 100 South 4th Street St. Louis, MO 63102 EMail: alan.johnston@mci.com Jonathan Rosenberg dynamicsoft 600 Lanidex Plaza Parsippany, NJ 07052 Phone: +1 973 952 5000 EMail: jdrosen@dynamicsoft.com URI: http://www.jdrosen.net Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University Department of Computer Science 1214 Amsterdam Ave. New York, NY 10027 USA EMail: schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu Appendix A. Bit-exact archive of each test message The following text block is an encoded, gzip compressed TAR archive of files that represent each of the example messages discussed in Section 3. To recover the compressed archive file intact, the text of this document may be passed as input to the following Perl script (the output should be redirected to a file or piped to "tar -xzvf -"). #!/usr/bin/perl use strict; my $bdata = ""; use MIME::Base64; while(<>) { if (/-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/ .. /-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/) { if ( m/^\s*[^\s]+\s*$/) { $bdata = $bdata . $_; } } } Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 47] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 print decode_base64($bdata); Figure 58 Alternatively, the base-64 encoded block can be edited by hand to remove document structure lines and fed as input to any base-64 decoding utility. A.1 Encoded Reference Messages -- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- H4sIAHCZ9UACA+xdy3PbSHq3PZnHaqNNbc0tJ1g1XM9YItXobrwoUyONLe9o /BiXJXuqNpvytIiGCBIEKAAULafiJD5sZS+p3JPDVipVuW5uSW1V8i94/og9 5JRjrukG+MCLJPTgw2P0DC2SaDy6+f1+/X1ff/31EdGJ16H1ik78azMqQARA lvE1wIqS+MuLhOA1VkWRkIgliX0vIlkUrwng2hxK1/OJKwjX3KbXIW7LG1dv 2vF3tHz75HD/28cHgmd2ql2Pujv0JWl3LFpx3GPhYP/JJqyA1ZXnJqkOPm0+ u/dEaDiejyuDunWnXZWADLaOXGLXG7VXWuOX+OhBS292MYIIr648Ii/L9x23 R1zdqwoKu+R9l50krH1FLWtD2LXYpWydumvCHf4kpHJcOWJHdiJ32N7yyXEN I4QhWl05dNjJ3xHfc+wN4bDhtInHzg2a4Vd6wfexpmyvrtwlllXev1cVjgYy 7+kGYI9nQ1v3AAGa1oWogRq23QNAq+stm7I77dbrtONXBdLpWGad+KZjb3p6 h13vgJ5UBaRB1kRN6Hfk6opVFVjzVlfejd+f9UX4o82QAKbhHwM5iX/2vsD/ QvHPEDfCP0dbVo0BjPmxOoNXnD8CwCIEMUwSAMqgFFFj7yqwIiZYZBICI4ju S7FHdMc2HIhMDEHzFBAPMFoxUBPZA8Sq7ypWZ4R/Bnw6y+F/Gv5FAKUk/jEq xv+5lP3Hz/cP964e/jb1A/hDNr5qfMBOawBR9AYyyIZRNra3bYZhBliIrCaG 5bJHdcNuB1pEiF+RDbkawkL46GOUk6hukqGW9FZX7rFbVoX7rrkhAFH4htgC ZKIoiHIVAPa/sHdwyO7o2D6pM+65E2kjv75UibR0O6xIbb98eNahWUzVP/yQ 2sd+g7VBEjnvnNZYPzi1doMpPxY9E6CmMFVCgQproMYaKOw/wUNilFZXvFp5 daVeSx/wa4AzWbtGurrpCKzLRQUITw+fbO4+fyKwVkF+8NTUqSMgCJXhIcSe g9Rcv9MmnSoShYdP7r7PdPhe8r89U/bPYf+JKMn/oigX/D9v/S/TcIrbgLxE qbaexwbsJdk/KCMjkJWEGTjdCgwHpaDErcDw1KymJExAJvZM3kRpJ9aGqfYe K2NMvncV/6Z9CsRF+n8UpuyN8C8F+h/7U+B/2fS/ZuUCGiD7MUVZxLIIsZxS A+OQDCURNAgwPVsnLU9vEo/pgtxHQ7yR/TZW8xvakNLW1sbWxkZEgVv7xqF9 71LToTFe2GIlS0VDU9W6c2pw4lgVTlyUDsd6/ZS63iLtP4AxSuFfUQr8L834 r6TGfyVr/M879MdG/t1KMPhPG/FPetQxTzo0Mu4fVvpDf+4hP5B0PugryUF/ OLaL75lz6KhOmLG8UP1fBGJq/BdRMf7PpfRHTwECIHz7YNKQqqkJfIsIhq6d 1DlQkiqRV/I8jxxRl584wmYghQCpWMUAApEN+GzwN0gLNSF1e1Q3vN0D3RjO uUhDFWCkfiRVk1D5EBna0cBcSFWjerfvpYJalgag5XLsjBxEwcW5ewiqUX7Z Pr+moKljVQVN3RShUvh8inIV/E9f+rO1/nL4fxQpxf8yLPh/3vpfDgPwxUWm ADCkvptUBOUo/YdCGDP8Vlee0pOu6TLStR2/YdrHB91Ox3F977BhehtZX+6Z foOyGz1xnZdn5cjp/AuTev26g/Pde86ufZY+ljFPGBvhDh8eCIZj6WVG5GUm PcFAMk0LTo4ty6JZHpnHdUdf6PwfkEScsv8wLvA/T/0PQw1rsoKAyNDo+9Tl ABOOXEpaAkOV4NI6NU85usZriCCp6UGkqQzODo1ivS9wxNMdA3WbECD21jYQ e4Iue9cwiIdoI3D8EE8zRzofwhpO6H13smgrNBiRRmzPMPua350s1S+sqAHY tHW7RVEmSscoeKyxKQ3vXfz964yx3QXP/ygySo//hf23PP7f+MitXtYjrPF5 fvaPA8dNsHftY/csOcM+YJBQZGPKQo+ahLGF3kI5nMTx6fv0iF3m8zu4DJEE 0bkn9jVWLuAXnuAYnq1nuM6EmrQXO/8jgYz5H1Dgfx7l6d4v9w8O954GeM0E Sparks, et al. 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Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 49] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 P1zE/86T/7P1v7EZYC9lEKqqiOMc35dAo2WfMN2PcTxGQNOIzpd+kx5FOxk6 oKhqSFWn5PsQp+mBSBvkeJ0Jyy+/+6hdtxad/wdIqfjPIv/Dctl/506mw1Mp QJSPJhy+a0OW24gvN4oQRSiqRsPmKqDjmg3SM3SHIAe7EnSQ6XqjHYJEiSlD IyMxBcyUJSqDdC0pCXifvvQ3OxYxbQ7rQ/bY9JYn2I7QI2eC7wh8PpR1TU9o E/tMcOo+9T2BuFTw+O4SHtV5pSMq8BMry2F8tk2vTfx6Y5YkMA3/SErGf2FQ xH8uo//nQnGdCEtQmrT9S1QGmzzzoPdSN6y8qdwLV8+V4B8uDv8KgBH8KyH+ C//PXMrjve8e7R1+/e295WAAOIUBxmrqCUV9MlOMT/43fUYYaRdR6bO0+aXw 0bS7lm/O2AKYvv4XJ/CPmPZY4H8R/l8G6A5TXnOu/4DSNNwN5D0723LmfFC4 3moE+SFJ9EVVU/k2UTsRJPVP0XKfAyeQ1tCnzd3TPAnxeBtmcCRlweTxfweZ sPg623yBKJOc0UhO/Awpj/o5GQuOncSGV55QodDLFlnsujVj708O/S+W/4vz P5RRkf9l0fN/47y/UMKX1QcD1w6KeoG5HMaW9UExcCG5EoY9NAwHAjnCgVCe xH7xJ5PQ5Ry95Yvs+sUT3YyJFEJzCxW0HZcSz7EXuv8PTNp/SC7W/8+nDPb/ ZP0vXHpvz6EwEYZivrOnybPzahqEPI/n2N3bi108Fzj+O6fU8uqLjf+DUhL/ EizwP1//r0M6lSNKO9XNzRHoURUBAK8mDFhNRfqgGHWEchhG+rDLgxPGMHYv DPxpWaMs3ShMITxuc+7+Ggwtz8wvLnISnXQd/4gsNv+3guUU/lHh/10e/T9Y ///IrQjfVASelyccRdOq/3auzX8zNrkSo3HAA5EMzIBJsf1aUmnPu+uVpFUl IIEctJA70AMtYuerK/ARu/SYdP3F7v+LZZDCPyj8v3MpM97/T1UQFBtNiESo TtrZbiiGMR/AANKMM8bu6ccH/JFzcoztv9v1G45rvgogXBUeO9/a9IHt9LzD hukd1Bs8BYnTISddWmY4IDUeoJFC+Y9SNWAdf0T0ur9Y/KOU/V+M/8uG/0no z8S+pqkIwYlLfobS10JYIp5rIUM/Ot0RQYX/J44WAU7a0BNJFVFltRF/oQl7 Ecf2EJ282wF7VeI7HvxIw0jYL8D3TVgs/iU57f8r4j/fdfyr06AfCl4C+slZ 3Svc2ufRGFfjNOi/A9v4XLh4zKAi7my3AJxq/6NU/AeWC/wvCf6zE7DDSQ42 hKGnG854t33UVzDB+w+5NQ6bjWEgGJJVDWG+gETBoiYCxA5HiGFILkOphsgB HV07JbZ1gnq2a9m05xhN4mldM62bIMDau/eyY7o0cErMoYyfmoj3ME8hKmzR 8NlqUAVQUyRNlhFURekSbsywp6zjReJfklL4l3Ex/z/X+T8JIOGAuqdmnQrP bHJKTIscWfSc8AcB/F+9eqmbfMdOr5ebAFIhVH0GoMTTmwZt9oa+ABgsDFER VhSIAAYQITG61CPOAUyybYd4FDgGjytt2PDEMRzCP0BCewa/lssTkPvuWXnX 8KnLboE1BKCKVNYp/C//yO+jqUyl+Y64tmkf8wVo7LbOKXX9rkuFtX1beOI6 xwyd3to7NK3g6Z2Fr/9SpGT8DwJi4f9bLv9/4OR7kTYCxq+dTMaG5kgJMDEZ QCiqfdcgDw7SGTfoqyu79Trt+P3VWbZz5OhnQ9/eOSYFRGlyTHhsUefS7AFw 2YkAj7bNBef/AFI0/7cMiv0/51iS67+2WCNr3RIGEXCenxTGQt1xj8NoAAQx nBQPMJDLzPkAdTTcD8CfgOBG7ItOq+4p5bbZphtcjQ5LEBrOWutvts2XVN+I fOGZxzb7JlKXjerkmLID7MqRD4ZLjidRyvKvR/N4ryx2/YcCovs/hvhHxf7f cx//+5lKL7YEnAM7LuxMTXftMHYnYgVk3SRuCXjU1uOMMXQGBCvDqNmNEUVf gLvOCTtCTu2WRQzaap4gbHYx6pIeHSYGUrkOz0bQoTIwLVNp/1lSTd1OqwVI TMcNJBlla8QoYem4ju/UHau2lqSrslLm5xBuXKylzmuzqtZxzWsQMXXsyOE7 zblntbUyK3u7X91H6i7Y3d1TFYDvMnzdFwEW1a92VaDcvb/GiahczlM11boR D/KLFJJ0QUlahiHsvPEuOBruHrZtWdKaXFScJyFwK9jvpLYWiEilo0RN/EOX hyhTt7xn1x09cA0cmTYD4KjKPdPrOJ4ZBh8Qn4lFo82+3xIM06LpK6+ugDef /P1HP7n9m69/83+r1z++8bs3n5yxr7o3rl8Xfwp+8tGH6z/74Maff3gN/HRU 6frv3nz0Crz5QANvbvzL7z64cf3GjU+u/eO139747Np1sDqsd/1DdlonuMoH z/7ko09vPDsQPwU/5x8++ZRjwTQc1zaJ+HPwZ/zLjz/95IDY3zgeFX8G/vT/ 27sWoKiuM8wCSoMaksBIWqA5ATsoZfHcx7J7F+mQajPGGFABdRInzd3du+xl l7vkPlhxdMJCGxv7cJLQPGwTZWqqpmOm1ZoaZxIf7aitzXTXpPQRoKZOE2lr M9pJY2gTe869u7BPwLRZGns+nvfcx577n/8/5z//+f//4JL8wlmIbUSVWgQr 8fGcwmZ82CIo6lJBVkU3JqIQ8bhQu+Fni+dBhoI0RbEsQ1vuLZ5HoUPKFjmE jv9KZUrgp/FxTtEtyVIPgztjKWCalZUT/GYWDD6SHQxmnenLnl1wy+kxc/HD j1UPKEN/6TlaUrLtvRXUXFF7bu0eZ8GL55b9brR/6PUdV7u7fub4zd63G8+8 Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 50] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 v7XihaOVT1wcdjjXbfZ9PjC0Gc5prr946J/fOtj70OC/vmN9addI786Sm4KD 9N79O3+Y//ANCy9s33rupe4jwqIVpwbPhrdtPO1t2sNsbazIzjFlmb4XHIXB t2AZeoOym3Pnw6JgqrfARCorzM1GCpJ+5Y2583OLGq6Wzi057Fm5r7jvmc7R LVeG73sgDIM78PmK3OBjMLi9p8h7Z3HRn/u7PtfTIhW2/H7gfEvRwIsD6m45 o3zQa8pKYMMcRH3/h5+p23Ah76fD1R/8Y3TjQ3eVfuWN94bCZQcG935ty+Lz l2u+6+l/+ou9f8rf9YcPS19uPHEiu7jvthP7awsuHRspe/NC503VY0//bdXK Lcd+q1U5EWmXD4+MjbSeDK2+9GrLr94+3lz5iOO5Je/wh7XjHyxRR+UF1UdM 1MHDJ/OOfvvgxtur9+25nwgMERgiMNcgMFSvaRD2ms6ioQhuzig9YqRzYgTc FfwRvHWcSDfkULEjIiydODOLKkBixUIrxdKQqYXWe2HFxNlcCnHGQvjGxVPr j+zTTDbbMurCpeCTxafhmomLCqgvwaUwf/anjIKcPHjj+P/Z2dlZPai5Jo5N DTDPqGZefPnCBNHKDfY8cDVrfunY8bfuCP388bFX+585wb0//G7lFfb7f71i PXT21E/W/j2/svXddzb1Mavl2+BubtHt5/ZY+p+fc7nR+9pThY6R3ZcXLjuz 6v7XTh775f5fL5gtPP6Diw0VC2DrL+aee6Hvks3zx2cfPf/8+q8P3XxgYDuX detX39zYvcpSIe7Y+lR1x/LXH902PYXJbCbB2tcdVCRtH3cA+JT+X7H5/wz7 D2TI+k+m7T+8j5ca2nnF3yFG0ls0ATRdSSw1Jtgy7+v0xBt97+HXm91N8jp+ javZDlCTxzp463wWZ8yNdfVa371pU7eZRpd5RAWgb9UjAEnrcKBpJZpBASNC xLiKsY9PuvWCOEcNVAuBN9Zn3X4/cKCmRc2Ga+334wNZ/5NiQmub7poOfhH0 /Ho9ccd1IP949oq33lRmMP9XrTVB/lma+H/OzPrPR9v/4T/a9wHE8KBXbPew vNcl8Q+2ewNIpVd4xY0XftIYyaa1I8TUaYATbmpe2oLuoie7y8cr7S6PO9E/ ZmUzUJlJ7qM5G9QkF36j+Go23t3YtK4RqOwkN/OKC7oZQUrhlDOp+yvkOdHl lgQhxdKTKgeUmR7/LdCaNP6zRP4zLv+y0OFXBTOiR1vqRV8A0vmD6dyXhuOx qwbk4k33aT4o3n7v86MuxSwLil+TnUKqjoVjaQ7auFg9A/OzX3RqDMtZsJVe Etw4gtwj0wxrkafsSGjGxsUGl6e2618/EeOa5FWcHR9vDzCl/s8ySeu/RP4z K/8JflNGTKRd9at402QjNNJpMH4mskFEuFIi2SAyIf8d9AzLP0Mnyj9dS+b/ GcH04r9ExSHZke7KWDnaZmXGR2mPquKEMYFAoCaV2o8EM1GqdV7Tp/+e7k6P IPGq4DInpvGeGIxZDsYGeCSPxukTjlLTiQRdgldf7Sv8HunLzR2i6vnC/1u2 cE2a8fxvFKSTxv9aK5H/jCCq2dMQgnpAV1UxoApYqqpoEHo59AoIB8O96E/o x6FDoQPh7bgsoSjcG/4GMIPQ0XBP9Fzo0GQ+kZwtQSZRb89ydHxHEWFKvBWk Fw/6XqadFuSA4HIrdzRPkkoubTAqRRnbzaXRWgSXZrgG0TSXyuWbm5aLTKow Ls6WlGHu2tLEcLa0rjOcbTFFW/8Xt5Um+IQgoIhS18zG/1BWS7L+RxH//0yv /3SJXYK3rcHp4UXZ7JJkZ9ykCSlvaHIoIRrwscphE7DPy5/6dlAHAEAdLPZE rEcdGGXDXwwjzct3y3inOWAH5SvAGr8iSA5BbgMbNmwoL4+4LhrZxlwyPtmQ FBOLf+En1wOc5L3dZZtiJcrg+BSLUPG9vl4lPdbHqeiZhyHk8EfFxBHhKxAl AFiMLtbJAfBQZ/hcjuuh0dGO4aASUT8VTLRGIXAnL7X5BNdygXfhuEMAJCHg NspAF+/TBPQoPOsWJQ2VJJ9sNdrEuH8dUl9bJU3ReN9afNoO6uqqq9FP3ZRj l57/ALdjxFVVDwNV4prfJ0c5IIA+p16vQLTELPnNegFqkC47iNJENxguBngO jqF0ini4i+OKSPMZFMKcAUDU51f0ttsAwA6s4yQ2noj+xfqETmCq1lZDWyw1 aHTHz4o8qB7dFI1Ex2GbaPCzl6/W/GiqARRVFiXEXuWYvdIyFnoUorbB6/VR H1pUor+lUWcF20NcxiV14EFUd1jDXHsWuLQ5oNnMDOubBCR+7hme/9Mw2f5H 9P9P0PrfZJa+No/iYqmYDjjCcu3YlOdzSx20n/axjGzRoGHuizPtIU1gkpW9 ae3xia0IYqLtAJLUrwQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQEBAQE BNcB/g03l0QmABgBAA== -- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE -- Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 51] Internet-Draft SIP Torture Tests July 2004 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Sparks, et al. Expires January 12, 2005 [Page 52]