
IPv6 Implications for TCP/UDP Port Scanning

Tim Chown *tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk*




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
Rationale

- The goals of the document are currently to
 - Note the properties of the vastly increased host address space in an IPv6 subnet (/64) or site (/48)
 - With respect to traditional port scanning probes
 - Describe new methods that attackers may use to identify target nodes
 - Given the target host address space is so large
 - Make recommendations to administrators to mitigate against new attack vectors
 - Publish document as Informational in the first instance




Traditional port scanning

- To scan one port per node in a /64 IPv6 subnet per second would require 500 billion years
 - Can reduce search space from 64 to 24 bits
 - If SLAAC used, knowing :fffe: padding & vendor codes
 - Not practical; unlikely to be used by attackers
- Scans also used by worms
 - Active propagation intra- or inter-subnet
 - Address space used much more densely in IPv4 site
 - Need to identify target nodes
- Used by local admins for 'defensive' scanning
 - Market for IPv4 'penetration testing' what's IPv6 market?




Recommendations

- For administrators
 - Consider subnet/host numbering plans
 - Potential for rolling server addresses
 - Consider where addresses/prefixes may be gleaned
 - Passive or active gathering
 - Mail headers, application access logs, etc
 - Possible site-scope multicast operations
 - Use of RFC3041 to reduce useful lifetime of exposed address information to an attacker
 - Contradicts ease of management
 - Considerations for 'defensive' scanning



Comments received on -02

- Title should be about 'address' not 'port' scanning
 - Or perhaps 'host address discovery'
- Look at Bellovin paper
 - http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/v6worms.pdf
- Attackers will find a way; don't suggest IPv6 offers protection; document new attack vectors and offer recommendations
- RFC3041 is a good thing
- Exposed to weakest of protocols in dual-stack network



Next steps?

- Various edits
 - Need to expand Section 3 on attack vectors
 - Add conclusions
- Is direction of document useful?
 - WG adoption?
 - Referenced in two mature v6ops drafts
 - NAP and ICMP filtering
- Comments?