DMM Requirements draft-ietf-dmm-requirements

H. Anthony Chan, h.a.chan@ieee.org; Dapeng Liu, liudapeng@chinamobile.com; Pierrick Seite, pierrick.seite@orange-ftgroup.com; Hidetoshi Yokota, yokota@kddilabs.jp; Jouni Korhonen, jouni.korhonen@nsn.com; Charles E. Perkins, charliep@computer.org; Melia Telemaco, telemaco.melia@alcatel-lucent.com; Elena Demaria, elena.demaria@telecomitalia.it; Jong-Hyouk Lee, jh.lee@telecom-bretagne.eu; Kostas Pentikousis k.pentikousis@huawei.com; Tricci So, tso@zteusa.com; Carlos J. Bernardos, cjbc@it.uc3m.es; Peter McCann,
PeterMcCann@huawei.com; Seok Joo Koh, sjkoh@knu.ac.kr; Wen Luo, luo.wen@zte.com.cn; Sri Gundavelli sgundave@cisco.com; Marco Liebsch, liebsch@neclab.eu; Carl Williams, carlw@mcsrlabs.org; Seil Jeon, seiljeon@av.it.pt; Sergio Figueiredo, sfigueiredo@av.it.pt; Stig Venaas, stig@venaas.com; Luis Miguel Contreras Murillo, Imcm@tid.es; Juan Carlos Zuniga, JuanCarlos.Zuniga@InterDigital.com; Slexandru Petrescu, alexandru.petrescu@gmail.com; Georgios Karagiannis, g.karagiannis@utwente.nl; Julien Laganier, jlaganier@juniper.net; Wassim Michel Haddad, Wassam.Haddad@ericsson.com; Dirk von Hugo, Dirk von Hugo, Dirk.von-Hugo@telekom.de; Ahmad Muhana, amuhanna@awardsolutions.com; Byoung-Jo Kim, macsbug@research.att.com; Hassan Aliahmad, hassan.aliahmad@orange.com

Issue tracker status

- Issue tracker: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/dmm/trac/ query?
 status=new&status=assigned&status=reopened&co mponent=requirements
- All 40 tickets closed right after Berlin meeting in version 08



Version 09 (September 28 2013)

- Resolved additional email comments in August 2013
- Requirements does not restrict whether to distribute or centralize in the control plane
- Included individual draft on prefix coloring

Version 10 (November 7 2013)

- Resolved new email comments in November
- REQ1 is revised
- Motivation of REQ6 on Security consideration is shortened

Next step

Backup

Version 10 (November 7 2013)

♦ REQ1

IP mobility, network access and routing solutions provided by DMM MUST enable distributed processing for mobility management so that traffic can avoid traversing single mobility anchor far from the optimal route.

Version 10 (November 7 2013)

REQ6 No change. Only shortened the motivation. Motivation: Various attacks such as impersonation, denial of service, man-in-the-middle attacks, and so on, may be launched in a DMM deployment. For instance, an illegitimate node may attempt to access a network providing DMM. Another example is that a malicious node can forge a number of signaling messages thus redirecting traffic from its legitimate path. Consequently, the specific node is under a denial of service attack, whereas other nodes do not receive their traffic. Accordingly, security mechanisms/protocols providing access control, integrity, authentication, authorization, confidentiality, etc. can be used to protect the DMM entities as they are already used to protect against existing networks and existing mobility protocols defined in IETF.