MSEC WG L. Dondeti Internet-Draft QUALCOMM Expires: September 2, 2006 J. Xiang Nortel Networks S. Rowles Cisco Mar 2006 GKDP: Group Key Distribution Protocol draft-ietf-msec-gkdp-01 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 2, 2006. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Abstract This document specifies a group key distribution protocol (GKDP) based on IKEv2, the IPsec key management protocol; the new protocol is similar to IKEv2 in message and payload formats, and message semantics to a large extent. The protocol in conformance with MSEC key management architecture contains two components: member Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 1] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 registration and group rekeying, and downloads a group security association from the GCKS to a member. This protocol is independent of IKEv2 except in its likeness. Conventions Used In This Document This document recommends, as policy, what specifications for Internet protocols -- and, in particular, IETF standards track protocol documents -- should include as normative language within them. The capitalized keywords "SHOULD", "MUST", "REQUIRED", etc. are used in the sense of how they would be used within other documents with the meanings as specified in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. Table of Contents 1. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Why do we need another GSA management protocol? . . . . . 3 2.2. GKDP usage scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. GKDP protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Member registration and secure channel establishment . . . 4 3.1.1. Initial exchange:GSA_INIT_EXCH . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.2. Authenticated exchange:GSA_AUTH_EXCH . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. GSA maintenance channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2.1. GSA rekey protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Informational exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Notify exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. Error message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. Traffic selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. GKDP protocol design details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Header and payload formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1. GKDP header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 16 Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 2] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 1. Revision History GKDP-xx: Draft tag and title changed to gkdp-xx Version 01: The protocol has been renamed GKDP for Group Key Distribution Protocol as per discussions at the MSEC meeting at IETF-60 and mailing list discussions. The name GDOIv2 will be used for a revision of GDOI which may retain the DOI concept and build upon RFC 3547. Version 02: This is a major revision with the following additions to the specification: * 2. Introduction and Overview Security encapsulation protocols such as IPsec and SRTP provide confidentiality, message integrity, replay protection, and in some instances access control, and data origin authentication. These security services require state establishment, maintenance, and teardown for correct operation. While these security associations can be managed manually, automatic key management protocols are essential for efficient and scalable operation. In case of point-to- point security associations, IKE and its successor IKEv2 are widely used for IPsec SAs, and MIKEY for SRTP associations. For multi-point SAs or group SAs (GSA), GDOI, GSAKMP, and MIKEY have been specified by the MSEC WG. GKDP is designed to be a counterpart - for GSA distribution and maintenance - to IKEv2 so we can reuse the work put in to its design and analysis, and of course implementation. 2.1. Why do we need another GSA management protocol? Given the collection of key management protocols mentioned above, there is a question on the need for yet another group key management protocol. First a look back at history: So far, we have two experimental RFCs, viz., RFC 1949 [RFC1949] and RFC 2093 [RFC2093], and a standards track RFC, RFC 3547 [RFC3547] specifying or describing group key management protocols. Furthermore there is GSAKMP, currently a standards track MSEC I-D, which borrows quite a few concepts from IKEv2, but not quite similar to IKEv2. The protocol we propose is mainly to reuse as much as the IKEv2 codebase, similar to GDOI reusing payload and message formats of IKE [RFC2409] and ISAKMP [RFC2408] . Consequently, GKDP requires fewer messages compared to GDOI, specifically 4 in most cases, compared to 10 in main mode and 7 in aggressive mode of GDOI. We discuss the advantages of GKDP, the shortcomings and remedies to address those shortcomings. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 3] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 2.2. GKDP usage scenarios GKDP is a key download protocol. Key download as opposed to key negotiation has several interesting use cases. o The first application is multicast security. As with GDOI, the current version of the GKDP spec limits the scope to single sender multicast applications. o The second intended application is point to point data security associations facilitated by a centralized group key server. o Others to be listed! 3. GKDP protocol 3.1. Member registration and secure channel establishment The first of two components in GSA establishment and maintenance is member registration. 3.1.1. Initial exchange:GSA_INIT_EXCH The first step in the registration protocol is to establish a secure channel with the group controller and key server (GCKS). This exchange is similar to IKE_SA_INIT exchange of IKEv2. The registering member proposes various combinations of algorithms in SAi1 to constitute the secure channel, along with a nonce, Ni, and a DH exponent, KEi. The GCKS has several options: o In the first, it honors the member's request for registration and sends the necessary information to complete the DH exchange: it selects and specifies the parameters of the secure channel, and includes a nonce Nr, and a public DH value of its own, KEr. o The second option is for the GCKS to consider if the request for secure channel establishment is spurious. The GCCKS has no way to tell except to throttle such requests by making the initiator do some work before it invests any computing resources. We refer to this mode as the denial-of-service or DoS protection mode specified in detail in Section 3.1.1.1 . o Finally, if none of the proposals are acceptable to the GCKS, it may reject the initial exchange itself. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 4] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 GSA_INIT_EXCH message is as follows: Member->GCKS: M1: HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni GCKS->Member: M2: HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ] Figure 1: Secure channel establishment 3.1.1.1. DoS protection mode In typical deployments of multicast or group security services, the GCKS address is well-known, which allows adversaries to launch a DoS attack by sending bogus GSA_INIT_EXCH messages. In the normal mode of operation, the GCKS responds and needs to maintain state (including storing Messages 1 and 2) corresponding to each exchange in progress. Notice that this process might result in the GCKS storing unnecessary state about bogus exchanges. To avoid this attack, the GCKS may first choose to verify whether the Intiator is live and responding to and processing GKDP messages. The GCKS verifies whether a prospective member (or the initiatior of the key exchange protocol) is live using the following procedure. The GCKS responds to the Initiator's message, by sending a challenge - a notify message (see Section 4), containing a a random value or generally referred to as a COOKIE; the GCKS MUST choose the COOKIE size between 1 and 64 octets. The Intiator is expected to include the received COOKIE as part of modified Message 1, which we refer to as "Response Message." (see Figure 2). The GCKS may choose to store the COOKIE and other relevant additional information such as Initiator's identity (thus reducing the amount of state to be stored, but not entirely eliminating it), to verify that the Initiator indeed used the COOKIE that was sent by the GCKS. Alternatively, it may generate the COOKIE following a local procedure (that the Initiator cannot repeat to generate another valid cookie) to encode the Initiator's identity, Message 1 etc. For instance the IKEv2 specification suggests the following derivation to generate cookies: COOKIE = VersionIDofGCKS-Secret | Hash(Ni | IPi | SPIi | GCKS-secret) The GCKS may use (TBD) method to expand or truncate the above value to generate the COOKIE of size (MUST be between 1-64 octets) based on local policy. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 5] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 DoS protection exchange is as follows: Member->GCKS: M1: HDR(A,0), SAi1, KEi, Ni GCKS->Member: CM: HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE) Member->GCKS: RM: HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE), SAi1, KEi, Ni GCKS->Member: M2: HDR(A,B), SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ] CM: Challenge Message from the GCKS RM: Challenge-Response Message from the Member Figure 2: DoS protection mode of GSA_INIT_EXCH 3.1.2. Authenticated exchange:GSA_AUTH_EXCH The GSA_INIT_EXCH (2 message or 4 message version) establishes an unauthenticated secure channel between a prospective member and the GCKS. The next step is for the member to request the GCKS to join a group; the GCKS evaluates the request and based on the evaluation a) accept the request and send the corresponding GSA GSA_AUTH_EXCH message is as follows: Member->GCKS: M3: HDR, SK{ G-ID, IDi, [ID_CERT,] [ID_CERTREQ,] AUTH, [IDr,] [GM_CERT,] [GM_CERTREQ,] [POP_I] } GCKS->Member: M4: HDR, SK{ IDr, [ID_CERT,] AUTH, GSA, [,KD] [,SEQ] [GCKS_CERT,] [,POP_R]} Figure 3: Authenticated Exchange The various payloads in the GSA_AUTH_EXCH messages have the following purposes: o G-ID: The group identity payload constructed using the IKEv2 Identification Payload specifies the secure group that M3 wants to join. o ID_CERT: The optional ID_CERT payload contains a certificate(s) asserting the GCKS's or a member's claimed identity as in IDi or IDr payloads. o GM_CERT: The optional GM_CERT payload contains a certificate asserting the group member's authorization to join the group G-ID as member. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 6] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 o GCKS_CERT: The optional GCKS_CERT payload contains a certificate asserting the GCKS's authorization to serve the role of a group controller and key server for the group G-ID. o AUTH: The AUTH payload constitues the "authenticated" portion of the 4 or 6 message AKE. In other words, the member in M3 and the GCKS in M4 prove that they are indeed the entities that sent M1 and M2 respectively. A pre-established shared secret or a certificate (optionally specified in the CERT payload) may be used for entity authentication. o POP: Similar to the AUTH payload's use in providing host/entity authentication, the POP payload is for member/GCKS authorization to assume their claimed roles. The GM_CERT or GCKS_CERT is used to sign a block of data, specified below, to constitute the POP payload. o GSA: The GSA payload contains the rekey and data security SA payloads. Note that this SA is not negotiated; the GCKS simply sends this SA. o KD: The KD payload contains the secret keys corresponding the rekey and the data security SAs included in the GSA payload. o SEQ: The optional SEQ payload MUST be included if the GSA payload contains a rekey SA. The SEQ payload contains a SEQ number for replay protection of the rekey messages. 3.1.2.1. Key material computation The key material computation and the AUTH payload are identical to that described in the IKEv2 specification. Key material and registration SA keys are computed as follows: SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir) {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr } = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr ), where prf+ is defined as follows: prf+ (K,S) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ... where: T1 = prf (K, S | 0x01) T2 = prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02) T3 = prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03) T4 = prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04) Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 7] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 Figure 4: Registration SA key material computation 3.1.2.2. Member and GCKS authentication and authorization GKDP requires mutual authentication between each member and a GCKS, as well as mutual authorization. First the member and the GCKS authenticate to each other using pre-shared keys or certificates prior to establishing a secure channel. M3 and M4 contain AUTH payloads that essentially protect against man-in-the-middle attacks against the DH exchange in M1 and M2. The member and the GCKS construct AUTH payloads by computing an HMAC over or signing a block of data containing the message M1 or M2 they sent earlier, the other party's nonce payload, and a prf over own identity. More formally, the block of data for HMAC or signature is as follows: Auth payload computation: Auth payload in M3 is computed over: auth-block-M3: M1 || Nr-Payload || prf(SK_pi, IDi-Payload) Auth payload in M4 is computed over: auth-block-M4: M2 || Ni-Payload || prf(SK_pr, IDr-Payload) For shared secret based host authentication AUTH payload is computed as follows: AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"KeyPad:GKDP-AUTH-MX"), ) Figure 5: Auth payload computation 3.1.2.2.1. Use of asymmetric authentication methods GKDP also allows the member and the GCKS to use different authentication methods, similar to TLS and IKEv2. More specifically, the GCKS uses a cert to authenticate itself and establish a secure channel, and the member uses EAP to send its authentication information via the secure channel. Members may also use EAP to prove their authorization to join a secure group. For instance, consider a use case where a member may use a SIM card for authentication, or a pre-paid SIM card to pay for content distributed to a secure group. In these cases, the authentication or authorization information can be sent via EAP. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 8] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 3.1.2.2.2. Proof of possession Proof of possession payload (POP) provides a mechanism so that members and/or GCKS can prove to the other party that they are indeed authorized to be a member or the GCKS, respectively. For POP payload derivation in GKDP, the member or the GCKS first constructs a message block, POP-HASH, containing the two nonces exchanged in GSA_INIT_EXCH and the prf over the ID payload as defined in the AUTH payload construction. Next, the member or the GCKS signs the POP-HASH value. POP-HASH construction is as follows: POP payload : POP payload in M3 is constructed over the following message block: POP-HASH-M3: "KeyPad:GKDP-POP-M3" || Ni-Payload || Nr-Payload || prf(SK_pi, IDi-Payload) POP payload in M4 is computed over: POP-HASH-M4: "KeyPad:GKDP-POP-M4" || Ni-Payload || Nr-Payload || prf(SK_pr, IDr-Payload) Figure 6: POP payload computation block 3.2. GSA maintenance channel 3.2.1. GSA rekey protocol GSA rekey protocol is optional to implement, but it plays a crucial role for large and dynamic groups. The GCKS is responsible for rekeying of the secure group as per the group policy. The GCKS uses multicast or multi-unicast to transport the rekey message. When multi-unicast is used, it may be appropriate in some scenarios to have a reply message from the member(s) to the GCKS. The reply message is optional. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 9] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 Rekey message is as follows: Multicast: GCKS->Member: HDR, SK {[N], SEQ, GSA, KD, [GCKS_CERT,] SIG} Unicast: GCKS->Member: HDR, SK {N, SEQ, GSA, KD, [GCKS_CERT,] SIG} [Member->GCKS]: [HDR, SK {N, SEQ, AUTH}] Figure 7: Rekey message 3.2.1.1. Multicast Rekey The multicast rekey is multicasted to all the group members that have completed the member registration in section 3.1. The HDR is the GKDP Header defined in section 5.1 The Notify Payload MAY be used by the GKCS to inform the group member of the type of rekey that is being conveyed or if there is an error state to convey to the group member. The Notify Message may be one of the following: STATUS NOTIFY TYPE KEKUPDATE 40960 Notify the member that rekey SA has expired TEKUPDATE 40961 Notify the member that Data SA has expired KEKTEKUPDATE 40962 Both the types of SA have expired and will be refreshed ERROR NOTIFY TYPE TBD The SEQ payload contains a sequence number that orders the rekey messages. The group member MUST check to see that the sequence number is greater than in the previous rekey message, before acting any further on the message. The sequence number for a new rekey SA will start from one. The GSA payload contains the current rekey and data security SA payloads. The GSA may contain a new data security SA or a new rekey SA or both. The GSA MAY also contain an LKH rekey SA, TBD. The KD represents the keys for the policy sent in the GSA. If the data security SA is being refreshed in this rekey message, the IPSec keys are updated in the KD, and/or if the rekey SA is being refreshed in this rekey message, the rekey Key is updated in the KD payload. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 10] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 GKCS-CERT: This optional payload SHOULD not be any different than in the registration. The SIG payload is a signature of the hash of the message, not including the GKDP header, prefixed with the string "GKDP-rekey". Hash {"GKDP-rekey", [N], SEQ, GSA, KD, [GKCS-CERT] } After adding the Signature of the above Hash to the rekey message, it is then encrypted with the rekey SA and multicasted to the group members which are registered with the GKCS. 3.2.1.2. Group Member Reply 3.2.1.3. Delete via Rekey SA The GKCS may want to delete the data security and/or rekey SAs for various reasons. One or more Delete Payloads [RFC 4306, Section 3.11] MAY follow the SEQ payload in a REKEY message in order to delete keys. If the GKCS has no further SAs to send to the group members, the GSA and KD payloads must be omitted from the rekey message. HDR, SK {[N], SEQ, D, [D], SIG} 4. Informational exchange 4.1. Notify exchange 4.2. Error message 5. Traffic selectors Traffic Selector(TS) allows the GCKS to communicate what kind of packets will be forwarded over the newly downloaded GSA. It can be used to implement a Secure Policy Database (SPD). It can also be used to solve other problems such as the replay window with QoS issue. Unlike negotiated key protocol, in whichTraffic Selector can be negotiated down e.g. the responder can choose a subset of the traffic proposed by the initiator; GKDP is a key downloading protocol in which the Traffic Selector sent by the GCKS together with the GSA specifies the selection criteria for packets forwarded over the new GSA. For rekeys, TS needs not be specified. 6. GKDP protocol design details Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 11] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 7. Header and payload formats GKDP payload design is based on IKEv2 payloads, to allow reuse of the IKEv2 payload processing code. Furthermore, we draw on the GDOI design specified in RFC3547, where possible and appropriate to avoid reinvention. 7.1. GKDP header GKDP messages use UDP ports GKDP-PORT and GKDP-NAT-PORT (TBA-IANA), with one GKDP message per datagram. The source and destination IP addresses from the IP header are used with role reversal to send the response messages. GKDP messages sent/received on UDP port GKDP-PORT follow the format of a UDP header followed by a GDKP header. GKDP messages sent/received on UDP port GKDP-NAT-PORT have four octets of zero immediately following the UDP header; the GKDP header follows the zeros. The zeros are not part of part of the GKDP message and therefore not part of the payload length fields. All GKDP messages begin with the GKDP header. Following the GKDP header -denoted by HDR in GKDP messages - are one or more GKDP payloads each identified by a "Next Payload" field in the preceding payload. Payloads are processed in the order in which they appear in an GKDP message by invoking the appropriate processing routine according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE header and subsequently according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE payload itself until a "Next Payload" field of zero indicates that no payloads follow. If a payload of type "Encrypted" is found, that payload is decrypted and its contents parsed as additional payloads. An Encrypted payload MUST be the last payload in a packet and an encrypted payload MUST NOT contain another encrypted payload. IPsecbis multicast group address or the destination address in the IP header and the Recipient SPI in the GKDP header identifies an instance of an GKDP security association. The format of the GKDP header is shown in Figure Figure 11: Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 12] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! GKDP Initiator's SPI ! ! ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! GKDP Responder's SPI ! ! ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type ! Flags ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! Message ID ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! Length ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 11: GKDP Header Format 8. Security considerations TBD Since GKDP piggybacks on the IKEv2 protocol and completes registration in the last two messages, of the ikev2 protocol, there is no opportunity for the group member to reply back to the GKCS that it cannot handle the policy sent in the GSA. In this case, the group member can send an informational message to the GKCS, which will then have to tear down any state regarding this group member. 9. IANA Considerations This document defines a number of new exchanges, fields and values where future assignments are needed from IANA. This section lists what future IANA assignments are needed. UDP port number for GKDP exchanges. GSA_INIT_EXCH exchange type GSA_AUTH_EXCH exchange type GSA_INFO_EXCH exchange type GSA_REKEY exchange type new Payload Types G-ID SEQ GSA Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 13] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 POP KD 10. Acknowledgments GKDP is based on IKEv2 and GDOI. Several sections of this document are quite identical to IKEv2 and GDOI specifications; in some cases the text may be identical to the text in those specifications. We included the text for completeness of this specification. We appreciate the efforts of the contributors and editors of those protocols. 11. References 11.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003. [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress), October 2004. 11.2. Informative References [RFC1949] Ballardie, T., "Scalable Multicast Key Distribution", RFC 1949, May 1996. [RFC2093] Harney, H. and C. Muckenhirn, "Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) Specification", RFC 2093, July 1997. [RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schneider, M., and M. Schertler, "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998. [RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. [I-D.ipsec-rfc2401bis] "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", draft-ipsec-rfc2401bis-00 (work in progress), October 2003. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 14] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 Authors' Addresses Lakshminath Dondeti QUALCOMM 5775 Morehouse Drive San Diego, CA 92121 US Phone: +1 858 845 1267 Email: ldondeti@qualcomm.com Jing Xiang Nortel Networks 600 Technology Park drive Billerica, MA 01821 US Phone: +1 978 288 8985 Email: jxiang@nortel.com Sheela Rowles Cisco US Phone: Email: Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 15] Internet-Draft GKDP Mar 2006 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Dondeti, et al. Expires September 2, 2006 [Page 16]