Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. Internet Draft Seo, K. Expires: January 2008 Kent, S. Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies July 2007 Template for an Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP Address and AS Number (PKI) draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-02.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2008. Abstract This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. Table of Contents Preface...........................................................8 1. Introduction...................................................9 1.1. Overview.................................................10 1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................11 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 1.3.5. Other participants..................................12 1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 1.5. Policy administration....................................13 1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 2.1. Repositories.............................................15 2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 3. Identification And Authentication.............................16 3.1. Naming...................................................16 3.1.1. Types of names......................................16 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................18 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation.................................................18 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.19 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............20 4.1. Certificate Application..................................20 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............20 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............20 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................20 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions ...........................................................20 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...20 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............21 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................21 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............21 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate................................................21 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................21 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........21 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............21 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........22 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......22 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................22 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................22 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............23 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................23 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate................................................23 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....23 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................23 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................23 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................23 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...24 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........24 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................24 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate................................................24 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................25 4.8. Certificate modification.................................25 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............25 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber.................................................26 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate ...........................................................26 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................26 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................26 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................26 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request....................................................27 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.27 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................27 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................27 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]..................................................28 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].28 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]..................................................28 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28 4.10. Certificate status services.............................28 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............28 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................28 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................28 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................28 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................28 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] ...........................................................28 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]........................................28 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................29 5.1. Physical controls........................................29 5.1.1. Site location and construction......................29 5.1.2. Physical access.....................................29 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................29 5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................29 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................29 5.1.6. Media storage.......................................29 5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................29 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................29 5.2. Procedural controls......................................29 5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................29 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................29 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....29 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................29 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................29 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements ...........................................................30 5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................30 5.3.3. Training requirements...............................30 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............30 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................30 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................30 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................30 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................30 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................30 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................30 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................30 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................30 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................31 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................31 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]..................................................31 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....31 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................31 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................31 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................31 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............31 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................31 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................31 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].31 5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]..................................................31 5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]..................................................31 5.6. Key changeover...........................................31 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............32 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]32 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED]........................................32 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..32 5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]..................................................32 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................32 6. Technical Security Controls...................................33 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................33 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................33 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................33 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........33 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........33 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................34 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking34 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)34 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls......................................................34 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........34 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......34 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................34 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................35 6.2.5. Private key archival................................35 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module.....................................................35 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........35 6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................35 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................35 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................35 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................35 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................36 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................36 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods....................................................36 6.4. Activation data..........................................36 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........36 6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................36 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................36 6.5. Computer security controls...............................36 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....36 6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................37 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................37 6.6.1. System development controls.........................37 6.6.2. Security management controls........................37 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................37 6.7. Network security controls................................37 6.8. Time-stamping............................................37 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................38 Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr- res-certs-01].................................................38 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................38 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................38 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............38 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................38 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................38 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......38 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....38 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....38 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................38 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................38 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............38 7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................38 7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38 7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................38 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................39 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................39 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................39 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............39 8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................39 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................39 8.6. Communication of results.................................39 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................40 9.1. Fees.....................................................40 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................40 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............40 9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................40 9.2. Financial responsibility.................................40 9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................40 9.2.2. Other assets........................................40 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....40 9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................40 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................40 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information................................................40 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..40 9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................40 9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................40 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................40 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................40 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......40 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......40 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process....................................................41 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........41 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............41 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................41 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................41 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........41 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........41 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]..................................................41 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................41 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................41 Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 9.9. Indemnities..............................................41 9.10. Term and termination....................................41 9.10.1. Term...............................................41 9.10.2. Termination........................................41 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................41 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.41 9.12. Amendments..............................................41 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................41 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................41 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]..................................................41 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................41 9.14. Governing law...........................................41 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................41 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................41 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................42 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................42 9.16.3. Severability.......................................42 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).42 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................42 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................42 10. Security Considerations......................................43 11. IANA Considerations..........................................43 12. Acknowledgments..............................................43 13. References...................................................43 13.1. Normative References....................................43 13.2. Informative References..................................44 Author's Addresses...............................................44 Intellectual Property Statement..................................45 Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45 Copyright Statement..............................................45 Preface This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The user of this document should 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., " Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" with date, author, etc. 2. delete this Preface Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 3. fill in the information indicated below by 4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a reference section with just the references in 13.2 5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and additions above. Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the Introduction below. This information should be left in the CPS as an explanation to the user. 1. Introduction This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of . It describes the practices employed by the Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [CP]) of this PKI. The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses. Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED]. 1.1. Overview This CPS describes: . Participants . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) . Key management . Audit procedures . Business and legal issues The PKI encompasses several types of certificates: . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder . End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in verifying signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system 1.2. Document name and identification The name of this document is "'s Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI". 1.3. PKI participants Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an LIR/ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP. 1.3.1. Certification authorities will operate a CA, the primary function of which is the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space or AS numbers are allocated by the registry. In the future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in support of repository maintenance. 1.3.2. Registration authorities For the certificates issued by this registry under this PKI, this function is provided by the registry per se. The registry already performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of address space and AS numbers. Since the registry operates the CA, there is no distinct RA. 1.3.3. Subscribers Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies) who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or LIRs/ISPs.> 1.3.4. Relying parties Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make use of address and AS number allocation certificates in support of improved routing security are relying parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross) certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to this space. To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties. 1.3.5. Other participants will operate a repository that holds certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects, e.g., ROAs. 1.4. Certificate usage 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy. Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system. Such uses also are permitted under this policy. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. 1.5. Policy administration 1.5.1. Organization administering the document This CPS is administered by 1.5.2. Contact person 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.6. Definitions and acronyms CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations. LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or National) Registry. NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs: ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia - Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa). ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of address blocks. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2.1. Repositories As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this data for use in support of routing security. 2.2. Publication of certification information will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories. 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times and frequency: A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance. The CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate. 2.4. Access controls on repositories Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 3. Identification And Authentication 3.1. Naming 3.1.1. Types of names The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is identified by an X.500 Disinguished Name (DN). For certificates issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the NIR. 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique relative to all certificates issued by . However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this PKI. Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense, since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of routing security, not for identification 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided. 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms None 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced through technical means. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc. 3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this registry's records. 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a resource holder. However, this registry maintains contact information for each resource holder in support of certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation. 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy. 3.2.5. Validation of authority 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request Note: If additional IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a new certificate may be issued with both the old and the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old certificate will be a revoked (and a re-key will be performed in the event of a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its resource holdings be spread over a set of certificates, rather than consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource allocations as distinct allocations within his organization. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1. Certificate Application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application The following entities may submit a certificate application to this CA: o o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by this registry 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities 4.2. Certificate application processing 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications 4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance When a certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is provided below. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to which it allocates IP address space and one or more "shadow" certificates for use in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of repository access control. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route filters. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of relying party. 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then will notify the resource holder The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous certificate by , to ensure uninterrupted coverage. Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4.6.2. Who may request renewal The certificate holder or may initiate the renewal process. 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when requested, based on: (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked. Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.8. Certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of additional resources, or may be explicit. A subscriber also may request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the previous certificates. If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not request that a new certificate be issued containing only these resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation) issued. 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification The certificate holder or may initiate the certificate modification process. 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber review and acceptance. 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either or the subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by that certificate. 4.9.2. Who can request revocation The certificate holder or may request a revocation. 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request . 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified. 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours. Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. will set the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued. 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay after generation. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED] 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED] 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED] 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED] 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED] 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] 4.10. Certificate status services does support OCSP. 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED] 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED] 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED] 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED] 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED] 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls 5.1. Physical controls 5.1.1. Site location and construction 5.1.2. Physical access 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning 5.1.4. Water exposures 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection 5.1.6. Media storage 5.1.7. Waste disposal 5.1.8. Off-site backup 5.2. Procedural controls 5.2.1. Trusted roles 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties 5.3. Personnel controls Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements 5.3.2. Background check procedures 5.3.3. Training requirements 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel 5.4. Audit logging procedures 5.4.1. Types of events recorded Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include: Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions Posting of any material to a repository Any attempts to change or delete audit data 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 5.4.4. Protection of audit log 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED] 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED] 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED] 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED] 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED] 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED] 5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED] 5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED] 5.6. Key changeover The CA certificate will contain a validity period that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA certificate. To support this, will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED] 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED] 5.8. CA or RA termination Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 6. Technical Security Controls This section describes the security controls used by . 6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1.1. Key pair generation 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from this system. Public Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. 6.1.5. Key sizes For the CA's certificate and shadow CA certificate, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber certificates, the RSA keys will be 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent (e) F4 (65,537). is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.> 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. For 's CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls The CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS]. 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control There will be private key out of multi-person control. 6.2.3. Private key escrow No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 6.2.4. Private key backup 6.2.5. Private key archival See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module The private keys for 's CA and shadow CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module. 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module The private keys for 's CA will be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS]) 6.2.8. Method of activating private key 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by The module will be stored securely when not in use. 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS]. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3.1. Public key archival Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods The CA's key pair will have a validity interval of 6.4. Activation data 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 6.4.2. Activation data protection Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by . 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data 6.5. Computer security controls 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] 6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6.1. System development controls 6.6.2. Security management controls 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls 6.7. Network security controls 6.8. Time-stamping The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RESCERT]. 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED] 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED] 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED] 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED] 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED] 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED] 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension [OMITTED] 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED] 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED] 7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED] Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 8.4. Topics covered by assessment 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency 8.6. Communication of results Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 9. Other Business And Legal Matters 9.1. Fees 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 9.1.3. Refund policy 9.2. Financial responsibility 9.2.1. Insurance coverage 9.2.2. Other assets 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities 9.3. Confidentiality of business information 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 9.4. Privacy of personal information 9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.2. Information treated as private 9.4.3. Information not deemed private 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED] 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.8. Limitations of liability 9.9. Indemnities 9.10. Term and termination 9.10.1. Term 9.10.2. Termination 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 9.12. Amendments 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED] 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions 9.14. Governing law 9.15. Compliance with applicable law 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 9.16.1. Entire agreement 9.16.2. Assignment 9.16.3. Severability 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 9.16.5. Force Majeure 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED] Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 10. Security Considerations The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7 Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems. 11. IANA Considerations None. 12. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this document and Matt Houston for his help with the formatting. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [CP] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", draft- ietf-sidr-cp, July 2007 (work in progress). Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 [RESCERT] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs, June 2007 (work in progress). 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. Author's Addresses Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 Email: skent@bbn.com Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 Email: dkong@bbn.com Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Email: kseo@bbn.com Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Template CPS for an Internet Registry July 2007 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Kong, Seo & Kent Expires January 2008 [Page 45]