Keying and Authentication
for Routing Protocols WG
(karp WG; RTG Area)
Chairs: Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com>
Administrative Items, Chairs
Mailing List Address: karp@ietf.org
To Subscribe: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp
Archive: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp/current/maillist.html
Scribes (Meeting Minutes and Jabber)
- Richad Graveman (Meeting
Minutes)
- Wes George (Jabber)
Archive: http://www.ietf.org/jabber/logs/karp/2012-03-28.html
Blue Sheets
Links to slides are on the KARP agenda &
proceedings pages for IETF 83.
Welcome and Document
Status, Chairs
See presentation slides.
Note
well.
RFC
6518 was published.
The
threats-reqs draft is waiting for AD go-ahead. Other drafts depend on this.
The document
dependencies tree was shown.
RFC
6518 (Design Guide) promises work on KMPs. The threats-reqs draft promises more
work on KMP requirements. The WG will do generic solutions (e.g., IKEv2) and
then protocol-specific documents, not more pure requirements documents on KMP.
OK?
Core Document
KARP Overview, Threats,
and Requirements, draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-04, Manav Bhatia
See presentation slides. He covered changes, new title, application of RFC 4593,
restructuring to include threat sources, specific requirements like shared
keys, default mechanisms, and circular dependencies.
He proposed
a quick second WG LC.
Mike
St.Johns (MStJ): There was a change in Requirement 6. What is the impact on
routing infrastructure? Immediate?
Sam
Hartman (SH): New parameters do not imply not using old ones. The requirement
is useless but harmless.
MStJ:
Disagree. Matter of language. Clarify the text.
Steve
Kent (SK): Slide 9. Default mechanism. Can anything work without configuration?
Manav
Bhatia (MB): He cited IS-IS as an example. It does not specify a default.
SK: Is
one a MUST?
MB:
Yes. But what is the default?
SK:
Still need to do keying. That is a configuration [step].
MB: See
the entire document.
Gregory
Lebovitz (GL) (from Jabber): On the first topic. This occurred in TCP-AO. On the
second: He learned this doing IKEv2 testing.
Brian
Weis (BW): Please review and comment.
Routing Protocol
Analysis
KARP IS-IS security gap
analysis, draft-chunduri-karp-is-is-gap-analysis-01, Uma Chunduri
See presentation slides: This was updated to the -01 version. It uses RFC
6518. Questions from IETF 82 were reviewed.
#1: BW
asked for a clarification about lifetime 0.
#2: MB: What changed since RFC 5310? Ans.: Deployment experience. IS-IS may be on the broadcast network.
Chairs: Discuss WG adoption on the ML.
Key Management
Database of Long-Lived
Symmetric Cryptographic Keys, draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table-02, Sam Hartman
See presentation slides:
á
Goals were derived from
discussions among authors (GL: What does communicating secret mean? Ans.:
covered later)
á
What key tables include
á
Operations
á
Proposed changes in
DB(1) (GL: provide an example of separate key name and key ID? Ans.: Russ
Housley (RH) cited 802.1)
á
Proposed changes in
DB(2) (Acee Lindem (AL): Sharing keys across protocols? Ans.: No, not done. If
share keying info, then multiple entries) (BW: Clarification: BGP is not
interface specific. Ans.: Use peer, not interface, for things like BGP)
á
Textual Conventions
(Jabber: With respect to local and remote, sending and receiving is clearer),
á
What protocols
specify(1)
á
What protocols
specify(2) (Jeff Haas (JH): An example is IPv6 link local. SH: Need to document
this.) (Tero KivinenŐs comments on the ML will be addressed.)
á
Management Approach (Wes
George (WG): Need for more operator feedback).
Key Management for
Pairwise Routing Protocols, draft-mahesh-karp-rkmp-01, Dacheng Zhang
See presentation slides:
SA
Payload:
SK:
TCP-AO is not a RP. LDP discovery is UDP over a certain port. SH: Wait for next
slide. SK: No, still not clear.
TCP-AO
(GL: Need more field to make this work.)
Traffic
Selector Payload:
SK: Can
use existing IKEv2 structure, even if it has more than needed. Analysis of both
approaches is should be done.
SH:
Consider in context of previous presentation. Desirable to use key tables (KT).
Using IKEv2 may be more work.
JH:
Clarification: KT is an abstraction. If KMP uses the KT abstraction, is this
the conceptual simplification?
RH and
SK: There must be a mapping back to KT.
SK:
Still is a need to analyze both approaches.
Tero
Kivinen (TK): IKEv2 traffic selectors use addresses and other things that may
not be used here. Most RP parameters use protocols or port numbers that can be
expressed in IKEv2.
SH:
Yes, the comparative analysis should be done.
Uma Chunduri
(UC): Agree, can use IKEv2 TSŐs.
Using IKEv2 with TCP-AO, draft-chunduri-karp-using-ikev2-with-tcp-ao-01, Uma Chunduri
See presentation slides:
SK:
Pulled in TCP-AO key derivation functions. Questioned need. Clarified.
BW:
Difference between Gatekeeper and KT? Ans.: Gatekeeper handles lifetimes, has
configuration and keying information.
SH:
Need to do the same analysis as above with respect to KT.
TK: Two
proposals are similar and may be missing some pieces, e.g., lifetimes and data
management. Can push much of Gatekeeper to KT.
TK: The
IKEv2 and KT designs need to be harmonized. Merge IKEv2 drafts. Specify
interface to keying material.
GL: Does
IKEv2 do the timing. Ans.: NO.
GL:
Interface with UI? [see Jabber log]
TK: If
this is all pushed into IKE, a lot of policy is needed. KT does not have policy
information, which IKEv2 needs.
GL: KT
is not the right place for IKE-specific policy information.
Multicast Router Key
Management Protocol, draft-hartman-karp-mrkmp-04 and draft-tran-karp-mrmp-01, Paulina Tran
See presentation slides.
Drafts
will be merged. A simplified state machine is now included.
GL:
Need one solution, not two. BW: Group KM is different.
BW and
RH: Had previous discussions on choosing key server. Key server may not be a
router. (GL: Or a router that is now acting just as a key server.)
MB:
Should be independent of the DR.
SH:
Analysis of state 1 is questionable.
Key Management and
Adjacency Management for KARP-based Routing Systems, Bill Atwood
See presentation slides.
SK:
Identifiers exist in the BGP (including I-BGP) sense.
GL: This
is good for the pairwise key case. See Jabber log.
Time
ran out.