

85th IETF @ Atlanta

IS-IS ESN TLV

draft-chunduri-isis-extended-sequence-no-tlv-03

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IETF 85, Atlanta, GA Nov 4-9, 2012 85th IETF @ Atlanta



IS-IS ESN TLV

Problem Briefly described in

• Sec. considerations section of [RFC5304]

Sec 3.1 - "This mechanism does not prevent replay attacks; however, in most cases, such attacks would trigger existing mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol that would effectively reject old information."

• [RFC5310]

Sec 4- "The mechanism detailed in this document does not protect IS-IS against replay attacks. An adversary could in theory replay old IIHs and bring down the adjacency [CRYPTO]...."

OPSec WG [RFC6039]

Sec 4.2 "IS-IS does not provide a sequence number. IS-IS packets are vulnerable to replay attacks; any packet can be replayed at any point of time. So long as the keys used are the same, protocol elements that would not be rejected will affect existing sessions."



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Brief Recap

Presented in 83rd IETF Paris

Problem??

- Replay attacks with IS-IS protocol messages to create churn in the networks
 - \checkmark discussed briefly in the draft and also in
 - ✓ Section 2.3.1 of

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-chunduri-karp-is-is-gap-analysis-03

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Background & Recap

- IS-IS is not only restricted to few Tier-1 ISP backbones but..
- Has been adopted widely in various L2 and L3 routing deployment of the data centers for critical business operations.
- Continue to being adopted in various "forms" of SDN, where messages are directly being sent to the nodes



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How?

• IIH

- ADJ flaps in broadcast by replying empty neighbor list (TLV 6)
- SNP
 - Can mount DoS attacks by sending old CSNP/PSNP packets
 - The above two are most important and easy to protect

LSP

- Already protected from intra session replay attacks with header seq. no
- But still vulnerable for inter session attacks
 - Existing recovery applicable in some cases



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Solution

ESN TLV

- IIH

- SNPs

- LSPs (for inter-session replay prevention) ESN TLV (Type – IANA TBD)

3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Length Extended Session Sequence Number (High Order 32 Bits) Extended Session Sequence Number (Low Order 32 Bits) (optional) Packet Sequence Number (32 Bits) ESSN → Starts with non-zero and incremented in PSN wrap scenario, session refresh, cold restarts etc.. PSN → Incremented per packet (only applicable for IIH and SNPs)

Further details in:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-chunduri-isis-extended-sequence-no-tlv-03



Partial Deployment

- Gradual deployment in the network without requiring a flag day
- Can be deployed for the links in a certain area of the network where the maximum security mechanism is needed, or it can be deployed for the entire network

IIH & SNPs:

- When the router software is upgraded to include this feature, one can configure the IS-IS to 'send' the ESN TLV
- When all the routers attached to the link or links have been upgraded with this feature, network operators can start to configure 'verify' on the IS-IS interfaces for all the routers sharing the same link (s)



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Partial Deployment (Contd.)

LSPs

- This feature has to be done for the entire IS-IS area or levels with in the same flooding domain.
- The deployment and upgrade to support ESN TLV
 - can be gradual and
 - from node to node.
- Provision 'Send' in the network. No 'verify' is enabled until all the routers in the entire IS-IS area/level or entire network is upgraded
- In the face of active attack it is recommended that provisioning of 'verify' SHOULD be done in a timely fashion by the network operators from first node to the last node (with out much delay).



Questions & Comments?

Thank You!



Backup Material

(LSP inter session replay attack)



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Inter Session Replays - issues with LSP



- After Restart/upgrade/failure LSP Sequence number get's back to previous value
 - "if rest of the network has it's old copies" i.e., the nodes come back online before the refresh time

Existing Recovery

- Once replay reaches to the actual node
 - it quickly (?) updates the sequence number and floods
 - Traverse all the way to the actual node, processing in the node, flooding the entire network...

Key Q?

- Can a node after upgrade/out-of-service brought-in before network age out it's LSPs ?
- Can an accepted reply is not being processed before it get's the updated LSP ?
 - Think of FC timers on all the nodes where replay is being processed
- Damage depends on
 - Change in the LSP content in the replays
 - This can potentially happen to any node and any LSP fragment
 - And every time all nodes are impacted

Discussed in Section 2.3.1 of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-chunduri-karp-is-is-gap-analysis-03