



# MAC Labeling and Enforcement in NFSv4

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# Access Control Concepts



- Subjects - Active entities (e.g. executing programs).
- Objects - Passive entities (e.g. files, sockets).
- Reference Monitor
  - Mediates all accesses by subjects to objects.
  - Tamperproof, non-bypassable, verifiable



# Discretionary Access Control (DAC)



- Typical form of access control.
- Decisions based on user identity/ownership.
- Users and their programs are free to change access rules (e.g. file modes, ACLs).
- No protection against malicious and flawed software.
- Coarse-grained privilege, prone to escalation.



# Mandatory Access Control (MAC)



- Historically limited to separate “trusted” operating systems.
- Decisions based on security labels.
- Access rules defined by admin/organization.
- Can confine malicious and flawed software.
- Can enforce system-wide security requirements.



# Flexible MAC

- Enabling MAC to address a full spectrum of security needs (confidentiality, integrity, least privilege, separation of duty, etc).
- Supports a wide range of security models (BLP, Biba, Type Enforcement, etc).
- Requires encapsulation of security labels/contexts and policy logic.



# MAC entering the mainstream



- SELinux released as a proof of concept in December 2000, mainstreamed in Linux 2.6 since 2003.
- FreeBSD MAC framework and SEBSD module.
- Solaris trusted extensions and Solaris FMAC.
- All of these systems could benefit from NFSv4 MAC support.



# security\_attribute RA



- UTF-8 encoded string
- Per file object attribute
- RA format
  - Opaque data?
  - Structured string?
  - Combination of both? (<opaque>@doi)



# Label Change Notification



- Label change callback
  - Fall back on cache timeout
  - Scaling problems?
- **OP\_PUTFILELABEL**
  - Pass client's idea of label state
  - Server returns **ENFSRETRY** or **ENFSSTALE**
  - Client grabs new file handle.





# Process Label Transport (OP\_PUTCLIENTLABEL)



- Server needs to know client's process context
- Place PUTCLIENTLABEL call at start of each compound op
- Indicates process context for remaining operations
- Similar semantics to PUTFH



# Label Translation

- Client and server may have different DOIs
  - different MAC models
  - different policy versions
  - different policy semantic
- Similar to ID  $\rightarrow$  {g,u} id mapping
- Administration issues?
- Similar model to DNS forwarding?
- Central DOI authority?



# Dumb Server



- Truly Dumb Server
  - Server does not maintain a DOI
  - Stores label directly
  - Strip or leave the DOI?
- Semi-Dumb Server
  - Server maintains it's own DOI
  - Translates label into its own DOI
  - Appends it's DOI onto label when sending



# Exports

- `seclabel` export option: enables exporting of file labels
- `filelabel=<label>` all files on this export given this label
- `clientlabel=<label>` client process label is always given this label



# Smart Server



- Maintains a DOI
- Maintains local policy
- Uses client process label in
  - access decisions
  - file creation



# Questions?

