

XMPP E2E

IETF 83

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Current Status

- New ideas, new document
- Using work from ~~JOES WOES~~ JOSE

Big Ideas

- Encryption for multiple end-points
- Request content keys when needed

Discovering Support

- CAPS (XEP-0115)
- supported if any resource announced e2e

Encrypting ...

- Start with stanza
- Wrap with `<forwarded/>`
- Serialize to UTF-8

... Still Encrypting ...

- Generate block cipher factors
- `encData == BlockCipher(cek, fwdStr)`
- Package as partial JWE
 - no public key use (yet)

... Encrypted!

- Package into container
 - stanza with matching kind + type + addressing
 - `<e2e/>` child
 - ✓ 'id' to associate CEK
 - ✓ `<header/>` for JWE header
 - ✓ `<data/>` for encrypted data

Decrypting ...

- if key is known ...
 - continue
- if key is ***NOT*** known ...
 - GOTO “Keyreq”

... Still Decrypting ...

- fwdStr == BlockCipher(cek, encData)
- stanza parsed and unwrapped from UTF8

... Decrypted!

- Validated via JOSE (AEAD | MAC)
- Timestamp from <forwarded/>
- Others?

Making a Keyreq

- `<iq type='get'/>` to sender
 - 'id' for CEK
 - PK(s)
- sender accepts/rejects

Accepting a Keyreq

- Encrypt CEK using provided PK
- `<iq type='set'/>` to requester
 - `<header/>` with JWE header (key info)
 - `<cek/>` with encrypted CEK

Denying a Keyreq

- Requester does not match bare JID of recipient (or sender)?
- Certificate does not validate?
- Other ... ?

Open Issues

- Optimize for known PKs
- CEK usage
- No offline
- Signing ...

Side Benefits

- PK operations spread out
- Compatible with MUC (maybe)

Caveat Emptor

- Trust issues?
- Potential for keyreq floods
- Stanza info not completely protected

References

JSON Web Encryption (JWE)

<[draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption](#)>

XEP-115: Entity Capabilities

<[http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0115.html](#)>

XEP-0297: Message Forwarding

<[http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0297.html](#)>