

# BGP operations and security

draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security-01.txt

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# Goals

- Describe BGP security **best practices** for the Internet
- **Synthesis** of many existing pieces available (Cymru, RIPE, many IETF docs, some well known pages...)
- **Help** smaller AS'es build secure and stable BGP networks
- Have **consistent** recommendations / best practices
- **IP version agnostic** (IPv4 and IPv6)

# What's covered: the basics

- Control-plane protection (ACL or CoPP)
- BGP session protection (TTL, MD5, TCP-AO),  
reference to KARR

# What's covered: prefix filters

- Default routes
- Special addresses per IPv4 and IPv6 special purpose address registries
- Unallocated addresses (IANA and RIR-based)
- RPKI
- Too specific prefixes (descriptive)
- IXP subnets (with examples)

# What's covered: prefix use cases

## Use cases

- **Full routing networks:** filters with peers, upstreams and customers
- **Leaf networks**


## Filters described:

- Inbound and outbound filters
- Loose or strict filters

# What's covered: AOB

- BGP **Route Flap Dampening** (don't)
- **Maximum prefixes** per peering/BGP neighbor (just recalling it's an observed best practice without recommending any particular thing)
- **AS-path filters** (including customer-facing filters) **Clarification that exceptions could occur upon ASN migration**
- **Next-hop filters** (or next-hop enforcement)
- BGP **community scrubbing**

# BGP next hop filters



- BGP updates can have 3<sup>rd</sup> party next hop
- Good for optimal traffic flow, bad on IXP LAN
  - Problem#1 – Traffic redirection
  - Problem#2 – Blackholing (invalid next hop)
- **Solution:** change BGP next-hop to peer's IP address with inbound policy

# Changes between opsec-01 and -00

- Obsolete RFC2385 moved from normative to informative reference
- Clarification of preference of TCP-AO over MD5
- Mentioning KARP efforts in TCP session protection section
- Removing reference to SDR working-group but instead give reference documents
- Better dissociating origin validation and path validation to clarify what's potentially available for deployment
- Adding that SDR mechanisms should be implemented in addition to the other ones mentioned throughout this document
- Added a paragraph about ASN renumbering for AS-PATH filtering
- Change of security considerations section to clarify what's not covered
- Added the newly created IANA IPv4 Special Purpose Address Registry instead of references to RFCs listing these addresses



# Conclusion and next steps

- Great feedback received so far!
    - Lot of support and many contributions received
    - THANK YOU !!
    - **Read, Review & Comment!**
  - Read the document @  
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security/>
  - **Conclusion of WGLC**
    - Need to spread the widest possible audience
    - Quick presentations in SIDR, GROW and IDR WG during this IETF to gather maximum feedback
  - Discuss on IETF OPSEC WG mailing list @  
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec>
- ➔ Questions ?