



Authentication Context QC Statement

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


The use case and problem

- User identities and user authentication is managed through SAML assertions.
- Some applications need certificates that are issued on the basis of a SAML assertion (or other approved authentication technique)
- The SAML attribute profile and the certificate attribute profile is NOT an exact match (e.g. due to RFC 3739 requirements)
- Users of the certificate need the underlying SAML authentication context
- **HOW STORE IT IN THE CERT?**



Authentication Context




Use Case

Electronic Signatures

Authentic Swedish e-gov use case


- Users don't have PKI credentials
 - OTP tokens
 - Mobile credentials (e.g. Google authenticator)
 - Etc
- The infrastructure needs user's electronic signature
- A central signing service generates user PKI credentials based on SAML assertions
- The relying party trust the SAML federation and understands the federation attribute profile
- The relying party needs to compare user ID in certs with user ID in SAML assertions

Central Signing Service



Signing process

1. Generate keys and certificate
2. Sign
3. Destroy private key
4. Send signature info



Current solution

new QC Statement (RFC 3739)

```
AuthContextQCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {  
    authContextType      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,  
    authContext          AuthContext }
```

```
AuthContext ::= SEQUENCE {  
    contentType          PrintableString,  
    authContextInfo      IA5String }
```

- contentType holds a mimeType
- authContextInfo stores base64 encoded data.
 - JSON, XML, DER etc

Demo



<https://eid2csp.3xasecurity.com/login/>

Use Idp named: Testbädd Referens Idp

User name: vlindeman

Password: hemligt

Alternatives

- Why not store the whole SAM Assertion in the cert?
 - Exploding the size of a cert
 - Includes information we may not want to reveal to the public
 - Relying party system is often SAM unaware
 - Note that you CAN store a full SAML assertion using current structure (But you don't have to)
- Why use a typed hole?
 - There will always be a use case we never thought about
 - Standardizing the data content will require an extremely complex structure to meet all possible needs
 - Local context need to decide data format (XML, JSON, DER etc)

Way ahead

- Could this merit an amendment to RFC 3739?
- Should it go into a new extension?
- Is there a better solution out there?



Questions Comments



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