


EAP Identity Protection

draft-zcao-emu-id-protection-00.txt

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EMU WG Meeting @ IETF78
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




The problem

- Upon receiving the authentication Identity provided by the peer, the EAP server determines which EAP method to start with
- The Identity can be easily forged, resulting into downward attacks
- We should protect the ID

An Example






Intuition of the Solution:

- Native IDs are easy to compromise
- What's desired :
 - Identity ownership: EAP peer has a method to demonstrate its ownership of the Identity
 - Others cannot generate the correct message if they do not know the “secret”
- Crypto-binding Identity is the way we choose



The Solution

- ID generation
 - Public-private key pair: (PK, SK)
 - $CBID = \text{HASH}(\text{PK} || \text{OPTIONAL-CONTENT})$
- ID exchange






Other considerations

- To avoid replay attack
 - We have used the random number R_a
 - The EAP server needs to keep the history of this random to avoid replay

The extended message





- Any interests to continue working on this direction?
- Adopt it as a work item?