draft-heer-hip-midauth-01.txt

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
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HI Verification by Middleboxes

- Middleboxes need to be able to verify host identities
 - Firewalls, intrusion detection, logging
 - Accounting
 - Access control / Certificates
 - Peer-to-Peer systems
- General functionality partially provided by BEX
 - E.g., RSA/DSA signatures in control packets
- Mechanism prone to replay attacks

Replay Attack



What's the Problem?

- Everyone can replay a BEX
 - No knowledge of private key needed
- Middleboxes can't verify freshness of BEX
 - No timestamp (and that's good)
- No signed IP Addresses
 - No src/dst IP addresses covered by signature (and that's good)
- End-host nonces are useless to middleboxes

How Severe is the Problem?

- Only relevant to middleboxes
- Full impersonation towards the middlebox
- Attack can be launched...
- ... by any one
 - No special knowledge necessary
- ... at any time
 - No temporal restrictions
- ... from anywhere
 - No spatial restrictions (IPs)
- ... towards any middlebox
 - A BEX/UPDATE can be replayed to different middleboxes

draft-heer-hip-middle-auth

- Scope
 - MB that authenticate packets/hosts "on the fly"
 - No explicit registration
 - No explicit middlebox detection
- Support for authentication by middlebox during
 - BEX
 - Mobility signaling
- Protection from DoS on middlebox

Authentication Mechanism

- Let MB "participate" in BEX, UPDATE
- MB injects parameters to HIP control packets
- Challenge response
 - Pretty much like ECHO_REQUEST / RESPONSE
- ECHO_REQUEST_M, ECHO_RESPONSE_M
 - Middlebox adds ER_M parameter to control packet
 - Receiving host echoes parameter in signed part of response packet
- DoS protection for middleboxes
 - Puzzle mechanism


New Parameters

- ECHO_REQUEST_M
 - Identical to ECHO_REQUEST (except type no.)
 - In unsigned part of packet (65332)
- ECHO_RESPONSE_M
 - Identical to ECHO_RESPONSE_SIGNED
 - In signed part of packet (962)


New Parameters (cont'd)

- PUZZLE_M
 - Similar to PUZZLE
 - Larger opaque data field (6 bytes vs. 2 bytes)
 - In unsigned part of packet (65334)
- SOLUTION_M
 - Similar to SOLUTION
 - Larger opaque data field (6 bytes)
 - In signed part of packet (322)
- Puzzle + request / solution + response should be one parameter (ordering problem)

Authentication: BEX



Authentication: UPDATE



Parameter Handling

- Middleboxes
 - MUST preserve order of parameters
 - MUST add further parameters after present ones
 - Helps host to determine location of MB
- End-hosts
 - MUST preserve order when copying to response
 - Sign packet
 - Helps MB to find parameter

Missing HOST_ID

- Problem: no HOST_ID in UPDATE packet
 - But: MB must figure out PKs
 - Request from URL (Hash and URL)
 - Slow (1 RTT)
 - Insecure (resource exhaustion, reflection, amplification)
- Solution: send HOST_ID in UPDATEs
 - Carrying ECHO_RESPONSE_M
 - Carrying SOLUTION_M
- BUT: larger packets

Open Issue: ESP - HIP Bindings

- Strong authentication for HIP packets
- Weak binding between ESP and HIP
 - No packet-level authentication for ESP
 - Packet injection possible
- Use of the extension: Attackers cannot...
 - ... open a channel by themselves (...by any one)
 - ... store and reuse old BEXes (... at any time)
 - ... use arbitrary network locations and connection properties (... from anywhere)
 - ... cannot replay BEX to different middleboxes
 (... towards any middlebox)

Conclusion

- draft-heer-hip-middle-auth
 - Prevent replay attacks
 - Use BEX and UPDATE to authenticate communicating peers
 - Enables secure access control without explicit registration
 - Protection from DoS
 - Is this useful for the RG?

draft-nikander-hip-mm-00 (2003)

- Reason for signature in update packet:
 - "The purpose of the signature is to allow middleboxes to verify the integrity of the packet. The HMAC allows the peer node to verify the packet very fast."