

DTLS Profile for IoT

draft-hartke-dice-profile

IETF 88

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DICE Charter

“The first task of the working group is to define a DTLS profile that is suitable for Internet of Things applications and is reasonably implementable on many constrained devices.”

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Profile Applicability

- Communication Model
- Threat Model
- Security Requirements
- Classes of Devices
- Trust Model
- ...

Cipher Suites

- Specific Cipher Suite(s)

vs.

Cryptographic Agility

- Server Authentication

vs.

Mutual Authentication

- X.509 Certificates

vs.

Raw Public Keys

vs.

Pre-Shared Keys

- Perfect Forward Secrecy

- ...

Extensions

- Signature Algorithms
[RFC5246]
- Server Name Indication
[RFC6066]
- Maximum Fragment Length
[RFC6066]
- Certificate Status Request
[RFC6066]
- Truncated HMAC
[RFC6066]
- Supported Elliptic Curves
[RFC4492]
- Supported Point Formats
[RFC4492]
- Application Layer Protocol
[I-D.ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg]
- Cached Info
[I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info]
- Session Resumption without
Server-Side State [RFC5077]
- Snap Start
[I-D.agl-tls-snapstart]
- Renegotiation Indication
[RFC5746]
- Heartbeat
[RFC6520]
- ...

Other

- Compression
- Renegotiation vs. Reconnection
- Session Resumption
- Replay Protection
- Timer Values
- Certificate Revocation
- Encrypt-then-MAC [I-D.gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac]
- Hash Algorithm
- ...

Implementation Considerations

- Version negotiation
 - [I-D.pettersen-tls-version-rollback-removal]
 - [I-D.bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv]
- ...

Next steps

- Same understanding of a DTLS profile?
 - Are any aspects out of scope?
 - Do additional aspects need to be included?
- Many choices depend on the usage scenario
 - Can we identify a single profile or should we aim for a (small) family of profiles?
- Identify the profile elements
 - Can we already identify DTLS functionality that is/isn't useful to have in any scenario?
 - E.g., compression