Negative Trust Anchors (refer to -06 version)

DNSOP WG

IETF 86

March 2013

DNSSEC Validation Is Good

Except when it fails. Then people get angry. Very angry.



NTA What!?

- Sometimes DNSSEC signing domains mess things up a bit operationally…
- Some blame the validators, and have a hard time understanding it's an authoritative issue.
  - "It resolves just fine with ShinyCloudFreeDNS+ but not with you guys!"
  - "I'm switching to a non-validating resolver. DNSSEC stinks! No security for me!"

Open Questions

- Q: Should this be a DNSOP WG draft?
- Q: Should this be Informational or a BCP?
- Q: Should we recommend that an individual NTA be time limited?
  - “Reasonably short period of time”
  - 1 month or less
  - 1 week or less
  - 1 day or less
  - Is this a MUST or a SHOULD?
- Q: How do we (or should we) assess when critical DNSSEC deployment mass has been achieved so that this is no longer a common practice?
- Q: Is it desirable to say that NTAs should not be distributed across organizational boundaries?



For the Next Version

- Add examples in an appendix (as suggested by Warren Kumari and Rick Lamb)
- Other incremental improvements
- Address issue raised by Olafur Gudmundsson on whether a non-validatable RRSIG should be returned or not when a NTA is in place.



Anything Else?