


# TLS-based Security solution for Mobile IPv6

draft-korhonen-mext-mip6-altsec-02

Jouni Korhonen,  
Basavaraj Patil,  
Hannes Tschofenig,  
Dirk Kroeselberg  
IETF #76, MEXT WG




# Solution Architecture




# Solution Architecture Cont'd

- The TLS connection is only used between the MN and the HAC during the **MN authentication & bootstrapping** phase.
- HAC is a functional entity and can be colocated with the HA, AAA or as a separate element.
- Security for the MN-HA signaling and optionally user traffic is via the SA bootstrapped by the HAC.


# HAC and HA Deployment Models



Model 1



Model 2



Model 3

# MN-HAC Communication

- Simple Request-Response lockstep protocol inside the TLS-tunnel.
- The I-D defines one container format that carries “http-like” Type-Value pair headers:

0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1			
+++++	+++++	+++++	+++++
Reserved	Identifier	Length	
+++++	+++++	+++++	+++++
Content portion..			~
+++++	+++++	+++++	+++++


- Six “pseudo” messages defined:
  - Request/MHAuth-Init, Response/MHAuth-Init
  - Request/MHAuth-Mid, Response/MHAuth-Mid
  - Request/MHAuth-Done, Response/MHAuth-Done

# MN-HAC Authentication


- Simple PSK exchange based on (simplified) GPSK.
- Also supports EAP based authentication.
- Protected by the encapsulating TLS tunnel between the MN and the HAC.
- Uses TLS channel binding ('tls-server-endpoint' described in [I-D.altsman-tls-channel-bindings]).
- Server Certificate required for TLS.

# MN Authentication using PSK

- Simple two roundtrip PSK authentication defined in the I-D.



# MN Authentication Using any EAP Method




# Bootstrapping

- Bootstrapping implies:
  1. Bootstrapping of an SA between the MN and the assigned HA.
  2. Bootstrapping of Mobile IPv6 specific parameters.
- Negotiation is minimal. A HAC “pushes” the configuration to the MN and the HA.
- Bootstrapping messages between the MN and HAC are protected by the TLS tunnel.

# MN-HA Communication

- All communication between the MN and the HA is UDP encapsulated and uses a HAC provisioned port number.
- Control traffic is always protected.
- User traffic may be optionally protected.
- Common encapsulation header format, which allows easy multiplexing of different payload types using a single SA.
- The encapsulation/ciphering is similar to ESP/UDP but is decoupled from and **not** using IKE/IPsec.
  - Everything can be done in user space.

# Common MN-HA UDP Encapsulation Header Format – Protected



# Common MN-HA UDP Encapsulation Header Format – Plain Text

0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
:	IPv4 or IPv6 header (src-addr=Xa, dst-addr=Ya)	:	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
:	UDP header (src-port=Xp, dst-port=Yp)	:	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
PTtype=0	0		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
	0		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
:	Payload Data (plain IPv4 or IPv6 Packet)	:	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			

# Implementation Progress

- Implementation of this security solution is being done for DSMIP6.
- Our implementation is making progress!
  - MN-HAC part completed.
  - MN-HA part integration to mipd in progress.
- Will be made available by the end of year.

# Next steps

- Request the adoption of this I-D as a WG document in MEXT.

# Questions and Discussion

