The pNFS NFS-Objects Layout

IETF-85 Atlanta, GA 2012-11-08

Benny Halevy <bhalevy@tonian.com>

Background

- The proposed NFS-Objects layout is based on the pNFS Objects layout (RFC5664)
- It reuses the Objects layout:
 - Flexible, per-file striping patterns,
 - Client-side object-based RAID,
 - Centralized security model
- And adds NFS as:
 - A storage-access protocol and
 - Basic back-end control protocol
 - Like the way T-10 OSD is currently being used

History

- RFC5664 defines the pNFS Objects Layout
- Ratified Jan. 2010
- RFC5664bis underway contains minor technical errata

Motivation

- Use an ubiquitous, standard protocol to access the data servers
 - The T10 OSD protocol, although standard, lacks wide adoption, while NFS is very popular and widely available
- Encourage best-of-breed solutions
 - Relying on NFS as the basic back-end control protocol allows one to mix and match a metadata server and data servers from different vendors

Use Cases

- Aggregation of standalone NFS servers
 - Customers heavily invested in NFSv3 filers, looking to reuse their legacy filers as data servers in a clustered configuration
- Exporting of existing clustered file system
 - For example: Ceph, Gluster
 - These file systems do not have a standard storage access protocol. Therefore NFS can be used instead

Use Cases (2)

- Flexible, per-file striping patterns
 - Application SLAs and management policies as well as dynamic load balancing and tiering decisions require per-file control over striping
 - Existing clustered FSs do not map to the files layout striping patterns

Security Model

- A simple security control method is proposed:
 - The metadata server controls the file ownership and permissions of the objects
 - Client is handed a corresponding RPC credential on LAYOUTGET a-la OSD capabilities
 - Outstanding credentials are unilaterally revoked by the MDS by modifying the objects user or group owner
- Data Servers should be configured to allow root access only to MDS

Security Considerations

- pNFS files layout provides tighter security and DS-based access enforcement (client fencing)
 - By using a proprietary back-end control protocol
- Block layout (RFC5663) has no such mechanism and respective caveats are documented there
- Objects layout (RFC5663) provides robust security and client fencing model using T-10 OSD
 - But lacks global state to enforce e.g. mandatory locking

Security Considerations (2)

- Advisory security mechanism: NFSv3 can be used to simulate the basic object capability model using a per-file rpc credentials handed out to clients as a naive RO or RW capability
- Mandatory security mechanism: NFSv4 and RPCSEC GSS can be used for authentication and authorization
- **Global State**: Support for back-end protocol a-la files layout is possible
 - OPEN at MDS, client is handed out a stateid to use.
 - For the mix-and-match design goal it is required to be a (IETF) standard