## Report: The IAB Workshop on Unwanted Traffic

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# IAB Unwanted Traffic Workshop USC/ISI - Marina del Rey, March 2006



#### Why an "Unwanted Traffic" workshop

- Lots of Unwanted Traffic on the Internet today
  - (D)DoS, Spam, viruses, worms, etc.
- The trend
  - The ratio of Unwanted Traffic is increasing, not decreasing
  - Persistence of infected hosts considerable
- The impact
  - Significant economic losses and growing



## **Evolution of Threats**

- From worms/viruses that simply wreak havoc on the network to malware that propagates, compromises hosts and enables command and control infrastructure and services platforms for malicious activity. E.g.:
  - Code Red (DDoS against IP)
  - Blaster (DDoS against hostname)
  - Deloder (Arbitrary DDoS toolkit)
  - Fully extensible today
- (D)DoS was initial botnet threat, array of employment functions today; mostly with economic motivators, though religious, political, etc.. as well



## The Workshop

- IAB called the workshop to
  - Assess the state of affairs
  - Examine existing counter measures
  - Collect input for action planning
- Participants
- The major findings are report in: – draft-iab-iwout-report-00.txt



## The Workshop Findings

- An Underground Economy exists
   It drives majority of unwanted traffic
- An arms race with the evolving underground economy
  - Currently the situation is getting worse
  - Increasing virulence of malware
  - Persistence of existing compromised systems
- An action plan is needed!



#### **The Underground Shopping Mall**

See.

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.....

5th Floor Servers: Military Government Business

4th Floor Retail: Credit cards Social Security No's Bank Accounts

**3rd Floor** Internet: Hosts Core Routers Spoofed Addresses

2nd Floor Equipment: Bots & Botnets

### The Root of All Evils: An Underground Economy

- The Underground Economy is a virtual shopping mall where **your** belongings and assets are bought and sold
- The shopping mall and stores are managed by criminals
- They use the tools we have developed to run the warehouse
- Inventory list: credit cards, bank accounts, core Internet routers, business critical servers, bots, botnets, etc.



### Why an Underground Economy?

- The monetary incentives are HUGE!
- Lack of meaningful deterrence
  - Vulnerable host platforms
  - Lack of education to add protection or prompt repair
  - Prosecution of miscreants extremely difficult
- No proactive actions from service providers
  - Lack of resources
  - Lack of adequate tools
  - Efforts go into reactive patches (damage control, miscreants move around)
  - Rare for mitigation to involve sanitizing hosts
    ROI



## The botnet example

- Vectors
  - Vulnerability -> Exploit
  - Compromise/Infection
  - Propagation
  - C & C



- Employment
  - DDoS (spoof and non)
  - Spam
  - Spam w/phishing, host phishing sites
  - Open proxies
  - ID theft
  - Key loggers
  - Lift CD keys
  - Click Fraud
  - Stream video?
  - Marketing!

### Current Vulnerabilities and Existing Solutions

#### **Vulnerabilities**

- Source address spoofing
- BGP route hijacking
- "Everything over HTTP"
- Everyone comes from Everywhere
- Complex network
   authentication
- Security tools unused


#### **Solutions**

#### <u>Internet</u>

- Access control lists (ACL)
- BGP null routing
- BCP38
- uRPF/BCP 84

#### **Enterprise**

- Firewalls
- ALGs
- Anti-Spam SW



# Why Existing Solutions Fail

- Tools are inadequate ... ...or improperly deployed
- Competence is low ...
   ... and education is inadequate
- Network operators must demonstrate ROI for CAPEX and BCP investment, not immediately obvious

## Hard Questions

- Internet Architecture and stopping Unwanted
   Traffic
  - Cryptographic mechanisms
  - Curtailing the openness
  - Increasing the system complexity
  - Architectural principles we need to preserve
  - Separate control plane
  - The adversary is very adaptive ...

... and will take counter actions for any move we make to defend ourselves - e.g., BlueSecurity example



## Medium and Long Term

- Tightening security of the routing infrastructure
- Cleaning up the Internet Routing Registry Repository [IRR], and securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used for routing verifications
- Take down bots and botnets
- Even without a magic wand we are able to take measures to reduce the unwanted traffic
- Community education (e.g., TCP MD5, use the filtering BCP's, etc..)
- Layer security, raise the bar



### Actionable

- Update the host requirements
- Update the router requirements.
- Update ingress filtering (BCP38 [RFC2827] and BCP 84 [RFC3704]).
- The IAB
  - inform the community about the existence of the underground economy.
- The IRTF
  - steps toward understanding the Underground Economy
  - encourage research on effective countermeasures.



## A Concluding Note

- The Underground Economy is different from what we have seen before
  - It's no longer kiddies with nothing better to do
  - It is a financially motivated illegal activity
  - The technology and global connectedness of the Internet is just the enabler
- The situation is getting worse
- However, there is growing awareness of the issues of the Underground Economy and that is the first step towards effective solutions

