

IPFIX Mediation: Framework

draft-ietf-ipfix-mediators-framework-02

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Feedback received for -01

❖ Thank you to reviewers:

□ Gerhard Muenz

- This draft is in a very good shape.
- The description of different mediation functions is comprehensive.

□ Nevil Brownlee

Feedback received for -01

❖ Resolved issues in -02:

- ❑ Delete informative references to three drafts (flow anonymisation, aggregation, and flow selection techniques)

- ➔ Deleted references for three drafts

- ❑ Should not define the Information Elements

- ➔ Deleted Information Elements.

Maximum and minimum count elements could be included in future document.

Changes in -02: Selection Function

- ❖ “Flow-based Collector Selection” should not be a function of its own. (Gerhard)
 - Described as a use-case of one or more Selection Functions and Exporting Processes.




Figure D: Exporting classified Data Records to dedicated Collector.

Changes in -02: use-case

- ❖ Also added a use-case of the Selection Functions and other functions




Figure E: Flow Selection and Aggregation

Changes in -02: Time Composition

- ❖ Improved the paragraph to avoid confusion.
 - Time composition advantages:
 - **Reducing the number of Flow Records**
 - **Computing the active time period for long-running Flows**
 - **Revealing the up-and-down traffic volume within an active time**
 - Short period Flow Records created by configuring a short active time, e.g., 1 or 10 sec, are merged within a certain time period, e.g., 60 or 300 sec, at an IPFIX Mediator. While merging, the IPFIX Mediator computes new metrics such as maximum and minimum.

Changes in -02: Security Considerations

- ❖ Added some solutions to specific security threats related to Mediator
 - **Attacks against IPFIX Mediator**
 - IPFIX Mediators host the packet filter function to reject malicious packets at an outside interface.
 - **Man-in-the-middle attack by untrusted Mediator**
 - IPFIX Collectors and Exporters must verify trusted Mediators to prevent connection to untrusted Mediators.
 - **Configuration on IPFIX Mediation**
 - To eliminate the risks, IPFIX Mediators must provide an authentication function for authorized administrators and facilities for tracing configuration changes to their origin.

Open Issue

❖ **New observation group (Benoit)**

- In case of aggregation (for example all routers in Japan), where should we encode the information?
 - In a new Observation Point as a Flow Key in the Flow Record?
 - Or with a new Mediator Observation Domain ID?
- ➔ Is this a framework issue or a protocol issue?

Next Steps

- ❖ The draft was stabilized thanks to Gerhard's detailed review.
- ❖ A new version will be produced (some editorial comments)
- ❖ Then it will be ready for WG last call