

Two JW* Issues

Background

- I did a full, detailed review of the docs
- Chairs asked that these two be discussed
- More issues coming soon



Two Issues

1. Public key formats
2. COMSEC requirements for jku/x5u

Key Formats

EC + RSA

- EC keys are points on elliptic curves
 - Two coordinates from a finite field
 - Finite field can be “binary-like” or “integer like”
- RSA keys are sets of large unsigned integers

RSA Format (current)

- It is represented as the `base64url` encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation **MUST NOT** be shortened to omit any leading zero octets.
- `n = 0x04030201` could be encoded as `0x00000000000000004030201`

RSA Format (issues)

- Developer-hostile: If I try to check the length of the key without decoding it, I could think it's longer than it is.

```
• if (jwk.n.length > 342)
  {
    /* It's at least
       a 2048-bit key */
  }
```

RSA Format (issues)

- Incompatible with base64 padding removal:
RSA keys can be any number of bits long,
not just a multiple of 8
- So if you strip the base64 padding, you
don't know how long the key is

RSA Format (proposed)

- It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The array representation MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the value.
- If the length of the modulus is not a multiple of 8, then it MUST be padded to the nearest multiple of 8 with leading 0 bits.
- (That is, make “n” the same as “e”)

EC Format (current)

- The "x" (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence.

EC Format (issues)

- Lots of ambiguities here (e.g., what is the “big-endian representation” of a finite field element?)
- The “SEC1” format is the most common standard for EC points
 - CMS, TLS, IPsec, X.509
 - ANSI X9.62, FIPS 186-2, IEEE 1363
- Let’s just use that!

EC Format (proposed)

- {
 "key": "EC",
 "crv": "P-256",
 "pt": base64([0x04] || X || Y)
}
- Allow compressed / uncompressed?

URI COMSEC

Gedankenexperiment

- Suppose the certificate referenced by an x5u is issued by a major CA
- Do I need to use TLS for the HTTP query I use to get this certificate?
- ...?

Gedankenexperiment

- Suppose the certificate referenced by an x5u is issued by a major CA
- Do I need to use TLS for the HTTP query I use to get this certificate?
- **No! The certificate is self-protecting**

URIs (current)

- The protocol used to acquire the resource **MUST** provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the JWK Set **MUST** use TLS; the identity of the server **MUST** be validated.

URIs (issues)

- The need for TLS in this case is highly application dependent
- Some applications do need TLS
- JW* should say “this signature is valid under \$KEY, which is associated to \$DATA”
- It’s up to the application to decide whether \$DATA is enough to authenticate \$KEY

URIs (proposed)

- The protocol used to acquire the resource SHOULD provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the JWK Set SHOULD use TLS. If TLS is used, the identity of the server MUST be validated.

Proposal Summary

- Key Formats
 - Use “SECI” EC point format
 - Require RSA parameters to be octet strings with no leading zeros
- URIs
 - Change TLS MUST to SHOULD