IETF 78 – radext
28 jul 2010

RADIUS over TLS

Status of draft

- WGLC completed; in PROTO writeup
- Some unresolved comments
  - Client Identity
  - Packet flow Client -> Server and vice versa
  - Connection backoff
- The end is nigh?

Client Identity

- We've been here before...
- Problem: there are many attributes in a X.509 certificate which can be used to classify connecting clients
  - Be open, by stating „it SHOULD be configurable which of those attributes a deployer considers for denoting a client's identity?
  - Or: provide a „default“ identity scheme, like „the CN in combination with the issuing CA uniquely identifies a client“?
  - Or: make it someone else's problem: **draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-08**

Packet flow constraints

- RADIUS/UDP: sessions flow one way

  (Client sends Access-Request, Server replies with Access-Accept)
- RADIUS/TLS: transport creates bidirectional channel
  - In combination with dynamic discovery, server might think it's a good idea to forward Access-Requests for certain realms to the Client
  - That shouldn't be allowed to happen
- Text right now enumerates packet types which can flow in the respective directions
- There might be more elegant wording.

Example RADIUS



Example
RADIUS/TLS + dynamic discovery



Connection backoff

- What happens if a client attempts to connect to a server, but fails?
  - Retrying immediately could generate DoS
  - Backing off is required
  - Define and put into Security Considerations
- Will check text in Status-Server and use that or produce new text.