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### **Basic Model**

'named objects make other named objects'
 Natural parent-child relationship in process

- Follow the hierarchy
  - Nodes (ie directories) and Objects (files)
  - Information management advantages
    - Local sub-trees can be independently managed
    - 'what made me' & 'what do I make' easy to find/combine into global information base
- Use g(AKI) and g(SKI) for names, CRL, '\*IA'
  - Algorithmic naming, not real-entity. Tied to public key of certificate
    - (very low) risk of hash collision
    - Avoids 'real world name' politics

# Hierarchy model

- Rooted at each Trust Anchor (TA)
  - Trust anchor self signed
  - In repository name model, AKI == SKI
  - (don't just trust self-signed or AKI==SKI, TA must be externally defined to be valid)
  - For each certificate issued
    - Sub-dir at 'node level' (for products of certificate) named by SKI of certificate. Sub-dir contents:
      - produced certs, CRL (for CA certs)
      - Signed objects (for EE certs)
    - Name structure stable across certificate re-issuance
      - if public key remains constant.

#### **Trust Anchors (self-reference)**

Canonical file name: pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0-2F.cer

serial: 2F

**Trust Anchor** 

10.0.0/8

192.168.0.0/16

lpv4

g(AKI): pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0 g(SKI): pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0

CRLdp:rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0.crl

AIA: rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0

SIA: rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0

### Products of TAFORT

Canonical file name: DLA15E2IJgSdp2sy09gvEeptpsI-51.cer

#### Cert made by TA

Ipv4 10.0.0/8 192.168.0.0/16 serial: 51

g(AKI): pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0 g(SKI): DLA15E2IJgSdp2syO9gvEeptpsI

CRLdp:rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ DLA15E2IJgSdp2sy09gvEeptpsI/ DLA15E2IJgSdp2sy09gvEeptpsI.crl

AIA: rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0

SIA: rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ DLA15E2IJgSdp2sy09gvEeptpsI

### Products of (products of TA)

Canonical file name: zGJyRYzO3n7rcGV\_hH-Hmn68OPY-505.cer


Cert made by Cert, made by TA serial: 505

g(AKI): DLA15E2IJgSdp2syO9gvEeptpsI ( g(SKI): zGJyRYzO3n7rcGV\_hH-Hmn680PY

CRLdp:rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
DLA15E2IJgSdp2syO9gvEeptpsI/
zGJyRYzO3n7rcGV\_hH-Hmn68OPY/
zGJyRYzO3n7rcGV\_hH-Hmn68OPY.crl

AIA: rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ DLA15E2IJgSdp2sy09gvEeptpsI

SIA: rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
DLA15E2IJgSdp2sy09gvEeptpsI
zGJyRYz03n7rcGV\_hH-Hmn680PY



#### **Object-Name model**

- For a CA
  - Your parent's SKI became your AKI.
  - Your SKI becomes your children's AKI
  - Sha1 hash over ASN.1 of public key
    - Extremely low collision risk
    - g(ski) or g(aki)+<serial> unique for any given CA
    - g(ski) alone: all re-issues with same public key hash to same location (serials not involved)
      - No name change with normal certificate renewal
    - Public key change == complete namespace rollover (unavoidable)
  - Represented by 'url friendly' modified base64 representation, <64 chars per cert instance</li>

## **Hierarchy Implications**

- Inter-RIR registration/transfers explicit in repository certificate, naming model
- Clean separation of address-types in hierarchy
  - Experimental separated from Historical from Current RIR policy from ...
  - Clean model for independent sub-trees
    - Provide publication point in RSYNC: URL space
    - Irrespective of local naming policy, cert identity in repository is deterministic
    - No risk of collision when uploaded into global repository structure

# Modified-Gutmann Alg: g(ski)

- Use of base64 Specified in rfc4387
  - Reduces 160-bit sha1 to 27 char Base64 encoding.
    - URLs not workable in filestore contexts due to presence of '/' character.
    - '+' character interfered with URL parsing
  - I-D.josefsson-rfc3548bis
    - Base64 transform, '/' and '+' replaced by '-' and '\_'
      - No size increase, URL friendly, filestore friendly
    - Can be implemented as a post-process on Base64 transform, or as a native function
  - Resulting object names are at least 26 chars long
    - Plus serial (up to 20 chars of HEX) plus syntactic sugar for filename.ext purposes)
    - Under 64-char limits for older FS (but clearly over 8.3)
    - Not 'mandatory' to implement as dir/file store, but useful

# Why not certificate names?

- These are not identity certs
  - No applicability in browsers, webservers, email signing
  - Identity checks for issuance still required but now local to issuer, no global context
    - Unless driven by other needs
  - Can use 'shadow cert' process to derive certificates with apparent name for business purposes
  - Avoids any consideration of entity name collision
    - in certificate namespace, encodings, field choices
    - directory name model is inherently complex
  - Survivable across future models of address transfer/trading
    - "it's the crypto, not the name which secures"
      - Proof of knowledge of private key authorizes signed outcomes, not the name on the certificate in this model

#### **Operations** models

#### Authenticated copy

- TA must be sourced out-of-band.

Fetch repository via rsync

- Crl from CRLdp of TA
- Repository contents via AIA of TA
- Top-down walk to validate all objects published at TA
  - Recurse for independent SIA/CRLdp
- Local sub-repository
  - Requires at LEAST path back to issuing TA to perform validation

# Why Rsync?

Avoid inventing new protocol

- Desireable features
  - Can fetch single objects, trees
  - Byte efficient (only differing blocks)
  - No fetch of unchanged objects
- Downsides
  - May be expensive on server
  - Lax formal specification

#### What do we get?

- Deterministic, simple naming
- Objects always have a known place in hierarchy
  - EE certs, CRLs, 'products' nest cleanly inside 'producer' namespace
- Clean separation of certs by delegation (right back to TA == 'root')

