DTLS Relay for Constrained Environments

draft-kumar-dice-dtls-relay

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Use case: Secure Network Access

- **draft-jennings-core-transitive-trust-enrollment**
- *Joining Devices* only have initial trust (keying material) with a *Trust Agent*



- *Device-3* is multi-hop away from the controller.
  - Can only communicate with link neighbors
  - No IP routing yet for point-to-point connection with *Transfer Agent*
- Similar issues with raw-public key based pairing of controller and devices multi-hop away

Motivation



- DTLS is chosen security solution for CoAP: beneficial for constrained devices if it can be also re-used for the "joining device" authentication
- Perform DTLS authentication handshake from a non-IP routable *Joining Device* to *Transfer Agent (*or *Controller).*
- Once authenticated, keys or key management messages can pass through the secure session tunnel (**out-of-scope** for now and should be addressed in a broader context)

Proposed solution

- An already authenticated device in the network acts as a **relay** to forward messages between the *Joining Device* and the *Trust Agent/Controller*.

- Two cases:
  - Address is known by the *Joining Device.* E.g. during manufacturing
  - Address is not known by the *Joining Device* but known to the *relay.* E.g. in raw public-key case
- Relay can either maintain state or can be stateless

Stateful Relay with unknown address

IP_C:p_C = IP (non-routable) and port of Client
IP_S:5684 = IP and coaps port of end Server
IP_Ra:5684 = IP (link-local) and coaps port of Relay
IP_Rb:p_Rb = IP and the port of Relay

Relay stores table {IP_C, p_C, p_Rb}



Stateless Relay with unknown address

IP_C:p_C = IP (non-routable) and port of Client
IP_S:5684 = IP and coaps port of Server
IP_Ra:5684 = IP (link-local) and coaps port of Relay
IP_Rb:p_Rb = IP and the port of Relay

DRY(Header,Content) – DTLS RelaY message for encapsulation



Other issues

- Need to prevent Denial-of-Service attacks from malicious unauthenticated nodes
  - Policies in the Relay to (dis)allow relaying of such messages
  - Policies can be sent by the controller to all devices

- Should DRY be DTLS message or in another layer?
  - Should the DRY headers be secured?

Summary

- DTLS Relay mechanism in nodes to enable *end-to-end* DTLS session for *Joining nodes*

- Enables re-use of existing security protocols on constrained devices in LLNs to also enable network access.

- Further define security mitigation for DoS and DRY headers

Questions?