MILE Working Group T. Takahashi
Internet-Draft NICT
Intended status: Standards Track K. Landfield
Expires: August 16, 2013 McAfee
T. Millar
USCERT
Y. Kadobayashi
NAIST
Feb 12, 2013
IODEF-extension to support structured cybersecurity information
draft-ietf-mile-sci-06.txt
Abstract
This document extends the Incident Object Description Exchange Format
(IODEF) defined in RFC 5070 [RFC5070] to exchange enriched
cybersecurity information among cybersecurity entities and facilitate
their operations. It provides the capability of embedding structured
information, such as identifier- and XML-based information.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Extension Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. IANA Table for Structured Cybersecurity Information . . . 4
4.2. Extended Data Type: XMLDATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Extended Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.1. AttackPattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.2. Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.3. Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.4. Scoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.5. Weakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.6. EventReport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3.7. Verifcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.8. Remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Mandatory to Implement features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Transport-Specific Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Appendix I: XML Schema Definition for Extension . . . . . . . 18
10. Appendix II: Candidate Specifications for the IANA Table . . . 23
11. Appendix III: An XML Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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1. Introduction
The number of cyber attacks is growing day by day, and incident
information needs to be reported, exchanged, and shared among
organizations in order to cope with the situation. IODEF is one of
the tools enabling such exchange, and is already in use.
To efficiently run cybersecurity operations, these exchanged
information needs to be machine-readable. IODEF provides a
structured means to describe the information, but it needs to embed
various non-structured such information in order to convey detailed
information. Further structure within IODEF increases IODEF
documents' machine-readability and thus facilitates streamlining
cybersecurity operations.
On the other hand, there exist various other activities facilitating
detailed and structured description of cybersecurity information, as
listed in Section 10. Since such structured description facilitates
cybersecurity operations, it would be beneficial to embed and convey
these information inside IODEF document.
To enable that, this document extends the IODEF to embed and convey
various structured cybersecurity information, with which
cybersecurity operations can be facilitated. Since IODEF defines a
flexible and extensible format and supports a granular level of
specificity, this document defines an extension to IODEF instead of
defining a new report format. For clarity, and to eliminate
duplication, only the additional structures necessary for describing
the exchange of such structured information are provided.
2. Terminology
The terminology used in this document follows the one defined in RFC
5070 [RFC5070].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Applicability
To maintain cybersecurity, organization needs to exchange
cybersecurity information, which includes the following information:
attack pattern, platform information, vulnerability and weakness,
countermeasure instruction, computer event log, and the severity.
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IODEF provides a scheme to describe and exchange such information
among interested parties. However, it does not define the detailed
format to describe such information.
On the other hand, there already exist structured and detailed
formats for describing those information and facilitating such
exchange. Major of them are listed in Section 10. By embedding them
into the IODEF document, the document can convey more detailed
contents to the receivers, and the document can be easily reused.
These structured cybersecurity information facilitates cybersecurity
operation at the receiver side. Since the information is machine-
readable, the data can be processed by computers. That expedites the
automation of cybersecurity operations
For instance, an organization wishing to report a security incident
wants to describe what vulnerability was exploited. Then the sender
can simply use IODEF, where an XML [XML1.0]-based attack pattern
record that follows the syntax and vocabulary defined by an industry
specification is embedded instead of describing everything in free
format text. Receiver can identify the needed details of the attack
pattern by looking up some of the XML tags defined by the
specification. Receiver can accumulate the attack pattern record in
its database and could distribute it to the interested parties if
needed, without needing human interventions.
Another example is that, when an administrator wishes to check the
configuration of host computers in his organization, he may send a
query to host computers, which may automatically generate XML-based
software configuration information upon receiving thequery by running
a software and may embed that to an IODEF document, which is then
sent back to the administrator.
4. Extension Definition
This draft extends IODEF to embed structured cybersecurity
information by introducing new classes, with which these information
can be embedded inside IODEF document as element contents of
AdditionalData and RecordItem classes.
4.1. IANA Table for Structured Cybersecurity Information
This extension embeds structured cybersecurity information defined by
the other specifications. The list of supported specifications is
managed by IANA, and this draft defines the needed field for the
list's entry.
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Each entry has namespace [XMLNames], specification name, version,
reference URI, and applicable classes for each specification.
Arbitrary URIs that may help readers to understand the specification
could be embedded inside the Reference URI field, but it is
recommended that standard/informational URI describing the
specification is prepared and is embedded here.
The initial IANA table has only one entry, as below.
Namespace: http://xml/metadataSharing.xsd
Specification Name: Malware Metadata Exchange Format
Version: 1.2
Reference URI: http://standards.ieee.org/develop/
indconn/icsg/mmdef.html
Applicable Classes: AttackPattern
The table is to be managed by IANA using the Expert Review [RFC5226]
and Specification Required [RFC5226] allocation policies as further
specified in Section 7.
The SpecID attributes of extended classes (Section 4.3) must allow
the values of the specifications' namespace fields, but otherwise,
implementations are not required to support all specifications of the
IANA table and may choose which specifications to support, though the
specification listed in the initial table needs to be minimally
supported, as described in Section 5. In case an implementation
received a data it does not support, it may expand its functionality
by looking up the IANA table or notify the sender of its inability to
parse the data by using any means defined outside the scope of this
specification.
4.2. Extended Data Type: XMLDATA
This extension inherits all of the data types defined in the IODEF
model. One data type is added: XMLDATA. An embedded XML data is
represented by the XMLDATA data type. This type is defined as the
extension to the iodef:ExtensionType [RFC5070], whose dtype attribute
is set to "xml."
4.3. Extended Classes
The IODEF Incident element [RFC5070] is summarized below. It is
expressed in Unified Modeling Language (UML) syntax as used in the
IODEF specification. The UML representation is for illustrative
purposes only; elements are specified in XML as defined in Appendix
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A.
+--------------------+
| Incident |
+--------------------+
| ENUM purpose |<>---------[IncidentID]
| STRING ext-purpose |<>--{0..1}-[AlternativeID]
| ENUM lang |<>--{0..1}-[RelatedActivity]
| ENUM restriction |<>--{0..1}-[DetectTime]
| |<>--{0..1}-[StartTime]
| |<>--{0..1}-[EndTime]
| |<>---------[ReportTime]
| |<>--{0..*}-[Description]
| |<>--{1..*}-[Assessment]
| |<>--{0..*}-[Method]
| | |<>--[AdditionalData]
| | |<>--[AttackPattern]
| | |<>--[Vulnerability]
| | |<>--[Weakness]
| |<>--{1..*}-[Contact]
| |<>--{0..*}-[EventData]
| | |<>--[Flow]
| | | |<>--[System]
| | | |<>--[AdditionalData]
| | | |<>--[Platform]
| | |<>--[Expectation]
| | |<>--[Record]
| | |<>--[RecordData]
| | |<>--[RecordItem]
| | |<>--[EventReport]
| |<>--{0..1}-[History]
| |<>--{0..*}-[AdditionalData]
| | |<>--[Verification]
| | |<>--[Remediation]
+--------------------+
Figure 1: Incident class
This extension defines the following seven elements.
4.3.1. AttackPattern
An AttackPattern consists of an extension to the
Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The
extension describes attack patterns of incidents or events.
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It is recommended that Method class SHOULD contain one or more of the
extension elements whenever available.
An AttackPattern class is structured as follows.
+------------------------+
| AttackPattern |
+------------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING AttackPatternID |<>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
+------------------------+
Figure 2: AttackPattern class
This class has the following attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that
specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information.
The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed
in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private"
is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not
listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data
formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the
value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that
specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information.
When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be
"private."
AttackPatternID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an attack
pattern to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever
such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements
MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them
MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.
The AttackPattern class is composed of the following aggregate
classes.
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. A complete document that is
formatted according to the specification and its version
identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used,
writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by
SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are
consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be
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prefered, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can
correct the problem.
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element
allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured
information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData
element.
Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of software platform involved
in the specific attack pattern, which is elaborated in
Section 4.3.2.
4.3.2. Platform
A Platform identifies a software platform. It is recommended that
AttackPattern, Vulnerability, Weakness, and System classes contain
this elements whenever available.
A Platform element is structured as follows.
+----------------------+
| Platform |
+----------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING PlatformID |
+----------------------+
Figure 3: Platform class
This class has the following attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
PlatformID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a platform to be
reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier
is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be
used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be
used if this attribute is omitted.
This class is composed of the following aggregate classes.
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RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. The meaning of this element is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. The meaning
of this element is the same as that of the AttackPattern class
(Section 4.3.1).
4.3.3. Vulnerability
A Vulnerability consists of an extension to the
Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The
extension describes the (candidate) vulnerabilities of incidents or
events.
It is recommended that Method class SHOULD contain one or more of the
extension elements whenever available.
A Vulnerability element is structured as follows.
+------------------------+
| Vulnerability |
+------------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING VulnerabilityID |<>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
| |<>--(0..*)-[ Scoring ]
+------------------------+
Figure 4: Vulnerability class
This class has the following attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
VulnerabilityID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a
vulnerability to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used
whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference
elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while
either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.
This class is composed of the following aggregate classes.
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RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. The meaning of this element is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. The meaning
of this element is the same as that of the AttackPattern class
(Section 4.3.1).
Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of software platform affected
by the vulnerability, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.2.
Scoring: Zero or more. An indicator of the severity of the
vulnerability, such as CVSS and CCSS scores, which is elaborated
in Section 4.3.4. Some of the structured information may include
scores within it. In this case, the Scoring element SHOULD NOT be
used since the RawData element contains the scores. If a reader/
receiver detects scores in both RawData and Scoring elements and
their inconsistency, it SHOULD prefer the scores derived from the
RawData element, and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can
correct the problem.
4.3.4. Scoring
A Scoring class describes the scores of the severity in terms of
security. It is recommended that Vulnerability and Weakness classes
contain the elements whenever available.
A Scoring class is structured as follows.
+----------------------+
| Scoring |
+----------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>---------[ ScoreSet ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |
+----------------------+
Figure 5: Scoring class
This class has two attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
This class is composed of an aggregate class.
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ScoreSet: One. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted
according to the specification and its version identified by the
SpecID/ext-SpecID. This element includes a set of score
information. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST
ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the
one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the
namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be prefered, and the
inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.
Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and version
identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of the
Score; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD
prefer the specification name and version derived from the content,
and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.
4.3.5. Weakness
A Weakness consists of an extension to the
Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The
extension describes the weakness types of incidents or events.
It is recommended that Method class SHOULD contain one or more of the
extension elements whenever available.
A Weakness element is structured as follows.
+----------------------+
| Weakness |
+----------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING WeaknessID |<>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
| |<>--(0..*)-[ Scoring ]
+----------------------+
Figure 6: Weakness class
This class has the following attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
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WeaknessID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a weakness to be
reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier
is available/ Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used
when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if
this attribute is omitted.
This class is composed of the following aggregate classes.
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. The meaning of this element is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. The meaning
of this element is the same as that of the AttackPattern class
(Section 4.3.1).
Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of software platform affected
by the weakness, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.2.
Scoring: Zero or more. An indicator of the severity of the
weakness, such as CWSS score, which is elaborated in
Section 4.3.4.
4.3.6. EventReport
An EventReport consists of an extension to the
Incident.EventData.Record.RecordData.RecordItem element with a dtype
of "xml". The extension embeds structured event reports.
It is recommended that RecordItem class SHOULD contain one or more of
the extension elements whenever available.
An EventReport element is structured as follows.
+----------------------+
| EventReport |
+----------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING EventID |
+----------------------+
Figure 7: EventReport class
This class has the following attributes.
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SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
EventID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an event to be
reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier
is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be
used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be
used if this attribute is omitted.
This class is composed of three aggregate classes.
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. The meaning of this element is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. The meaning
of this element is the same as that of the AttackPattern class
(Section 4.3.1).
This class MUST contain at least one of RawData or Reference
elements. Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and
version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of
the RawData; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD
prefer the specification name and version derived from the content,
and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.
4.3.7. Verifcation
A Verification consists of an extension to the
Incident.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The extension
elements describes incident on vefifying incidents.
A Verification class is structured as follows.
+----------------------+
| Verification |
+----------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING VerificationID|
+----------------------+
Figure 8: Verification class
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This class has the following attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
VerificationID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an check item
to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such
identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST
NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST
be used if this attribute is omitted.
This class is composed of two aggregate classes.
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. The meaning of this element is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. The meaning
of this element is the same as that of the AttackPattern class
(Section 4.3.1).
This class MUST contain at least either of RawData and Reference
elements. Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and
version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of
the RawData; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD
prefer the specification name and version derived from the content,
and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.
4.3.8. Remediation
A Remediation consists of an extension to the Incident.AdditionalData
element with a dtype of "xml". The extension elements describes
incident remediation information including instructions.
It is recommended that Incident class SHOULD contain one or more of
this extension elements whenever available.
A Remediation class is structured as follows.
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+----------------------+
| Remediation |
+----------------------+
| ENUM SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |<>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| String RemediationID |
+----------------------+
Figure 9: Remediation class
This class has the following attributes.
SpecID: REQUIRED. ENUM. The meaning of this attribute is the same
as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
ext-SpecID: OPTIONAL. STRING. The meaning of this attribute is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
RemediationID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a remediation
information to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used
whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference
elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while
either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.
This class is composed of two aggregate classes.
RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. The meaning of this element is the
same as that of the AttackPattern class (Section 4.3.1).
Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. The meaning
of this element is the same as that of the AttackPattern class
(Section 4.3.1).
This class MUST contain at least either of RawData and Reference
elements. Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and
version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of
the RawData; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD
prefer the specification name and version derived from the content,
and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.
5. Mandatory to Implement features
The implementation of this draft MUST be capable of sending and
receiving the XML conforming to the specification listed in the
initial IANA table described in Section 4.1 without error.
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The receiver MUST be capable of validating received XML documents
that are embedeed inside that against their schemata. Note that the
receiver can look up the namespace in the IANA table to understand
what specifications the embedded XML documents follows.
6. Security Considerations
This document specifies a format for encoding a particular class of
security incidents appropriate for exchange across organizations. As
merely a data representation, it does not directly introduce security
issues. However, it is guaranteed that parties exchanging instances
of this specification will have certain concerns. For this reason,
the underlying message format and transport protocol used MUST ensure
the appropriate degree of confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity for the specific environment.
Organizations that exchange data using this document are URGED to
develop operating procedures that document the following areas of
concern.
6.1. Transport-Specific Concerns
The underlying messaging format and protocol used to exchange
instances of the IODEF MUST provide appropriate guarantees of
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The use of a
standardized security protocol is encouraged. The Real-time Inter-
network Defense (RID) protocol [RFC6045] and its associated transport
binding [RFC6046] provide such security.
The critical security concerns are that these structured information
may be falsified or they may become corrupt during transit. In areas
where transmission security or secrecy is questionable, the
application of a digital signature and/or message encryption on each
report will counteract both of these concerns. We expect that each
exchanging organization will determine the need, and mechanism, for
transport protection.
7. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemata
[XMLschemaPart1] [XMLschemaPart2] conforming to a registry mechanism
described in [RFC3688].
Registration request for the IODEF structured cybersecurity
information extension namespace:
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URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0
Registrant Contact: Refer here to the authors' addresses section
of the document.
XML: None
Registration request for the IODEF structured cybersecurity
information extension XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-sci-1.0
Registrant Contact: Refer here to the authors' addresses section
of the document.
XML: Refer here to the XML Schema in the appendix of the document.
This memo creates the following registry for IANA to manage:
Name of the registry: "IODEF Structured Cyber Security Information
Specifications"
Namespace details: A registry entry for a Structured Cyber
Security Information Specification (SCI specification) consists
of:
Namespace: A URI [RFC3986] that is the XML namespace name used
by the registered SCI specification.
Specification Name: A string containing the spelled-out name of
the SCI specification in human-readable form.
Reference URI: A list of one or more of the URIs [RFC3986] from
which the registered specification can be obtained. The
registered specification MUST be readily and publicly available
from that URI.
Applicable Classes: A list of one or more of the Extended
Classes specified in Section 4.3 of this document. The
registered SCI specification MUST only be used with the
Extended Classes in the registry entry.
Information that must be provided to assign a new value: The above
list of information.
Fields to record in the registry: Namespace/Specification Name/
Version/Applicable Classes.
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Initial registry contents: none
Allocation Policy: Expert Review [RFC5226] and Specification
Required [RFC5226].
The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the mile (Managed
Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group or its successor if any
such WG exists (e.g., via email to the working group's mailing list).
The Designated Expert is expected to retrieve the SCI specification
from the provided URI in order to check the public availability of
the specification and verify the correctness of the URI. An
important responsibility of the Designated Expert is to ensure that
the registered Applicable Classes are appropriate for the registered
SCI specification.
8. Acknowledgment
We would like to acknowledge Mr. David Black from EMC, who kindly
provided generous support, especially on the IANA registry issues.
We also would like to thank Jon Baker from MITRE, Paul Cichonski from
NIST, Panos Kampanakis from CISCO, Robert Martin from MITRE, Kathleen
Moriarty from EMC, Lagadec Philippe from NATO, Shuhei Yamaguchi from
NICT, Anthony Rutkowski from Yaana Technology, Brian Trammel from
CERT/NetSA, and David Waltermire from NIST for their sincere
discussion and feedback on this document.
9. Appendix I: XML Schema Definition for Extension
The XML Schema describing the elements defined in the Extension
Definition section is given here. Each of the examples in Section 11
should be verified to validate against this schema by automated
tools.
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10. Appendix II: Candidate Specifications for the IANA Table
This draft defined the structure of the IANA table in Section 4.1.
Though the management of the table is up to IANA, this appendix
provides candidate entries. Note that OVAL and CVE are registered
trademarks, and CAPEC, CCE, CEE, CPE, CWE, CWSS, MAEC, and OCIL are
trademarks, of The MITRE Corporation.
1. CAPEC 1.6
Namespace: http://capec.mitre.org/observables
Specification Name: Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
Version: 1.6
Reference URI: http://capec.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: AttackPattern
2. CCE 5.0
Namespace: http://cce.mitre.org
Specification Name: Common Configuration Enumeration
Version: 5.0
Reference URI: http://cce.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: Verification
3. CCSS 1.0
Namespace: N/A
Specification Name: Common Configuration Scoring System
Version: 1.0
Reference URI: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html
#NIST-IR-7502
Applicable Classes: Scoring
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4. CEE 1.0 alpha
Namespace: http://cee.mitre.org
Specification Name: Common Event Expression
Version: 1.0 alpha
Reference URI: http://cee.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: EventReport
5. CPE 2.3 Language
Namespace: http://cpe.mitre.org/language/2.0
Specification Name: Common Platform Enumeration Reference
Version: 2.3
Reference URI: http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/cpe/,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html
#NIST-IR-7695
Applicable Classes: Platform
6. CPE 2.3 Dictionary
Namespace: http://cpe.mitre.org/dictionary/2.0
Specification Name: Common Platform Enumeration Dictionary
Version: 2.3
Reference URI: http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/cpe/,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html
#NIST-IR-7697
Applicable Classes: Platform
7. CVE 1.0
Namespace: http://cve.mitre.org/cve/downloads/1.0
Specification Name: Common Vulnerability and Exposures
Version: 1.0
Reference URI: http://cve.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: Vulnerability
8. CVRF 1.0
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Namespace: http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.0
Specification Name: Common Vulnerability Reporting Format
Version: 1.0
Reference URI: http://www.icasi.org/cvrf
Applicable Classes: Vulnerability
9. CVSS 2.0
Namespace: http://scap.nist.gov/schema/cvss-v2/1.0
Specification Name: Common Vulnerability Scoring System
Version: 2
Reference URI: http://www.first.org/cvss
Applicable Classes: Scoring
10. CWE 5.0
Namespace: N/A
Specification Name: Common Weakness Enumeration
Version: 5.1
Reference URI: http://cwe.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: Weakness
11. CWSS 0.8
Namespace: N/A
Specification Name: Common Weakness Scoring System
Version: 0.8
Reference URI: http://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/
Applicable Classes: Scoring
12. MAEC 2.0
Namespace: http://maec.mitre.org/XMLSchema/maec-core-2
Specification Name: Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization
Version: 2.0
Reference URI: http://maec.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: EventReport, AttackPattern
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13. OCIL 2.0
Namespace: http://scap.nist.gov/schema/ocil/2.0
Specification Name: Open Checklist Interactive Language
Version: 2.0
Reference URI: http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/ocil/,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html
#NIST-IR-7692
Applicable Classes: Verification
14. OVAL 5.10.1 Definitions
Namespace: http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5
Specification Name: Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
Version: 5.10.1
Reference URI: http://oval.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: Verification
15. OVAL 5.10.1 Results
Namespace: http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-results-5
Specification Name: Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
Version: 5.10.1
Reference URI: http://oval.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: Verification
16. OVAL 5.10.1 Common
Namespace: http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-common-5
Specification Name: Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
Version: 5.10.1
Reference URI: http://oval.mitre.org/
Applicable Classes: Verification
17. XCCDF 1.2
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Namespace: http://checklists.nist.gov/xccdf/1.2
Specification Name: Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
Version: 1.2
Reference URI: http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/xccdf/,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html
#NIST-IR-7275-r4
Applicable Classes: Verification
11. Appendix III: An XML Example
This section provides an example of an incident encoded in the IODEF.
This do not necessarily represent the only way to encode a particular
incident. This example reports an attack to a CSIRT and is extended
from the example described in [RFC5070]. It uses identifiers whose
dictionary follows CVE 1.0 schema, and it aembeds XML following CEE
0.6.
1894932001-09-13T23:19:24+00:00Incident report in company xxAn identifier of a vulnerability is embeddedExample.com CSIRTexample-comcontact@csirt.example.com
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192.0.2.200
57
192.0.2.16/28
802001-09-13T18:11:21+02:00a Web-server event recordsystem.example.comauthapplication12310loginappwebsuccess
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2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00Notification sent to
constituency-contact@192.0.2.200
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident
Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
December 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC6045] Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)",
RFC 6045, November 2010.
[RFC6046] Moriarty, K. and B. Trammell, "Transport of Real-time
Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages", RFC 6046,
November 2010.
[MMDEF] IEEE ICSG Malware Metadata Exchange Format Working Group,
"Malware Metadata Exchange Format".
[XML1.0] Bray, T., Maler, E., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C., and
F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth
Edition)", W3C Recommendation, November 2008.
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[XMLschemaPart1]
Thompson, H., Beech, D., Maloney, M., and N. Mendelsohn,
"XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition",
W3C Recommendation, October 2004.
[XMLschemaPart2]
Biron, P. and A. Malhotra, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes
Second Edition", W3C Recommendation, October 2004.
[XMLNames]
Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., Tobin, R., and H.
Thomson, ""Namespaces in XML (Third Edition)",
W3C Recommendation, December 2009.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC3339] Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the
Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008.
[RFC6116] Bradner, S., Conroy, L., and K. Fujiwara, "The E.164 to
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation
Discovery System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)", RFC 6116,
March 2011.
[CAPEC] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC)".
[CCE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Configuration Enumeration
(CCE)".
[CCSS] Scarfone, K. and P. Mell, "The Common Configuration
Scoring System (CCSS)", NIST Interagency Report 7502,
December 2010.
[CEE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Event Expression (CEE)".
[CPE] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Common
Platform Enumeration", June 2011.
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[CVE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Vulnerability and Exposures
(CVE)".
[CVRF] ICASI, "Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF)".
[CVSS] Peter Mell, Karen Scarfone, and Sasha Romanosky, "The
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Its
Applicability to Federal Agency Systems".
[CWE] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE)".
[CWSS] The MITRE Corporation, "Common Weakness Scoring System
(CWSS)".
[OCIL] David Waltermire and Karen Scarfone and Maria Casipe, "The
Open Checklist Interactive Language (OCIL) Version 2.0",
April 2011.
[OVAL] The MITRE Corporation, "Open Vulnerability and Assessment
Language (OVAL)".
[SCAP] Waltermire, D., Quinn, S., Scarfone, K., and A.
Halbardier, "The Technical Specification for the Security
Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2",
NIST Special Publication 800-126 Revision 2,
September 2011.
[XCCDF] David Waltermire and Charles Schmidt and Karen Scarfone
and Neal Ziring, "Specification for the Extensible
Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) version
1.2 (DRAFT)", July 2011.
Authors' Addresses
Takeshi Takahashi
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
4-2-1 Nukui-Kitamachi Koganei
184-8795 Tokyo
Japan
Phone: +80 423 27 5862
Email: takeshi_takahashi@nict.go.jp
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Kent Landfield
McAfee, Inc
5000 Headquarters Drive
Plano, TX 75024
USA
Email: Kent_Landfield@McAfee.com
Thomas Millar
US Department of Homeland Security, NPPD/CS&C/NCSD/US-CERT
245 Murray Lane SW, Building 410, MS #732
Washington, DC 20598
USA
Phone: +1 888 282 0870
Email: thomas.millar@us-cert.gov
Youki Kadobayashi
Nara Institute of Science and Technology
8916-5 Takayama, Ikoma
630-0192 Nara
Japan
Email: youki-k@is.aist-nara.ac.jp
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